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T H E D E A T H O F A R T 
The Transformation of Art from a Religious Perspective 
Andreas Andreopoulos 
Abstract 
The hypothesis put forth in this dissertation is twofold. The first part is based on a 
view (supported by writers such as Hans Belting) that maintains that art lost its 
sacred character in the late Middle Ages, when art was emancipated from religion 
and the artist was recognized as an original Creator. The two first chapters examine 
this issue: 
The first chapter (A Religious View of the History of the Arts) discusses theories of 
religious art from the ancient Jewish drama and the Greek tragedy to the late Middle 
Ages. Psychological material, mostly drawn from Lacan and Jung, is used to explore 
the connection between art and religion in the East and the West. 
The second chapter (Anti-Leonardo) focuses on some important changes in the 
Renaissance which can be observed mostly in art, that have affected religious and 
social consciousness to date. 
The second part of the hypothesis is that contemporary philosophy and art, having 
witnessed the death of the author as it has been presented by writers such as Michel 
Foucault and Roland Barthes, are now registering the withdrawal of the work of art 
as an independent object, and the reversal of the Renaissance art paradigm. The 
withdrawal or "death" of the work of art and of art as a process are discussed in the 
third chapter (The Death of Art), which explores these issues in contemporary 
philosophy, and argues that contemporary art, popular and classical, is withdrawing 
as a distinct activity, giving its place to a growing religious awareness. 
The fourth chapter (The Religious Artist) examines the art and the views of some 
contemporary artists whose art expresses the return of the sacred. Particular emphasis 
is given to the art of the New Simplicity, an artistic trend that epitomizes the 
vanguard of art while expressing spiritual and religious contemporary concerns. 
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Introduction 
The present study was initially conceived a few years ago in Toronto, under 
the auspices of the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, University of Toronto. 
The path that led to its completion at the Theology Department of the University of 
Durham under Dr Andrew Louth, was long and tortuous. To be sure, no one would 
be more surprised than myself i f by any magical way I were to get a glimpse of the 
future back in 1994 or 1995, and see myself working in the field of Theology. From 
the beginning I knew that I did not know where the examination of art I was 
attempting would take me, but I had accepted the fact that something within me, a 
part of my thought hidden from my conscious self, claimed a deeper and clearer 
knowledge of my purpose, and would gradually lead me there. I could only place my 
trust in this something and accept the fact that this work would require more than 
academic dedication and systematic study. 
My approach to art was dual, and I had accepted this from the beginning. 
Working as a musician for the last ten years, I could not examine art only as a 
phenomenon of cultural importance; my direct experience was too strong to permit 
me to proceed in this manner. On the other hand, the practice of art experienced from 
the inside, whether it happened to be commercial or classical, proved to be a constant 
intellectual challenge for me, and it would often lead me to contemplate on the 
problems of contemporary art, the role of the artist and, generally, the function of art. 
Beyond my own experience as a musician, I was lucky enough, or rather privileged, 
to be surrounded by accomplished artists immensely better than me, who faced 
similar intellectual challenges in their work, and to be able to participate vicariously 
in their concerns, their problems and their insight. I am particularly indebted to Dr 
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Christos Hatzis, one of Canada's leading composers, who has been a close friend of 
mine for the better part of this decade. He has always been a forerunner in 
contemporary classical music, and allowed me access to the issues contemporary art 
is facing. A devout Christian, as well as an ever-inquiring mind, Dr Hatzis, having 
been raised in a pious Orthodox Christian environment, has never been satisfied to 
accept a spiritual compromise in his work, never content to accept the established 
norms without questioning, and his continuous exploration of the borders of his art, 
as well as its relation to a profound spirituality, has been something of a moral 
responsibility for him. An intellectual at the same time, currently teaching 
composition at the Faculty of Music, University of Toronto, he has always weighed 
his insight and his intuition against the bulk of the tradition of classical art and its 
academic discourse. I am grateful to have witnessed and been inspired by his 
remarkable artistic and academic quests. 
I should also mention here my late friend Charis Polatos, who died in a tragic 
car accident on the 8 t h of May 1992. A self-taught musician, who covered almost all 
genres of music with his extraordinary talent, Charis was showing to me why art 
matters, through his incessant exploration of the possibilities of art and his late 
orientation towards classical music. He did not have a direct connection to the 
academic artistic establishment, not even a formal musical training. Yet, he had an 
amazingly direct connection to art itself. Music for him was a language he knew 
extremely well, that gave him the ability to express anything, even feelings, concepts 
and ideas verbal language and thought does not have the vocabulary for, in a way 
that could be understood by everyone. In many ways, and although he died at the 
early age of thirty-seven, he is thought of as the father of a generation of musicians 
of mixed backgrounds - Greek, Chilean, Canadian and American - who lived and 
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worked in Toronto. For many years he was content to use the language of music in 
order to communicate with his friends and with the people who merely happened to 
frequent the places where he was working. Towards the end of his life though, and as 
he was approaching a deeper personal maturity, he started pondering the power of his 
gift. During the last few years of his life he educated himself in classical music and 
started composing. What was unique about him, and has immensely influenced my 
personal quest, was that his approach to the issues and the concerns of contemporary 
music and art was completely guileless; he was never interested in making a name 
for himself, and he never sought any kind of recognition for his many contributions. 
In a way I often think of Charis as a saint of art, and my poor attempt to understand 
and sketch the dimensions of his talent is not truly doing justice to his memory. 
The other path of inquiry, my academic development, was quite unusual. My 
undergraduate interests included studies in psychology and education, as well as a 
cinema studies program with a strong basis in semiotics. It was, perhaps, because of 
the combination of semiotics and psychology that my research methods to date 
resemble the methods of a psychoanalyst; it is quite difficult for me to accept things 
at face value, and I always feel compelled to analyze them further, to discover deeper 
meanings and hidden subtexts, and to attempt unexpected connections. In addition to 
this, my Master's degree brought me in further contact with postmodernist thought. 
At the time I had already attempted to integrate my artistic experience into my 
studies, and the person who was most helpful to me was Dr Ronald Silvers from the 
department of Sociology in Education, Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, 
himself a renowned scholar as well as an art photographer. I studied the "other side" 
of the critical approach to art with him, one that was mainly based on 
phenomenology. My discourse became more personal and more indebted to a 
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process of synthesis, but what was more interesting was that the act of writing itself 
evolved into an introspective research for me, as it was essential to acknowledge my 
personal biases or influences and then attack them or build upon them. How was all 
that possible through the study of art? 
The tension between my professional experience and my academic education 
was somehow beneficial for both, as they became something like testing ground for 
each other. I was facing every day most of the problems of contemporary art, both 
commercial and classical. Such a problem was the great question of the opposition 
between classical and commercial art and their respective answerability to a 
financially unstable society. Several state channels, such as arts councils, were called 
to fund and promote or deny any assistance and, occasionally, deny existence to 
contemporary classical art. Increasingly shrinking budgets in Canada and the USA 
placed the future of the support for the arts, and in some cases the arts themselves, in 
grave danger. This was a reality I witnessed daily as friends of mine and people I 
knew were losing their jobs from classical orchestras or state-supported ensembles, 
or were in dire financial straits because their work used to depend heavily on state 
grants which were being curtailed. It seemed it was increasingly difficult to be an 
artist. Larger scale phenomena were also showing the toll of contemporary life on the 
arts: certain arts organizations, music, opera and ballet companies could not cope 
with the new reality, and declared bankruptcy. On the other hand, how could it be 
possible to isolate the financial problems of the arts from a larger tumultuous 
economy that, recently, led to the reduction of the number of hospitals in Ontario, 
and toughened welfare regulations? Who could really decide whether the arts should 
live or die? 
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Popular commercial art, on the other hand, was facing entirely different kinds 
of problems. The commercial system itself is not threatened at all, in fact it is hard to 
say whether big corporations who control the arts industry, especially the music and 
movie industry, have ever before been so powerful. Popular art cannot be reduced to 
its commercial aspect that easily, however. The fact that it was able to sustain itself 
and thrive in difficult times is an indication of a corresponding genuine demand for 
it. The problem is that for many years, mostly because of its success and the 
commercial machine that supported it, popular art had remained conceptually 
stagnant. It had succumbed to the process of industrial planning to such a degree that 
commercial art, conforming to the formal criteria that allow the art industry to repeat 
a successful formula over and over in music, the movies and television - traditionally 
the most lucrative arts - is not necessarily genuinely popular anymore, at least not in 
the deeper meaning of the word. The only new thing of some artistic quality that I 
could see in recent popular art involved a postmodern exploration of classical arts 
and other cultures, such as Elvis Costello with Kronos Quartet and the Kurt Weil 
songs, or Peter Gabriel working with traditional musicians from all over the world 
for his Last Temptation score. Still, it was difficult to discern the driving force 
behind these experimentations, and to interpret contemporary popular culture as 
something more than a mechanical reflection of postmodernity. 
How was I to deal with the problem of the duality of culture? It was rather 
obvious to me that both classical and popular art had equally valid contributions to 
make. I had to understand more about their nature in order to understand what was 
happening to them. I chose to employ a gaze from without, corresponding to semiotic 
analysis, and a gaze from within, corresponding to phenomenology. Both routes 
finally led me to a psychoanalytic approach and methodology: first as the extension 
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of the examination of what is and how it relates to human nature, second as the 
introspective examination of my own motivation and my fascination with it. 
The methodological problem was quite difficult to deal with. By the time I 
attempted the first sketches of the study I had discovered and had come to accept two 
things: first that the study was a lot more unpredictable than I had initially 
anticipated and was transforming in front of my eyes as I was attempting to penetrate 
its elusive object, and second that my personal motives themselves had to be 
researched because they, although only gradually revealed to me, were more 
responsible for the study than any purely academic choices I had made. 
Art became more than an object of examination, it became a research method 
and a way of knowing. In many ways, as my experience showed me, a part of artistic 
communication takes place in the space of the unspeakable and the unnamable, 
codifying a kind of knowledge that eludes the systematic rational classification of 
oral and (especially) written speech. This is not that much evident in the 
representational arts, which can up to a point be analyzed in terms of symbols and 
allusions, it is even less evident in literature which relies largely on the subtle 
combinations of meaning and expression, because the very medium of those arts is, 
in both cases, dissectable, but it is quite different in music, which is the area my 
active rapport with art has mainly taken place in. Music, perhaps more than the other 
arts, cannot be interpreted in terms of ideas easily. Ultimately, every kind of musical 
rule or established tradition eludes rational analysis more easily than in, say, poetry, 
whose words can be mined for a symbolic meaning that can sometimes reveal 
rational structures. Claude Debussy used to say characteristically that the rules are 
not important in music, in fact there are no rules, what matters is only "pleasure". 
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As a professional musician I was intrigued by the success of a relatively new 
kind of music, which was usually grouped with new, and sometimes unusual - as in 
the case of the music of Hildegard von Bingen - recordings of medieval and early 
Renaissance music. The choir of the Benedictine monks of Santo Domingo de Silos, 
Gorecki's Symphony No 3, the music of Arvo Part and John Tavener, and also 
explorations of popular music into tradition (found for example in the music of Dead 
Can Dance, Ross Daly, Loreena McKennitt, etc.), have elicited a response that 
baffled music critics and academics. This emerging music culture is defined by a few 
things: a spiritual ambience, a very simple and unemotional, yet somehow intense 
quality of sound, and an occasional echo of distant, half-forgotten cultural memories, 
consisting of the use of medieval instruments, voice arrangements reminiscent of 
Byzantine or early Western choirs, references to medieval and early Renaissance 
sources of reference, etc. I was rather suspicious of the "spirituality" of this artistic 
generation, because it was initially grouped with the flaky Kitsch of the New Age 
(which I could perhaps see as an interesting sociological movement, but certainly not 
as an artistic one). It seems that professional musicians and music academics could 
not accept this music as easily as the audiences, and to a great degree they still 
cannot. I found this intriguing, especially as I became more familiar with the new 
music. Could it be possible that it was actually successful because it was religious? 
At the same time, the decline of the arts everywhere else, and my own 
bafflement about the answerability of art and the question of the existence of high 
culture in a world with great social problems, seemed to create a very interesting 
background for the new religious art. Here we are at a time of financial recession, 
when government support for the arts dried up, perhaps understandably so, yet out of 
nowhere a new kind of high art appeared, one that can support itself, and also address 
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some of the most profound questions that have appeared in mainstream art since the 
Middle Ages. The concept of the "death of art", as it is presented here, was 
formulated within my thought by this contrast. 
The "death of art" is a question and a proposed hypothesis. The premise 
behind it is based on the postmodern condition, as it is expressed in (the philosophy 
of) art: what we experience in the visual arts, literature, and music, is the end of the 
formal history of the arts. There is no solemn declaration of such an auspicious idea 
anywhere; it can be perhaps inferred from the discourse on postmodernity, the 
collapse of the "grand narratives" and the re-emergence of ethnic and religious 
traditions all over the world, found in the writings of philosophers such as Foucault 
and Lyotard, but it is not a point that has to be proven scientifically, at least as far as 
art is concerned. Art without geographical borders, the success of institutions and 
organizations such as WOMAD, that promote the influx of World music into 
Western culture, and many other examples can be observed daily. The notion of an 
artistic tradition that develops in a more or less linear fashion, not unlike science, 
even with occasional stimuli from another culture, has been practically abandoned. 
At the same time, "originality" has been reduced to a great degree to a choice among 
a number of cultural styles. Postmodernity in art is practically synonymous with wide 
eclecticism and a return of the traditional. A phenomenon of our time, it is absolutely 
possible and not surprising to see an Arab taxi driver in Paris or New York listening 
to Christian medieval hymns arranged with flamenco guitars or synthesizers, or 
perhaps with both. The end of formal history of art does not mean that there is no 
development in art whatsoever; it just means that the concept of art has been as 
distanced from the formal history that used to account for the shape and evolution of 
Western art, popular and classical, in the same way the Western concept of history 
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(starting with the Greeks and including Marxism) has been distanced from the 
postmodern relativism which opposes the identification of the development of the 
human species with the history of white educated men. 
I have to add here that there is a reason for the examination of medieval 
painting and contemporary music in this study. My initial interest and my first 
observations about the "death of art" came almost exclusively from the area of 
music. It would be fruitful to examine the other arts in this context as well, and this is 
one way to pursue the object of this study even further, but I think that music is a 
quite good example of the phenomenon of the death of art, perhaps because it can 
combine immense popularity with as sophisticated tradition as any of the fine arts, 
and thus cover the entire social spectrum. Issues such as the popular and the 
classical, as well as the sacred and the profane, can be observed very easily in 
contemporary music. On the other hand, the theory of sacred art can be found mostly 
in the history of representational arts, as well as in literature. Issues like the 
representation of God in the Jewish and the Christian tradition have repeatedly 
defined the role of sacred art. Trying to connect contemporary art with medieval 
sacred art, and music with iconography, was not without precedent: John Tavener 
and Ivan Moody very often refer to their musical works as "icons in sound", 
something that will be discussed in The Religious Artist, suggesting that there can be 
a common basis for music and painting, in a way that reveals their possibility to 
express the sacred. In many places of this study I have employed a psychological 
exploration, trying to find a common denominator in both arts. 
My academic question could be expressed simply as that: "What lies at the 
end of formal art history, which we are experiencing at the age of postmodernity?" 
And my hypothesis, born out of intuition, but also from the observation of, and 
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perhaps faith in the new religious classical culture, is: "The death of art as we know 
it, and its reincarnation as a spiritual practice." 
I felt I was lacking something in my academic approach. I could not approach 
spirituality as an uninvolved observer, and my profession as a musician made it more 
difficult for me to (want to) be "objective". I was familiar with the discourse of 
subjectivity within contemporary culture and criticism, perhaps even with its 
metaphysical extensions from a sociological and philosophical point of view, but, 
having been educated within a scientific academic framework that praises the 
objectivity of knowledge and the distance of the researcher from his object of study, 
save for some writings inspired by phenomenology, I had never expected my own 
subjectivity to enter the picture. My convictions, my social and moral responsibility 
as an artist, and my faith, were becoming part of what I was studying; spiritual art 
has no meaning without them. I discovered that I could not continue my study under 
my former academic guidelines. Sociology and philosophy could not easily provide a 
framework that would include the spiritual self. With the advice and encouragement 
of my former supervisor, David Booth, and my valuable friend and professor, Joyce 
Wilkinson, I decided to change the field of my study and continue my research in 
Theology. It is a choice I have never regretted. 
The shift to Theology would not mean that my academic methods would be 
radically changed. Theology was a safety valve for me, once I had realized that in my 
working hypothesis art is the transient and spirituality the timeless. I felt safer 
knowing that my arguments could be measured against the tradition of the study of 
the spiritual, and I felt freer knowing that I could extend my thought to the roots of 
our social and psychological background. Art in my research was becoming, as 
perhaps it was also the case with the new religious art, the pretext to enter something 
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much more important, which one could get to only by sacrificing what led one there: 
This is what the "death of art" stands for. 
A Religious View of the History of the Arts 
The origin of the arts can be traced in the Book of Genesis, where we read 
that Jubal, the son of Lamech, "was the ancestor of all those who play the lyre and 
the pipe".1 The other two sons of Lamech, Jabal and Tubal, invented herding and 
metalworking. The following chapter of the book of Genesis presents a genealogy 
after Adam that differs somewhat from the genealogy of chapter 4, and without an 
account of the introduction of the arts and crafts. Lamech was born six generations 
after Adam according to Genesis 4, and eight according to Genesis 5. Genesis 6 
presents the strange account of the Nephilim or Nephthalim who were born of the 
"daughters of the people" and the "sons of God". Admittedly, the canonical bible is, 
sometimes, quite confusing about the number of generations after Adam, but this 
does not diminish the power and the significance of the events it describes. As far as 
the introduction of the arts and crafts is concerned, and for the purposes of the 
present study the introduction of the arts specifically, we could wish to have some 
more information. For this reason we may examine other sources that describe those 
events with more details, perhaps giving more weight to their theological 
significance. 
According to an early source of Judeo-Christian history, the origin of art can 
somehow be related causally to the Fall of the angels. The pseudepigraphon Book of 
Enoch mentions that some dissident angels, led by Samiazaz, taught the arts and the 
sciences to the human race, a story that may correspond to the account of the descent 
of the "sons of God" into humanity, in Genesis 6. It was because of those actions of 
theirs that they were expelled from Paradise and subsequently became known as the 
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fallen angels. Art then, according to this story, was either an invention of Satan 
(although we do not have any proof for this argument, as those angels were at the 
side of God when they taught the arts to the people), or a present from God, 
something to make life on Earth easier after the expulsion from Paradise.2 This idea 
is corroborated by the other end of the religious human trajectory in this tradition, the 
Apocalypse of John. In one of the last eschatological stages, just before the marriage 
of the Lamb to the Woman, we are told that the "voice of the minstrels and the pipers 
and the musicians stops and will never be heard again."3 The entire story of the Fall 
and the creation of New Jerusalem in Heaven suggests something we could have 
suspected anyway, our present inability to accept the world in our present, imperfect 
condition, without a need for a parallel reality, such as the one provided by art. 
It is interesting to note, discussing the two events, that the participation of 
man in both cases seems secondary. In the first case it is the angels who take the 
initiative to reveal to the humans the secrets of heaven and earth, all sorts of 
knowledge including astronomy and sorcery, and in the second case the 
eschatological drama takes place in the realm of the divine, after the entirety of 
human history has been traversed. Should we take this as an indication of human 
volition as irrelevant in the birth of history or in the eschatological conclusion of 
humanity as a species? In that case one could argue that human history is a plaything 
between a benevolent God and a malevolent Devil, and man's actions make no 
difference whatsoever, especially when one considers theological problems such as 
the final aKOKatamcujiq and the possibility of forgiveness of the Devil. This 
argument could become even more perplexed in the light of the fundamental 
Christian doctrine of Evil as orsptjaig TOV ayadov or privatio boni, a result of sin. 
Actually the trajectory between the first and the last moment is almost entirely placed 
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at the hands of humanity, even i f it does not originate from within humanity, and the 
arts and sciences can be seen, from a theological perspective, as educational tools at 
the disposal of man, which can be used in order to fulf i l l his eschatology. Besides, 
we should not forget that the Apocalypse does not foreshadow the fate of humanity 
as a whole, but differentiates strongly between the fate of the just and the fate of the 
unjust, the ones who have worked towards their salvation, and the ones that have not. 
At any rate, the arts, regardless of their dubious origin and eschatology, are closely 
interrelated to both the conscious and the unconscious mind. Furthermore, they apply 
equally to the individual and to the collective. In this view it makes sense to treat the 
history of the arts as a metaphor (or as a symbolical procession) of human 
consciousness! It would then be useful to put aside the discussion of the theological 
implications of this issue for the moment and concentrate on the examination of the 
arts between the initial and the final moment of human history. 
It is fascinating to observe how the initial and the final boundary of human 
life on earth are connected with the existence, birth and death, of the arts. Regardless 
of whether we accept the arts as a result or a cause of the Fall of man or the Fall of 
the angels, we can be sure that they are of no use whatsoever in the paradisal state of 
existence. Moreover, the exclusion of art and artists from Paradise or Utopia is by no 
means particular to the Judeo-Christian religious tradition. Several classifications of 
the citizens of a state ascribe the artist a very low social standing. It is interesting to 
note that in a classification from sixth century Byzantium dividing the civilian part of 
society into ten groups, the artists (charioteers, actors, musicians) rank at the bottom, 
even below the servants and the useless (the old, the infirm and the insane)4 
Aristotle accepted, somewhat reluctantly, the usefulness of artists and artisans in his 
Politics, but refused to admit them as full citizens, whereas Plato in the Republic 
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banished them in principle from his ideal Utopian state, allowing for martial and 
religious art only. This example demonstrates, however, that even in the rational 
Greek tradition where the artists did not enjoy a very respectable status, there was an 
implicit distinction between religious art, as we would understand it today, and 
secular art. Religious rituals had little to do with the secular art of the time. 
In the Judeo-Christian tradition, on the other hand, the character and the 
function of the arts, was predominantly religious from the beginning. It would be 
interesting to divide this tradition into several stages and study the importance of art 
and its connection to religion in each stage. One should keep in mind, however, that 
a full analysis of the evolution of the arts in a religious context would be a titanic 
undertaking, worthy of a lifetime of study, and could certainly not be exhausted or 
developed in a single dissertation. What I hope to do in this chapter is to comment on 
certain instances where the artistic was particularly indebted, inspired or drawn by 
the religious, in an ontological rather than decorative manner. By no means the 
examples I present should be regarded as the only or the stronger ones vis-a-vis the 
ontological relationship of art and religion. I have tried, however, to select instances 
that correspond to characteristic stages in the development of art and of religious 
consciousness. Moreover, I have limited this analysis to the Judeo-Christian 
tradition, which was also influenced by Greek thought. In a more or less simplistic 
way, I tend to detect two contrasting modes in the religious feeling of an era or a 
people: one takes the universe as a place with two distinct realms with not much 
interaction between them, whereas the other accepts that the division between the 
tangible and the transcendental is more or less temporary, and not as prohibitive. 
This is very important for the study of art, because the distinction and union between 
two different realms is as much a question of religion as it is of art. The present 
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dissertation attempts to capitalize on this striking similarity between art and religion 
in various ways, whether what is discussed includes the physical and the 
metaphysical, left- and right-brain thought, Heidegger's Welt and Erde, or popular 
and classical art. 
Somewhat arbitrarily, and not always corresponding to historical truth, but 
certainly not without good reason, in this chapter I locate the first mode primarily 
within ancient Greek culture, where the pantheon of the Olympian gods was 
anthropomorphic to such a degree that it was far removed from what we could call 
metaphysical; especially within Platonic tradition, the realm of the gods does not 
necessarily coincide with the highest degree of existence. The 'Ev (One) of Plotinus is 
not at all anthropomorphic, and even i f it were, it would have to be thought of as a 
deus otiosus rather as a God-Father. 
Conversely, I identify the second mode with Jewish monotheism. The 
exclusive relationship of Yahweh with his people, but also the Messianic promise, a 
feature that is amplified even further in Christianity and its eschatology, express 
something completely different from the rigid division between the physical and the 
metaphysical of Greek culture. 
As noted above, this generalization has to be taken with a grain of salt, for the 
sake of the argument. The goal of this dissertation is to investigate the condition of 
contemporary art and its particular rapport with spirituality and religion, and the 
present chapter wishes to explore the archeology of religious art, examine some of 
the critical stages it has gone through, and perhaps contribute something to our 
contemporary understanding of art. It should not be taken as a presumptuous attempt 
to exhaust the study of the development of religious art. As discussed elsewhere, 
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{The Death of Art, The Religious Artist) art can work in two fundamentally opposite 
ways: it can either create little autonomous parallel universes or, in a function not 
essentially too different from the function of religion, it can attempt to transcend the 
fragmentation of the universe and assist us in bridging the gap between the two 
worlds. I think the two ways correspond to the two opposed ways of religious 
practice mentioned above, and this is why I used this generalization. 
Jews and Greeks 
In many ways Judaism is a tradition of the word. Representation of God is 
strictly prohibited, representation of other beings is, often, suspicious. The Torah is 
the word of God, and the Ten Commandments are the legacy of the Supreme Being 
given directly to the Jewish people. The Word of the Bible is what kept this people 
together through centuries of Diaspora. It would be possible to argue that the books 
of the Bible constitute a form of art, but the boundaries between artistic creation and 
pure history, or divine legislation, are unclear in most cases. What is more, rabbinic 
tradition attaches a symbolical meaning to the words that can be correctly interpreted 
only through the prism of theology. Nobody can deny the artistic dimensions of 
books like the Song of Songs, yet even what seems just another beautiful poem to the 
uninitiated, can assume immense symbolical extensions for the initiate. A short 
phrase from the Song of Songs, such as "Sustain me with raisins, refresh me with 
apples; for I am sick with love"5 may seem like an inspired verse of erotic poetry, 
with an aesthetic intent, to anyone not familiar with Jewish symbolism. It can have 
quite a few interpretations within the context of biblical exegesis, though: 
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a. Raisins, dried in the sun, stand for fire, heavenly and earthly. The verse 
"sustain me with raisins" connotes the fire above, the heavenly fire, and 
the fire below, the fire of the altar. 
b. The two fires refer to the fire of Torah in writing and the fire of Torah in 
memory. 
c. The raisins refer to many fires, the fire of Abraham, the fire of Moriah, 
the fire of the burning bush, the fire of Elijah, and the fire of Hananiah, 
Mishael and Azariah. 
d. The fires refer to the well-founded laws. 
e. "Refresh me with apples": the apples refer to the lore, the fragrance and 
taste of which are like apples. 
f. "For I am sick with love": Said the Congregation of Israel before the Holy 
One, blessed be he, "Lord of the world, all of the illnesses that you bring 
upon me are so as to make me more beloved to you." 
g. Or, in another interpretation, "Lord of the world, all of the illnesses that 
you bring upon me are because I love you." 
h. Another interpretation: "even though I am sick, I am beloved unto him." 6 
We see that what seems to be simply a Jewish literary tradition when 
approached from the outside, cannot be separated from its theological background. 
An aesthetic, or even a literal interpretation would be not only beyond the scope of 
the way this tradition explains itself, but it could be contrary to the real meaning of 
the verses, even blasphemous. 
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It is the primacy bestowed to spoken word over various modes of 
communication however, that led to its subsequent identification with thought and 
the withdrawal of all other ways of communication and senses to the domain of the 
arts. The word, as this brief example demonstrated, has multiple layers of religious 
significance. Yet, even the Jewish tradition which values so much the word and the 
book, does not start with it, but with what was the form of art par excellence in 
Greece and the Western world: theatre. 
One of the earliest biblical writers is known to us by the code name J 
(Jahvist). He wrote the core of Genesis, Exodus and Numbers,1 although today there 
is nothing in the Bible that we call The Book of J. It is generally accepted that The 
Book of J was written some time in the tenth century BC, by someone who lived at 
o 
the court of Solomon and that of his son and successor, Rehoboam of Judah. The 
Book of J is the first testimony of monotheism in religious history.9 There was no 
Bible at all until five or six centuries after J, and no Bible as we know it today until 
after yet another six centuries.10 What is particularly interesting for the present 
account is that The Book of J, as one of the earliest extant testimonies of the dawn of 
the Jewish nation, reveals, as some scholars argue, a ritual drama created by Joshua, 
the Moses Festival Play. Ritual plays may be traced in many ancient civilizations, 
including the Greeks, the Hittites, the Egyptians and the Canaanites. What makes the 
rituals of the Israelites extremely significant for us, however, is the central position 
of Yahweh, making them the first monotheistic rituals in history, with perhaps the 
exception of the cult of the sun in the court of Akhenaten; several writers suppose 
that there was a direct connection between them. The Israelites conquered Canaan c. 
1250 BC, but their rituals were not recorded until The Book of J, some 300 years 
later.11 The Book of J, as an ancient piece of writing, bears the traces of an oral 
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tradition, which was not yet divorced from dramatic action. In addition to the 
historical, cultural and religious importance it had for the ancient Jews, it also has to 
be acknowledged as a sophisticated work of art, that influenced deeply all subsequent 
Western art. 
It is especially important for the present study that the structure of The Book 
of J, which can be thought of as the earliest document of the Jewish religion, 
suggests that a kind of codified artistic practice was employed by the ancient Jews as 
the medium for religious meaning. This may be evident in other parts of the Bible as 
well, such as the Psalms, but the outstanding importance of The Book of J lies in its 
position in time. To realize the importance of The Book of J, we may compare it, or 
rather the ritual drama it reveals, with the Thespian drama of ancient Greece. In spite 
of their similarities, they have to be compared on the basis of how they developed 
over time: the former led to the Bible, the latter to theatre. 
Bloom presents J's Yahweh as a literary character comparable to 
Shakespeare's prime characters: 
Perhaps J and Shakespeare resemble one another most in the endless 
newness of their imaginative worlds. Despite Yahweh's curiosity and 
his power, his creatures are made free to invent and reinvent 
themselves constantly, and that is the law of being for Shakespeare's 
protagonists also.12 
Richard Courtney goes even further, although he acknowledges that certain 
Old Testament scholars rely more upon the subsequent writers P (Priestly Author) 
and R (Redactor) and deny the historical value of J. He is convinced, however, that 
modern scholarship (Courtney cites mostly Bloom and Vatwer) corroborate his 
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views. One of the latest overviews of the relevant literature, Ernest Nicholson's The 
Pentateuch in the Twentieth Century,14 presents most of the difficulties modern 
scholarship faces in its attempt to organize Biblical material, and it shows that while 
the view that takes J to be the oldest document of the Bible is generally accepted, it 
would be inaccurate to say that Old Testament researchers are unanimous on this 
issue. That may be so, but one has to keep in mind that Courtney is not only an 
academic writer, but also a dramatist; even i f the historical information concerning 
the Book of J \s questionable, its dramatic features, as identified by Courtney, are 
quite convincing: 
Dialogue - J's main style is dialogue {dramatic speech). Indeed, we 
could equally well describe Shakespeare's style in much the same way. 
Irony - J is the master of irony: the incongruity between [a] an event 
and [b] the effect of the adjacent words and actions - understood more 
by the audience or readers than by the characters. This is dramatic 
irony, as seen in playwrights as distant as Sophocles, Shakespeare and 
Synge. 
In other words, internal evidence indicates that The Book of J records 
the early Festival ritual drama of the Israelites.15 
Artistic practice at the time was not at the fringe of social or religious life or 
opposed to it in any way: it was the very way religion was practiced and the core of 
social life. This is the reason the discussion on Jewish symbolic poetry and the Book 
of J has been somewhat detailed. Here we have a coincidence of the artistic and the 
religious, which is not circumstantial: religion was initially expressed using the 
language of the arts. This moment of co-existence of art and religion is essential for 
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the later development of both. We can generally see that art belongs more to the 
religious rather than to the secular realm, the farther back we go in time. It is perhaps 
when a tradition or culture needs to define itself in contrast to another culture it 
comes in contact with that these balances are disturbed, something that can be said 
for the relationship of the Jewish and the Greek culture, as well as for the Christian 
and the Jewish. The Old Testament is full of images of singing and dancing, in 
contrast with the almost complete absence of such images from the New Testament. 
One reason for this must be that traditional art of the time was too closely related to 
the religious practice that underlay it; Christianity initially could not ignore this 
connection, just as it could not ignore circumcision and kosher food, yet it eventually 
forged its own distinct artistic language. 
We have to make here a far-reaching comparison between Jewish drama and 
Greek tragedy. Tragedy, according to the Aristotelian definition, is the "imitation of 
an action that is serious and also, as having magnitude, complete in itself... with 
incidents arousing pity and fear, wherewith to accomplish its catharsis of such 
emotions,"16 whereas the Jewish drama and its descendant, the Christian Mass, are in 
essence not a mere reenactment of any important historical or mythological events 
but a ritual reliving of the covenant with God, the celebration of the presence of God 
in the community. The tragedy provides a channel for catharsis of the "unclean" 
emotions of pity and fear; the viewers can subsequently return to their ordinary lives, 
having been freed of their heavy emotional luggage. The tragedy is therefore situated 
at the margins of social and religious life. The Jewish drama, on the other hand, 
reminds the participants of the continuously open channel between Heaven and 
Earth. The tragedy opens a window to the world of imagination, sometimes inspired 
by the divine space (especially in Aeschylus, less in Sophocles, even less in 
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Euripides), but not identified with it. Jewish ritual drama affirms the unity of human 
and divine space. This is very important in the comparison between the two genres, 
because the Jewish view postulates the notion of art as fundamentally connected with 
the religious practice, and the Greek view presents art as something that may 
emanate from religiosity but is embedded within the ethical rather than the religious 
mode. 
The key difference between Jewish and Greek art in our study, is the question 
of unity or separation between the present world and the divine realm. We must not 
forget that Greek cosmology followed a declining path, according to the five 
deteriorating ages described by Hesiod. The Jewish people, during the formative time 
of their religious system, on the other hand, had just been liberated from Egyptian 
rule, had been given the consciousness of a chosen nation, and were being constantly 
reminded that they were not alone, but always under the gaze of a strict yet loving 
father with an eschatological agenda for them. 
Further differences between Jewish and Greek art can be found in the 
representational art of the two civilizations. Representation of Yahweh is not 
possible, because the power of the image is such that it immediately evokes the 
represented. To utter the name of God, either in language or in painting and 
sculpture, is to invoke the presence of God. For Plato, on the other hand, art in 
general," including music and dance, is mimetic,17 whether the imitation reflects 
something of the visible world in a realist manner18 (in fact imitation has a central 
position in Platonic philosophy19), or whether it attempts to capture a glimpse of the 
ideal world. 2 0 Plato sees inspiration as a gift from God: "God takes away the mind of 
these men, and uses them as his ministers, just as he does soothsayers and godly 
seers, in order that we who hear them may know that it is not they who utter these 
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words of great price, when they are out of their wits, but that it is God himself who 
speaks and addresses us through them."2 1 There is a striking similarity between the 
Platonic poet and the Old Testament prophet here. Both receive their inspiration and 
their guidance from God, whether this is the Muse or Yahweh, but there is an 
important difference: "The Platonic Muse, being a true Greek god, does not know 
about love. Having touched the poet's mind in its ecstasy, she does not care about the 
further adventures of her message. The poet can only meet his god when being in an 
abnormal state, and this god leaves him as soon as he returns to sanity. So he is not 
only entirely left to himself as to the real meaning of the revelation, but his 
interpretation is a mere guess, because it refers to something fundamentally 
inaccessible to rational understanding. Accordingly, Plato admonishes his readers to 
distrust any interpretation of poetry."22 Yahweh, on the other hand, was speaking the 
truth, and was guiding his people through his prophets and through his Bible. 
Platonic and Neoplatonic philosophy posits, in general terms, a hierarchical 
order of the world. As is widely known, there are two levels of reality for Plato, the 
intelligible realm, TO votjrov, and the physical, sensible realm, TO opoxov or TO 
aiaOrjrov. The lower realm reflects the higher one, but other than that, there does not 
seem to be a lot of communication between the two worlds. Plato's divided line, as it 
is described in the sixth book of the Republic, is a quite static model, unlike the 
analogous models of the Neoplatonists, which saw two fundamental kinds of 
movement between the two worlds, an ascending and a descending one. In the 
Jewish tradition, on the other hand, God has a very personal relationship with his 
people - to the point of jealousy. The position of the gods of Olympus, towards 
which veneration is due, is quite problematic within Platonism; these gods seemed to 
be as susceptible to human passions as everyone else, and as such cannot possibly be 
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placed on the same metaphysical level as the intelligible realm. Zeus was certainly 
not the Great Creator, and he was not even credited with reigning at the age of 
prosperity. The gods of Olympus were rather ignored by the Platonic tradition, 
perhaps as not genuinely metaphysical beings, but were, nevertheless, expressing the 
dominant religious feeling. Yet, Plato and ancient Greek philosophy were much more 
interested in religious matters than the average citizen. The sociological dimensions 
of this issue suggest that everyday life and its problems had little to do with the 
metaphysical realm. Michel Foucault, commenting on life in ancient Greece and its 
meaning, wrote: 
What strikes me is that in Greek ethics people were concerned with 
their moral conduct, their ethics, their relations to themselves and to 
others much more than with religious problems. For instance, what 
happens to us after death? What are the gods? Do they intervene or not? 
- these are very very unimportant problems for them, and they are not 
directly related to ethics, to conduct.23 
The metaphysical realm was not at all remote in the very theistic, Jewish 
understanding of the cosmos, but it was rather continuously manifested in their 
everyday life, sometimes with very dire consequences. Communication between the 
two realms was possible: Yahweh was, quite obviously, a God who cared a great 
deal about the fate of the chosen people, and governed it through his prophets. 
Furthermore, two humans did what was unthinkable for even the gods of Olympus: 
Enoch and Elijah crossed over completely, with their bodies, to the metaphysical 
realm. The point is that whereas the structural center of religious practice for the 
Greeks was on the earth, at the most at the summit of Olympus, for the Jews it was in 
the world of the invisible. 
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The special position of art in Jewish tradition is underlined by the two 
aforementioned episodes at the beginning and the end of Judeo-Christian trajectory, 
in the books of Enoch and Apocalypse. It is rather clear that a fulfilled soteriology of 
any kind would not tolerate the existence of a parallel reality, such as the one 
postulated by Platonic imitation, as this would undermine the perfect status of the 
God-given (or re-instated) reality. For this reason we have to identify the difference 
between Greek tragedy and Jewish ritual drama as representative of the split between 
religious and secular art, which is still meaningful today. 
I think of Christian iconography primarily as a descendant of the Jewish 
rather than the Greek conception of art, although it has certainly assimilated 
characteristics from both. I make this differentiation for reasons that refer to the 
psychological rather than the formal debt of iconography to the two traditions, 
something that will be explained further shortly. There is, however, an archfeological 
find of the early twentieth century that broke our previously unquestioned certainty 
on what we thought the artistic views of the Jews of the third century AD were: the 
synagogue of Dura-Europos; found in 1932. 
The synagogue of Dura-Europos is something of a scandal within Jewish 
artistic and philosophical tradition, because it is decorated with visual representations 
from the Bible. Moses, Aaron, Jacob, and other figures are depicted in an 
unprecedented manner. Moreover, pagan figures, such as the figures of Ares 
supervising the Exodus from Egypt, or the three Nymphs guarding the infant Moses, 
blend with the traditional biblical characters. A cultural syncretism may be observed; 
many figures are represented with Persian or Greek clothes. 
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Dura-Europos is not the only site where such evidence of Jewish religious 
representations was found. A series of archeological discoveries in the 1930s 
unearthed similarly unexpected finds, which forced Jewish scholars to rethink their 
until then unquestionable belief in a Jewish iconoclasm. The remains of a sixth-
century synagogue from the community of Bet-Alpha were found in 1930, where, 
among other representations, there was a painting of the hand of God reaching down 
to Abraham. Furthermore, there is the less famous case of the second-century 
excavation of the city of Sephora in Palestine, which is also decorated with scenes 
from pagan mythology. Unfortunately, there is a gap in archaeological findings due to 
the persecution Jews suffered. The oldest extant synagogue, built in the eleventh or 
twelfth century, was destroyed by the Nazis,2 4 and our historical knowledge of the 
development of Jewish religious art is incomplete. 
It would not be prudent, however, to interpret such findings as conclusive 
proof that the use of religious paintings had been adopted by all or most medieval 
Jews. Modern scholarship is quite divided on that issue. Carl H. Kraeling saw the 
paintings of Dura-Europos as an expression of normative Judaism, directly 
influenced by the Targum and the Midrash in an "illustrative rather than definitive" 
way. 2 5 He reads Jewish religious paintings as a direct extension, rather than a 
O f t 
mystical interpretation, of the Jewish religious tradition. 
Erwin Goodenough, on the other hand, sees the paintings of Dura-Europos as 
a mystical interpretation of the Torah. In his view, the Babylonian Jews who built the 
synagogue were not participants in the "established traditions of Judaism",27 but they 
had formed something like a cultural ghetto, deeply influenced by the dominant 
Hellenistic culture, and they should not be taken as reflecting the ideas and practices 
of the Jewish world at the time. 
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Still, the location of the synagogue of Dura-Europos inside modern Syria 
makes the archeological discovery invaluable. Relatively outside the sphere of 
Hellenistic influence, Dura-Europos was very likely a synagogue of normative rather 
than Hellenistic Judaism. I f true, this is an important indication that normative 
Judaism had, indeed, accepted the use of images. 
What we can say with some certainty, is that the Hellenistic era saw the use 
of religious paintings both by Jews and Christians. Sister Charles Murray, examining 
the art of the early Christian Church,28 shows that the attitude of early Christians to 
religious paintings, once thought to be rather negative, is a quite complex affair, as 
well. A link, however, can be observed between Greek painting and Judeo-
Christianity. We must not forget that the early Christian era coincides with what is 
often regarded as the classical age in the development of Judaism. This is the time 
when Jews, having lost their state, their temple and priestly cult, defined the ritual 
life of Judaism, and when the most important postbiblical documents in law, lore and 
liturgy (Mishna, Talmud, Midrash, Siddur) were compiled;29 
It is interesting that this unclear position concerning religious painting, is 
shared by both traditions. It became possible to envision Christianity, a religious heir 
to Judaism, with an iconic background that, although Greek in origin technically 
speaking, included at least a portion of the Jewish tradition. This perhaps facilitated 
the appropriation of Greek painting by Christians. Certainly the possibility of the use 
of paintings was available to both religions. Goodenough's observation that the 
representation of Moses in Dura-Europos and the representation of Moses in Santa 
Maria Maggiore must have shared a common ancestor30 is noteworthy. 
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Icons: the Religious Art of the East 
Byzantine medieval art is usually seen through the perspective of the last few 
centuries of Western art and thought, that is, as an early stage of art that prepared the 
way for the Renaissance in the West, and ultimately, for modern art. Any persistence 
in the ways of medieval iconography at the present would be seen, from the point of 
view of modern art, an incomprehensible anachronism, or a particular religious 
activity that does not belong to art proper. 
We have to note here that the art of the Byzantine tradition was not limited to 
the Middle Ages, but survived mostly within the tradition of the Eastern Orthodox 
Churches. Iconography is as much an art of the twentieth century, as it was of the 
seventh. Its theory was developed in the Middle Ages, and its style has not changed 
much since then, at least compared with the rate of development of Western art. It 
would be a mistake however, to interpret this as an uncritical conservatism. 
Iconographers and critics as Photis Kontoglou and Leonid Ouspensky, whose 
writings have been used extensively in this chapter, keep reminding us that the icon 
is not out-dated as long as the basis of its art is the truth and the connection to the 
divine,, as understood within the Orthodox Church: the Church, in this way, 
guarantees the unity between medieval and modern iconography. Ouspensky's 
Theology of the Icon,31 an important source for this study, may contain many 
historical inaccuracies, but it expresses exquisitely the unity of vision, or what the 
icon intends to represent, within iconography. As we shall see later, it is impossible 
to separate this vision, which is informed almost exclusively by a theistic view of the 
world, from the iconographic style of all ages. The style of the icon is not a question 
of taste as it is understood in modern art; to make stylistic changes that do not 
correspond to the religious function of the icon would betray its sacred character, and 
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its function. Ultimately, this is a question of spiritual perspective. Iconography and 
Eastern religious tradition look back to the Middle Ages as a time of spiritual peak, 
the same time which for modern non-theistic West is known as the "Dark Ages". 
Characteristically, the modern Serbian iconographer Milich Stankovitch said "the 
Middle Ages are a bright phase of human history, when the problems of the world 
were solved with spiritual alchemy. I see the Middle Ages as a carrier of light, not 
darkness."32 Furthermore, we can add that Kontoglou and Ouspensky, as well as 
other iconographers, instigated a revival of tradition within contemporary 
iconography, trying to clear the Western influences that had found their way into it in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth century. This can be seen, among other places, in 
Kontoglou's criticism of the eighteenth century iconographic manual of Dionysios of 
Fourna, in Ekphrasis, his own iconographic manual.33 Modern secular painting has 
also been influenced greatly by this revival; Yiannis Tsarouchis, for instance, 
perhaps Greece's most well known contemporary painter, studied and worked for a 
few years with Kontoglou, and incorporated many iconographic elements into his 
own art. 
From an Eastern point of view the secularization of art would be 
incomprehensible for reasons that are understood only too well in the present age. 
The art of sacred icons, as we shall see in this section, connects the unconscious and 
the numinous in such a way that the presence of the divine is manifested or implied 
through it. The separation of the sacred from the psychological would mean, on a 
theological level, a further separation of man and God, something like a second Fall, 
and a fragmented aesthetic, where beauty is reduced to earthly, superficial, subjective 
or psychological beauty. This could be described in Platonic language as the cult of 
forms instead of the cult of ideas, or in psychoanalytic terms, the fixation on the 
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fetish displacing natural pleasure. For these and many other reasons, the 
secularization of art would seem an anomaly of the history of the arts, even as early 
as the late Middle Ages, an evolutionary line as it were, eventually destined to reach 
a dead end. These are, indeed, some of the problems of modern aesthetics. 
Hans Belting argues that art as we understand it today, "art as invented by a 
famous artist and defined by a proper theory",34 begins some time after the 
iconoclastic Reformation, although signs that point towards this direction can be seen 
much earlier. Icons in the West lost their sacred function, and art became the domain 
of the artist. The birth of art, or its separation from religion, brought about new ways 
of dealing with images, and new problems, a new raison d' etre: 
Aesthetic mediation allows a different use of images, about which artist 
and beholder can agree between themselves. Subjects seize power over 
the image and seek through art to apply their metaphoric concept of the 
world. The image, henceforth produced according to the rules of art and 
deciphered in terms of them, presents itself to the beholder as an object 
i: 
of reflection. Form and content renounce their unmediated meaning in 
favour of the mediated meaning of aesthetic experience and concealed 
argumentation.35 
In this section we shall explore the semiotics of the icon and its connection to 
a psychological and religious economy. The basic argument in this presentation is 
that since the integration of Jewish metaphysics and Greek philosophy in the 
Hellenistic era, since the advent of Christianity, art could only be formed according 
to the rules that defined iconography. The icon as the "mirror of God", a notion that 
will be explored in psychological terms and in patristic writings, is the par excellence 
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Christian art, and the deviation from the premises of iconography and sacred art is 
seen, from a religious point of view, as the exploration of a sterile path, which, as we 
shall see in the next chapters, is reaching its end. 
A Semiotic View of the Icon 
Byzantium inherited many cultural elements from both Judaism and the 
Greek world, and, despite indications that Judaism had shown some signs of 
compromise in its mostly iconoclastic practice, as in the case of the synagogue of 
Dura-Europos, the dichotomy between Greek (secular) and Jewish (metaphysical) art 
was passed on to the Christian era. I believe that the balance between the two modes 
favoured mostly the Jewish mode, at least in religious art. This would mean that 
although the technique of early Christian art was almost exclusively derived from 
Hellenistic art, its metaphysical basis was very much indebted to the Jewish concept 
of unity between Heaven and Earth, and this section describes exactly the liturgical 
and psychological function of the icon in a way that shows that it was the spiritual 
descendant of the Jewish mode, even i f it is also related to Greek art, formally and 
technically speaking. The existence of religious art is associated with a specific 
function to such a degree that we can say that the icon, for the most part, did not have 
the artistic aura of the Greek statue or painting, but, as a form of art, it was totally 
submitted to its religious function. The very title of a signal work examining the 
history of icons, Hans Belting's Likeness and Presence: A History of the Image 
before the Era of Art,36 accepts the unity of artistic and religious practice in the 
Middle Ages, in a way that made it impossible for the object of art to exist on its own 
merit as such, instead by virtue of the religious function it was assuming. 
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This is not to be taken as suggesting that art did not exist outside the religious 
realm in Byzantium, although we cannot really know what the ratio of religious and 
secular art was. Secular buildings that we know were heavily decorated, such as the 
Great Palace in Constantinople, were destroyed after the Ottoman conquest, to be 
replaced by buildings erected by the conquerors, whereas many churches did not 
share the same fate. We know of the existence of secular art, not only from the few 
surviving paintings, but also from the secular folk songs that date from the Byzantine 
years, some of which are still part of the living Greek tradition. Several secular 
paintings were said to exist in Byzantine monuments such as the arch of Milion that 
marked the starting point of the great highway running across the Balkan peninsula 
which was said to have representations of hippodrome scenes.37 Furthermore, 
according to an account of the time, the Emperor Theophilos put up secular paintings 
such as paintings of shields and weapons, animals, trees and men picking fruit in the 
imperial Palace itself.3 8 One should also not forget secular expressions of art such as 
the works of Efstathios Makrembolites and Theodoros Ptochoprodromos. The status 
of the secular artist and secular art altogether, however, was quite low in Byzantium, 
as it can be attested in a variety of sources, from Procopius' Secret History and his 
disparaging comments on the status of actors, to the aforementioned placement of the 
artists at the bottom of the social scale, and patristic texts such as the writings of St 
John Chrysostom39 that condemn theatre as a particularly lewd and indecent place. It 
would be wrong, however, to take this argument too far. Certain kinds of secular art 
were highly respected in Byzantium, architecture, for instance. It is only fair, after 
we have mentioned Procopius' Secret History, to mention one of his official works, 
On Buildings, where he describes a number of buildings erected by Justinian, whom 
he eulogizes on account of the buildings' beauty and usefulness. Secular art, 
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however, was at the fringes of artistic creation in Byzantium, at least as much 
aesthetic theory was concerned. The function of religious art needed to be defined in 
the iconoclastic period, and this is why we have an extensive body of a religious 
artistic discourse, while nothing like that ever needed to be done for secular art. The 
distinction between religious and secular art was known in Byzantium, as it can be 
seen as early as in the Seventh Ecumenical Council: 
This art [iconography] was not created by artists. On the contrary, it is a 
sanctioned institution and a tradition of the catholic Church... Only the 
artistic aspect of the work belongs to the artist; the institution itself is 
obviously dependent upon the Holy Fathers.40 
In a way that shows the liturgical connection of the icon to Jewish ritual 
drama, the icon is "not merely provoked or inspired by the liturgy: Together they 
form a homogeneous whole. The icon completes the liturgy and explains it, adding 
its influence on the souls of the faithful." 4 1 The implication of such statements is that 
the purpose of the icon is not aesthetic pleasure, at least not as we would mean it 
nowadays, but a quite specific function of visual communication aiming towards 
religious experience instead. Contemplation of an icon by the believer suggests a 
personal and profound practice that can be compared to liturgical practice and not to 
artistic enjoyment and appreciation. In that sense theology incorporates the study of 
beauty as a concept subject to theological doctrine. 
Indeed, the primary concern of the Byzantine artist was how to represent 
theology in a precise way that would reflect religious orthodoxy, a concern shared by 
modern iconographers in exactly the same way. The role of the icon as the gospel of 
the illiterate, demonstrated by sayings of Fathers like St Basil the Great "that which 
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the word communicates by sound, the painting shows silently by representation," or 
St Nilus of Sinai "the illiterate who are unable to read the Holy Scriptures may, by 
gazing at the pictures, become mindful" 4 3 is a recurring issue in patristic writings. 
The icon held its place in Byzantine religious tradition because of its meaning, which 
was an issue important enough to divide the Church for two centuries. Today we 
have two ways to approach this issue. One way is the historical examination of 
iconoclasm, as well as the icon and its discourse in the context of the iconoclastic 
wars. There is a second method, however, which could enable us to illuminate what 
was perhaps implicit, and therefore not articulated, at the time. An examination of 
the icon for what it is and what it can tell us itself, can go beyond historical 
information. A semiotic approach may reveal additional layers of meaning beneath 
the surface, and in this way we could approach the mysteries of iconography with the 
tools of contemporary understanding. Semiotic analysis can often enlist 
psychoanalysis and its techniques in order to give meaning to the discourse 
surrounding the examined object. It is quite fruitful, therefore, to examine the 
semiotic function of the icon and iconography, as well as the role of the Byzantine 
iconographer. 
•) 
Icons were usually not signed, it is only some time in the thirteenth century 
that we come across names of artists and patrons44 (in the Russian tradition icons are 
still not signed), and even when this happens, the most common way to sign is "Sid 
XEipoq..." (by the hand of.. .) . The implication is that it may be the hand of the 
painter that physically created the image, but it was the Holy Spirit that engendered 
it. The artist is only a medium of divine expression and not a creator in the modern 
sense. It is interesting to note that this attitude has survived to date in iconography. 
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This is an excerpt from a letter of one of the most famous contemporary Greek 
iconographers, Photis Kontoglou, to a young iconographer: 
Work with fear of God, keeping in mind that the Lord gave you the 
ability to fabricate His divine likeness, and the likeness of the 
Theotokos, the angels and the saints. A great and awesome 
undertaking! Those works are made with the grace of the Holy Spirit, 
and our hand becomes its instrument. This is why we sign 'By the 
hand' and not by our imagination or our own ingenuity. The more 
devout an artisan who entered the mystery of iconography is, the more 
fragrant of spiritual fragrance his works become.45 
This idea and its implications on the relationship between God and the artist 
is also expressed marvelously in an extract from the rule of the monastery of 
Kosmosoteira in Pherrai, Greece, written by Prince Isaac Komnenos: 
One can only praise the artist [xeyyovpyoq] who received from the first 
creator of the world [5r|uioupY6<;] the wisdom of painting.4 6 
How are the. .roles of the artist and the creator to be understood in relation to 
each other? Their distinction is seminal in our account, because artistic creation here 
does not appear to be independent of the work of God the Creator; it rather seems to 
intend to somehow participate in the work of God. This attitude not only expresses 
deep humility, as the artist acknowledges an absolute lack of personal vision, but it 
also can be traced in a theological and philosophical analogue to the teachings of St 
Paul, who, as Pierre Teilhard de Chardin noted,47 saw man as a participant in the 
work of Creation, which continues beyond the six days of the original Creation: 
"oiSauBV yap o n 7taaa rj KTIOIC; oruaxevd^ei KCU cn)vco5ivei &xpi TOV vuv." 4 8 The role 
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of the artist in this context is to assist God in the continuing creation according to His 
plan, rather than to become a creator in his own virtue. It would be quite accurate to 
say that the artist here works in the work of God, which can be seen as a spiritual 
quest or exercise rather than as a material undertaking. In that sense, the real artistic 
event takes place elsewhere, not on the surface of the icon, but rather in the soul of 
the iconographer or the viewer. 
The tradition of iconography, as it is still practiced today, views the 
production of an icon as an exceptionally spiritual action. The icon as a religious 
artifact that, as we shall see later is supposed to be a window between Heaven and 
Earth, does not only have a material side, but a spiritual one as well. A great part of 
what the icon is about therefore, is grounded in the invisible world, and the creation 
of an icon addresses its spiritual nature as well. An icon has to be inspired by the 
Holy Spirit: the famous modern iconographer, Photis Kontoglou, wrote a technical 
manual of iconography, discussing the materials used by the iconographer, choice of 
colours, traditional patterns of representation, etc., but he often reminds the reader 
(the book is written as i f to be read by a novice iconographer) that he has to pray for 
the assistance of God and the Holy Spirit often, to cross himself (some iconographers 
also fast before they begin a major work), and to keep in mind that the character of 
iconography is "liturgical and doctrinal",49 and it cannot be treated in the same way 
as secular painting. 
There is a short story, an old tale attributed to Rumi, the founder of the 
Mawlana dervishes, which describes a contest between Chinese and Byzantine 
painters, organized by a powerful Sultan. The two groups worked on different parts 
of the same wall, and a curtain separated them from each other. The Chinese painters 
emerged every now and then from their curtain, and demanded more colours and 
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more brushes, whereas the Byzantine painters were not seen at all. At the end of the 
contest, the curtain was removed and the Sultan admired the work of both teams, 
however he expressed his curiosity as to why the Byzantine painters had asked for 
nothing at all during the course of the contest. Their response was that they spent the 
better part of the contest cleaning the wall before they actually started painting. They 
meant that, according to the iconographic tradition, the Byzantine artist has to clean 
his soul before he paints.50 This didactic story is still circulated among 
iconographers, as it reflects their views on the spiritual quality of iconography. 
Similar views are found in the Russian tradition of icon painting: "The artist 
does not compose the image from his own conception, but merely removes the 
covers from the already existing and unique image. He does not superimpose the 
paint on the canvas, but as it were clears away its extraneous coatings, the 
incrustations concealing its spiritual reality."5 1 In Russian icon painting terminology, 
the master "reveals" [raskryavat] the figures in the icon, and the paint which he uses 
for this purpose is called the "revealer" [raskryska].52 What both the Sufi story and 
the Russian testimony demonstrate is that it is essential for the iconographer to put 
his ego aside and submit to the guidance of the Holy Spirit. The iconic forms are 
similar to the pre-existent Platonic ideas, which can be recovered by the 
iconographer only i f and when his soul is ready to receive the guidance of the Holy 
Spirit. This not just a generic designated method of painting, although it is 
conceivable that a religious painter would feel a similar need to suppress his ego and 
pray for inspiration before painting a secular work, but it is essential that in the 
creation of an icon its spiritual, as well as its material part, are addressed. 
Debates over what exactly is represented in an icon have been of central 
importance in the church and the iconographic tradition. Iconoclasm questioned the 
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orthodoxy of the iconic depiction of Christ, and this is when a theory of iconography 
needed to develop. It has to be noted, however, before we discuss the details of the 
iconoclastic controversy, that the Jewish restriction on the representation of God the 
Father was maintained in Christianity, at least in the iconographic tradition of the 
East. A local council of Moscow in 1553-1554 accepted the representation of the 
Father on the grounds that it had already been introduced into the practice of the 
West. The Great Council of Moscow in 1667 however, considered the issue from a 
different angle, asking whether, in spite of its widespread use, this image 
corresponded to Orthodox teaching. It concluded that this practice was unacceptable, 
and the depiction of God as a venerable old man in the sky, or any other depiction of 
the first person of the Trinity, had to be forbidden.5 3 Still, this restriction common to 
Jewish and Christian art has to be interpreted as the recognition of the profound 
religious and psychological power of representation, and not as a general opposition 
to art. It is because of the significance ascribed to icons and statues that the Second 
Commandment and the iconoclastic controversy make sense within a tradition that 
thrived on artistic splendour and religious devotion. The limits of art had to be 
clearly defined, with the same importance that was given to theological writings. 
The historical antecedent of the Christian icon is, formally speaking, 
Hellenistic and Egyptian painting, as well as the Roman art of the catacombs, 
although influences can be traced to Indian and Oriental art as well. The burial 
portraits found in Fayoum, Egypt share many stylistic characteristics with the icon, 
but they are painted in a way that could almost be called naturalistic in the modern 
sense. It is noteworthy, however, that the naturalist perspective, the naturalist 
approach in general, gradually gives way to an unnatural depiction of space and 
figures, the echoes of which are found as late as in the art of the Renaissance and the 
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elongated bodies in the art of Domenikos Theotokopoulos. There is a very good 
reason for this, because the ancient Greco-Roman portrait was trying to preserve the 
physical likeness of the dead for eternity, or even an idealized physical likeness, yet 
decisively physical, nevertheless. This kind of preservation corresponded with the 
attempt to preserve (mummify) the physical body, or at least its most important parts, 
after death. Although the concept underlying the artistic practice has its roots in 
Egyptian metaphysical beliefs, the technique used is most certainly Greek: space 
perspective and the idealist representation refer us to ancient Greek rather than to 
ancient Egyptian painting and sculpting, as well as to the pictorial ideal of KOAOC; 
Kaya96q (beautiful and good). The functional role of the icon is fundamentally 
different. Preservation of physical likeness or beauty is not an issue in iconography, 
because according to church tradition, Christ and the saints have already reached 
spiritual fullness; it is transcendental beauty that needs to be denoted in the painting, 
not temporal and ephemeral. The semiotic significance of the Hellenistic portrait is 
entirely different from that of the icon, because the respective concepts of ideal 
representation and ideal being were entirely different, and it is only on the basis of 
such an investigation that we can understand how the painters of an advanced 
naturalist tradition suddenly began painting in a quite unnatural, even deformed way, 
which is how the icon appears when seen from a naturalist perspective. In addition to 
the aforementioned difference in the meaning of representation between the 
Hellenistic portrait and the icon, we should list two other factors that shaped the 
Byzantine icon: 
First, the practice of icon worship is quite different from the process of 
aesthetic pleasure and response that can be evoked from a work of art. The icon can 
never be gazed upon without due theological consideration; it never claims to be a 
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complete and independent creation, and icon viewing cannot be an artistic event by 
itself. The metaphysical background is present at every moment, in a way that goes 
beyond formal semantics: the believer does not only know who the depicted persons 
are, but is also expected to connect what is particular about them - their lives, 
martyrdom or spiritual quest - to the larger issues of Christian ethics, and 
contemplate the mysteries of faith. The icon is only a point of departure for divine 
contemplation, in many ways similar to Buddhist mandalas, compilations of sand 
and pebbles the very making of which constitutes a spiritual exercise. This kind of 
connection then, between the viewer and the icon, presupposes an entirely different 
environment than that of the aesthetic portrait, and this inevitably influenced the 
technical development of iconography. 
The second factor is of more practical nature: the Orthodox church is built so 
that people do not necessarily stay in one place during the Service. It is interesting 
that here we see that icons were painted and placed in such a way that makes them an 
object to be gazed upon. The wall paintings, traditionally and semiotically not 
distinguished from portable icons, cover the entire inside of the church, separated 
from each other by natural borders such as squinches and niches, or ornamental 
designs such as vines and meanders. The believer can thus have visual contact to 
many icons simultaneously, which are for this reason painted so that they may be 
viewed from a variety of angles and from a changing viewpoint.5 4 One has to bear in 
mind that medieval churches did not have pews or chairs, and the believers were 
usually standing or even walking inside the church. Their position in relation to the 
icons was, therefore, always subject to change. For this reason there is no fixed 
distance, or assumed distance between the icon and the viewer; the effectiveness of 
natural perspective would be diminished in this case. Moreover, the icon is not only 
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an object to look at, it is also an opening from which the believer himself is looked 
at: the icon is not only a window to another world, but can be said to be a window 
from another world as well, and the eyes of Christ and the saints are reminding the 
believer that he is always subject to the gaze of God. Prince Isaac Komnenos 
describes the icons of Christ and the Mother of God as "appearing like living beings 
who seem to speak graciously with their mouths to all who look at them."5 5 There is 
additional information that suggests the existence of a gaze of reverse direction in 
iconography, as i f there is an eye at the other side of the icon. Illumination of figures 
and faces seems to be coming from the inside, unlike in naturalist painting where a 
source of light has to be included in the painting or even indirectly suggested. But the 
most striking piece of information on this issue is the custom of Byzantine and 
Russian painters, who as late as the nineteenth century used to paint the so-called 
"Great Eye" on the painting and write the word "God" beneath it, before they started 
painting the icon. 5 6 This phenomenon can be traced to Egyptian art, but survived 
through the Middle Ages. Boris Uspensky writes "this was noted, in particular, by P. 
A. Florensky, who devoted one of his unpublished works to it. G.K. Chesterton 
mentions it as well in his work on Thomas Aquinas (St Thomas Aquinas, New York, 
1933)."57 
Inverted Perspective 
Not every critic agrees as to the uniformity of what has been termed the 
inverted perspective of the icon, and there is a very good reason for this: no set of 
formal or technical guidelines from the Middle Ages that would account for the 
official adoption of inverted perspective has survived. The earliest of those guideline 
rules is probably the Painter's Manual of Mount Athos written by Dionysios of 
Fourna,58 in the middle of the eighteenth century. The issue becomes more complex 
A Religious View of the History of the Arts 43 
when we consider that inverted perspective was only one o f several pictorial devices 
used in iconography. Even i f we accept that inverted perspective is invariably used in 
iconography, we still have to remember that figures o f major importance do not 
fo l low the usual rules o f spatial perspective, naturalist or inverted. The relative 
distortion o f shapes, even buildings, is dictated by their semantic importance: Nature 
is usually represented in the form o f "icon hillocks." Secular buildings are usually 
extremely distorted - often represented by the characteristic broken-off basilicas, 
which border the painting's background. Finally, churches are presented with very 
few distortions. 5 9 In addition to this semantic distortive hierarchy, certain figures 
appear distorted or even doubled for reasons o f pictorial narrative. Many icons 
dedicated to a saint, for instance, include events f rom the l ife o f this saint on the 
same plane, and the viewer can infer the temporal connection between the depicted 
60 
scenes. 
Commentaries and other writings on icons f rom before the Renaissance are 
concerned wi th issues o f representation according to orthodox doctrine, or with the 
ability o f painting to depict the divine nature o f Christ, rather than with aesthetic 
issues o f style. Many art critics (such as Hans Belting) simply avoid the question of 
inverted perspective, probably because they feel there is not enough evidence, 
certainly not any medieval source, to prove that there was such a thing as an inverted 
perspective. On the other hand, a semiotic examination o f icons can reveal certain 
common characteristics that constitute a specific style, which can be explained in 
terms o f the inverted perspective. After all, the semiotic approach is at the heart o f 
the iconoclastic crisis, where the issue was not only the nature o f representation, but 
also the attitude towards the sign. As Fr Pavel Florensky writes: 
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Art is 'recollective' according to the teachings o f the Fathers o f the 
Seventh Ecumenical Council. Our contemporaries, positivistically 
minded, readily allude to these teachings, but in modernizing the word 
'recollectiveness' by elucidating it in the sense o f subjectivism and 
psychologism, they are committing a grave historical error. One should 
always bear in mind that the terminology o f the Holy Fathers is that o f 
ancient Hellenic idealism and is generally coloured by ontology. In this 
case it is not at all a question o f the subjective recollectiveness o f art, 
but o f Platonic 'recollection', avauvncic, - as the manifestation o f the 
idea in the sensible: art leads out o f a subjective seclusion, bursts the 
boundaries o f the conventional world, and, beginning wi th images and 
through the medium o f images, brings us to the archetype."6 1 In the 
famous formula o f St Dionysios Areopagite, "phenomenal things are in 
truth the icons o f invisible things. 6 2 
Florensky's account is particularly interesting as it connects the icon and the 
Platonic anamnesis, but one has to keep in mind what the nature o f the iconic 
anamnesis is. The archetype he refers to cannot be identified wi th the Platonic 
archetype, because the latter could be conceived only through pure intellect. There is 
an additional factor in the contemplation o f an icon, which eludes intellectual 
contemplation, namely the experience o f faith. Similarly, perhaps the difference 
between Platonic anamnesis and iconic (or Christian) contemplation could be said to 
be analogous to the difference between philosophy and theology. Bishop John 
Zizioulas presents an interesting opposition between the Platonic and the Christian 
view, in a chapter o f his Being as Communion that examines the "iconic" approach to 
Truth, commenting on a passage from Maximus the Confessor: 
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The things o f the Old Testament are shadow (OKKX) ; those o f the New 
Testament are image (SIKCDV); and those o f the future state are truth 
(oXneeta).63 
Maximus' thought has often been contrasted to the thought o f Origen in 
relation to such matters. His most famous "correction" o f Origenism is that whereas 
Origen saw the beginning o f the world in an inert, perfect state, Maximus placed the 
perfect state at the end o f t ime. 6 4 Zizioulas identifies a Platonic streak in Origenism, 
and combines the above thought with the theology o f the icon, as he distinguishes 
between the Origenist school and the (majority o f the) Greek Fathers. As we shall see 
later on, in the discussion o f man as made in/after the image o f God, the theological 
meaning o f the icon is quite different for Origen; according to his view, at least as 
Zizioulas reads him, an icon does not reveal fu l ly the truth o f what it represents. The 
icon in this context can be thought o f not as a memory f rom the past, but as a 
prefiguration o f the future (perfection): 
The idea o f eiKrov in the Greek Fathers is often understood along 
Platonic lines. The passage o f Maximus quoted above shows clearly 
that this is wrong. In the Platonic way o f thinking, the image must not 
have its reality in the future; it is always the past which is decisive, 
making truth a matter o f avauvnatrf;, a connecting o f the soul to the pre-
existing world o f ideas. The authentic Greek patristic tradition never 
accepted the Platonic notion - adopted by Origen and St Augustine 
among others - in which perfection belongs to the original state o f 
things. The Greek patristic tradition also showed no tendency to 
understand the encdbv in a retrospective psychological sense, and at the 
Council in Trullo explicitly rejected symbolism in iconography. In this 
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crucial passage, Maximus shows once more that truth in Greek patristic 
thought is very different f rom that o f Platonism. We must search 
elsewhere for the roots o f the iconological language o f the Fathers. 6 5 
One wonders i f this "inverted" memory, the memory o f the future perfection 
that the icon expresses, attests to a psychological connection wi th the inverted 
perspective o f iconography. The true iconic perspective is not the privilege o f the 
viewer, but it is reserved for the "eye o f God", the converging point o f inverted 
perspective, in the center. The psychological interpretation o f iconography and the 
inverted perspective are o f central interest in this study, and w i l l be discussed in 
some detail in this chapter: the icon is a point where art, theology and psychology 
converge. 
Technically speaking, inverted perspective does not represent a figure or 
object in a particular setting, but the space as a whole and the figure or object in i t . 6 6 
A n object in a picture that is painted according to the rules o f direct perspective can 
be seen in the same way as part o f the picture or i f it is extracted and viewed 
separately. Its correspondence between the object it represents is based on similitude, 
which applies in the same manner to all figures or objects in the painting. 
On the other hand, an object in a picture painted according to the rules o f 
inverted perspective does not make a lot o f sense i f it is taken out o f its iconic 
context. Any visual distortion it may exhibit can be interpreted by its position within 
the entire space o f the icon, and its importance in relation to the other figures or 
objects. The dynamic space o f iconography corresponds as a whole to the world 
where the artist assumes a real, changing perspective, instead o f a fixed one. No 
individual viewpoint can be assumed here. This can also be demonstrated in the way 
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objects occasionally appear distorted so as to present surfaces that a f ixed gaze would 
not see, such as the inside and the outside o f a building. This principle is similar to 
the cubist principle o f a painting-in-time, where the artist is, nevertheless, placed 
outside the space o f the painting. An icon represents a space instead o f a viewpoint, 
and this is important in a religious painting whose center coincides wi th the "eye o f 
God". 
A dynamic relationship is underlying the principles o f spatial organization 
here. Moreover, since the icon is concerned with the representation o f a unified 
space, it cannot be conceived f rom the outside, but only as i f the artist (and the 
viewer) is part o f the represented space.67 Objects appear inverted as in a mirror and, 
therefore, what is right and left is usually determined as the right and left o f the artist 
as if he is in the picture. Therefore, the "left part" o f the icon is the one that appears 
to our right, and vice versa. The entire perspective is distorted, compared to the rules 
of naturalist representation: a conceptual focal convergence can be traced at the 
center o f the icon. This means that, all other factors being equal, the farther figures 
and objects o f similar order or importance are f rom the center o f the icon, the smaller 
they look. The world is depicted as i f surrounding the artist and not at an objective 
distance f rom him. This is not particular to Byzantine iconography only. Similar 
mirror effects can be seen in the palace o f Sennacherib in Nineveh (Assyria, 8 t h 
century BC) and in the art o f ancient Egypt (cf. the mural f rom the tomb o f the Vizier 
Rekhmira, New Kingdom) . 6 8 One can, therefore, see in the icon a mirror that reflects 
the real world back to the viewer, revealing something more at the same time. Why is 
this distinction so important? What is the semiotic significance o f a mirror? 
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The Mirror of God 
Jacques Lacan, drawing material from Freudian psychology, describes the 
mirror stage o f the psychological development o f the child, between the sixth and 
the eighteenth month. 6 9 This stage takes place before the Oedipal complex, and, in 
some ways, underlies it. What happens during the mirror stage is a gradual 
identification of the child wi th his image on the mirror, as he is held by his mother or 
even standing on his own, the conclusion o f which is the establishment o f a "relation 
between the organism and its reality, between the Innenwelt and the Umwelt."70 The 
identification o f the self at the mirror stage occurs within a Gestalt encompassing the 
image o f the child's own body and his surroundings. The duality between the child's 
sensory perception and its identification with the image on the mirror however, 
produces what Lacan calls the imaginary, which creates an environment for any 
future relation to any other (with a small o), or any object. This environment quickly 
assumes a symbolic nature, and an ideal ego is formed; any other can represent the 
original experience o f identification of other only metonymically, and thus ego and 
other are subjected to an even deeper sense of otherness, denoted by Other (with 
capital initial) in Lacan's wri t ings. 7 1 This absolute Other is always elusive, and its 
nature is always unconscious, it is the unconscious. The Oedipal stage begins at this 
moment, or even during the mirror stage itself, when the mother holds the child in 
front o f the mirror and is recognized by h i m . 7 2 The child can now be conscious o f the 
presence or absence o f the mother. Interestingly enough, Melanie Klein's account 
places at more or less the same time the recognition o f an object as good or bad, 
starting from the very fact o f presence/satisfaction o f oral pleasure or 
absence/negation o f this pleasure (the good and the bad breast). 
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H o w is the psychoanalytic discourse on the mirror stage relevant to 
iconography? This kind o f painting resonates with parts of the psyche that reach 
down to our primordial or most basic understanding o f the world and our relationship 
with it. Some neo-Freudian 7 3 theorists, such as Georges Bataille, 7 4 have traced the 
birth o f the opposition between good and bad and, therefore, the birth o f the religious 
instinct, to the basic satisfaction of the instincts o f hunger and possession. The 
examination o f the icon as a religious object however, seems to take us to even more 
primal stages o f the development o f the self. The recognition o f otherness, and the 
subsequent renunciation o f the Other, signify the acceptance and the memory o f a 
loss o f unity between the self and the others, that has its theo-mythological analogous 
in the expulsion from Paradise and the loss o f indirect communion with God. In fact, 
this memory and the desire to return to God transcends gender differentiation which 
occurs only at the subsequent Oedipal stage, and therefore has to be considered as an 
earlier and more basic part o f human psychogenesis. The icon appears as a mirror 
hiding the Other behind it, who can see us but cannot be seen. One immediately 
thinks o f the famous passage from the first epistle o f St Paul to the Corinthians: "we 
now see enigmatically through a mirror." 7 5 
The image and metaphor o f the mirror can be identified as one o f the most 
interesting ways neoplatonist philosophy has used to describe the relation between 
God and the human being. One o f the earliest references on the significance o f the 
mirror can be found in an Orphic story 7 6 where the mirror was one o f the toys used 
by the Titans to lure Dionysus as a child, tear him to pieces and eat him. After that, 
Zeus destroyed them wi th his thunderbolts and men were made out o f their ashes. 
Humans, therefore, contain a Titanic, earthy element, as well as a divine Dionysiac, 
which can be released by purification. The story is alluded to by Plotinus, who takes 
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the mirror as a symbol o f the attractiveness o f the material world and, thus, as the 
symbol o f the souls' descent into it, but later neoplatonists worked out an elaborate 
allegorical interpretation, where the division o f Dionysus by the Titans corresponds 
to the division o f the divine power in the material w o r l d . 7 7 
Plato discusses the mirror in an appendix to the Timaeus.7* According to him, 
what happens when we see an image in a mirror is that the light from the eye meets 
the light from the reflected object seen on the surface o f the mirror, and these two 
sets o f light fo rm the perceived image on the surface o f the mirror. I n that sense the 
reflection is as real as any object, not a visual illusion, and it owes its existence to the 
prototype and the light o f the sun. 
The acceptance o f the reflected object as a real object is quite important in 
Christian writers who picked up this concept from Plato. St Athanasios the Great 
likens the soul to "a mirror in which it can see the image o f the Father." 7 9 Similarly 
to the orphic myth o f the mirror which suggests purification o f the soul, Athanasios 
says: 
So when the soul has put o f f every stain o f sin wi th which it is tinged, 
and keeps pure only what is in the image, then when this shines forth it 
can truly contemplate as in a mirror the Word, the image o f the Father, 
and in him meditate on the Father, o f whom the Saviour is the image. 8 0 
St Gregory o f Nyssa used the metaphor o f the mirror in a way quite 
compatible wi th the meaning analytical psychology ascribes to the symbol o f the 
mirror. Gazing at the mirror suggests a kind o f introspection: the fol lowing excerpt 
describes the purified soul that looks onto itself and recognizes its archetype, the 
likeness o f the divine: 
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The soul w i l l go back to itself and see clearly what it is in its nature, 
and through its own beauty it w i l l look upon the archetype as i f in a 
mirror and an image. We can truly say that the accurate likeness o f the 
divine consists in our soul's imitation o f the superior Nature. 8 1 
The role o f the mirror has been undertaken, according to Athanasios' 
statement, by the Word. Visible to humans, Christ himself is an image o f the 
otherwise invisible Father. As an image he is born f rom the archetype, the Father. 
The mirror was created for man to see God, although there is something in the image 
that reminds man the archetype o f his own self: Man is, after all, fashioned after the 
image and likeness o f God, and in that sense it can be argued that it is man who took 
the fo rm of Christ and not Christ the form of man when he was born. Yet man is 
placed under a double field o f gazes: on the one hand he is always under the gaze o f 
God (the all-seeing eye), but Christ is given to humanity as an image to be seen by 
man. This metaphor resonates in the capacity o f the icon as a double mirror, which 
although submits its surface to our gaze, it assumes the presence o f God's gaze f rom 
the other side. 
The premise o f the eye o f God gazing upon us from the other side o f the icon, 
although subconscious, gives an unprecedented semiotic dimension to the practice o f 
art. During prayer one addresses God as directly as possible, by placing oneself 
voluntarily under the gaze o f God, and in that sense the icon can be seen as an aid to 
prayer. The viewer is placing himself in front o f the symbol o f the unknown and 
engages in the only possible (under normal circumstances) contact he may have with 
it. This renders prayer, among other things, as the most profound form of 
introspection, which is directed towards God through man's deepest and most elusive 
self. I t is not prudent, however, to identify God with the Lacanian Other: that would 
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be to reduce God to the human unconscious. Yet, it is fair to say that the Other, or 
rather the conscious Other, corresponds to the primordial condition o f man before the 
Fall, before the differentiation between the secular and the numinous within human 
consciousness, and that its contemplation includes both the Platonic anamnesis o f the 
undifferentiated condition o f Adam, still present in the collective unconscious, as 
well as the acceptance o f divine Grace and the wish for transcendence o f the Fall. 
How are these two different from each other? 
We must keep in mind that the icon as a sign is very closely connected to 
Christology, and that the iconoclastic arguments echo strongly the arguments o f the 
Monophysites. The arguments o f the Iconoclasts were directed specifically against 
the representation o f Christ, although their practice had a much broader scope and 
was directed against the representation and the veneration o f the relics o f saints, as 
well . One o f the main positions o f the Iconophiles was, as expressed by John of 
Damascus, the acceptance o f the "circumscription" o f God in the person o f Christ. 
God had become incarnate, assuming all the characteristics o f man, without ever 
losing anything o f his divinity. The issue o f the representation o f God lies at the heart 
o f the significance o f the view of St Athanasios, who described Christ as the mirror 
in which the uncircumscribed God can be contemplated. The psychological and 
religious function o f the icon was to maintain an open channel to the numinous 
world. This was denied in the monophysitic views which could not accept the dual 
nature/energy o f Christ and held his humanity to be "a drop o f honey dissolved in the 
sea o f his divinity," as the monophysitic view often put it; it was also denied in the 
iconoclastic views which could not accept that the icon can be accepted as, as we 
would describe in contemporary language, a "metaphor" for the presence o f Christ 
and the saints among us. 
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The Son is at the same time an icon o f the Father, according to the Johannine 
gospel "Anyone who has seen me has seen the Father," 8 2 as well as the archetype o f 
man. The latter can be understood in two different ways that, nevertheless, 
complement each other. As already mentioned above, Christ was the prototype for 
man, ontologically speaking. This statement, however, has a psychological 
counterpart, beyond its theological and historical dimension. Christ can be seen as 
what C.G. Jung described as a psychological "symbol o f the self," 8 3 or rather an ideal 
model o f the self, and can thus express and guide man's strive to actualize the image 
o f God inside him. 
Christ, as the second Adam, is a second beginning for humanity. He is, as 
Adam was when he was created, a pure image o f God, o f which Tertullian wrote: 
And this therefore is to be considered as the image o f God in man, that 
the human spirit has the same motions and senses as God has, though 
not in the same way God has them. 8 4 
The semiotic identity o f Christ is o f tremendous importance, because in his 
person the image o f God coincides with the image o f man. Patristic texts on the 
creation o f man in the image and likeness o f God often touch upon this issue. 
According to Origen, the image o f God, which is imprinted on the soul and not on 
the body, is an image o f an image: "for my soul is not directly the image o f God, but 
is made after the likeness o f the former image." 8 5 The Son, in his theology, is the true 
image o f the Father ("the Saviour is the figure o f the substance or subsistence o f 
God," 8 6 as well as "what else therefore is the image o f God after the likeness o f 
which man was made, but our Saviour, who is the first born o f every creature?"8 7 and 
"the image o f the invisible God is the Saviour" 8 8) after whose likeness our inner man 
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is made ("but that which is made after the image and similitude o f God is our inner 
man, invisible, incorporeal, incorrupt and immortal" 8 9 ) . The Godhead in us, 
according to Origen, reveals itself through prudence, justice, moderation, virtue, 
wisdom, and discipline. 9 0 
A different line o f thought on the relation o f the image and the prototype 
starts with Plotinus. His central idea of how things came to be is the emanation from 
a higher source, which in turn is emanated from an even higher source, and so on; 
everything can be ultimately traced to the ev, the One, the great Source and Principle. 
The metaphor o f the image is a way to describe the relation between the source and 
what proceeds from it: the latter is an image o f the higher source. A t the top o f his 
hierarchy we can see how the concepts o f the One, Cosmic Intelligence and Cosmic 
Soul are related: Intelligence is an image o f the One, and Soul is an image o f 
Intelligence. Each rung in his descending hierarchy is a little less than the previous 
one, o f which i t is the image. I t is important to note that the image proceeds directly 
from its prototype, and i t ultimately seeks to return to the prototype. Their likeness is 
the connection the image needs to know its archetype, so that, by contemplating the 
archetype, the image can return to it. The contemplation itself is the act o f return. 
Nevertheless, Plotinus' understanding o f this image hierarchy is very close to 
Origen's views. Both writers accept that there are certain orders o f images, and that 
an image o f the second order, an image o f an image, is not as good or accurate as an 
image o f the first order. Such views are not surprising in Plotinus, who thought o f the 
entire Cosmos as a hierarchy derived from the ev, and in spite o f Origen's Christian 
background, they are not surprising in his thought either, because his view of the 
man Jesus as one o f the Xoymoi, and divine only on account o f his participation with 
the Son, Xoyoq, the true image o f God the Father, shows something similar to the 
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thought o f Plotinus. The image o f God is Christ, who does not necessarily have to be 
taken as a cosubstantial image. Image and identity seem to be mutually exclusive, 
while for later Fathers, such as Maximus the Confessor, Christ is at the same time 
God and the image o f God. 
A change of this position can be seen wi th Augustine, or more precisely, with 
the difference between the early and mature Augustine, as shown by Andrew 
Lou th . 9 1 Although the early Augustine, like Origen and Ambrose, accepted that man 
was a second-order image o f God, he later combined the Plotinian idea o f an image 
as something that reflects what created it , with the argument that Christ is not a mere 
image o f God, but shares his substance, and concluded that man is the image o f God 
(an image o f the first order), as he is the immediate creation o f God, with no 
intermediate rung between them. Nevertheless, the nature o f the image relationship 
in Augustine seems to have been influenced by Plotinus' views o f the Divine 
Intellectual. For Augustine the image o f God has to be located in the rational part o f 
man. A certain analogy he used seemed to confirm his hypothesis: God is trinitarian, 
and man's rational self is also trinitarian: 
And in these three, when the mind knows itself and loves itself, there 
remains a trinity, mind, love and knowledge; and it is confused by no 
mingling; although each is singly in itself, and all are wholly in one 
another, whether one in both or both in one, and so all in a l l . 9 2 
There are two basic problems wi th Augustine's approach. The first problem 
is that such a trinitarian analogy would be, to say the least, foolhardy, i f not flatly 
wrong. Even now, in the beginning o f the twenty-first century, we still know so little 
about the way the mind works, we certainly do not "know" what love is, and, in spite 
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of the recent development o f cognitive psychology and philosophy, we do not know 
much about the nature o f knowledge, either. The trinitarian nature o f God is an even 
larger mystery, and therefore it does not seem prudent to draw an analogy between 
the two triads. Moreover, it seems very possible that in drawing such analogies we 
project some o f our limited understanding o f ourselves into the nature o f the 
unexplainable God, anthropomorphizing him inexcusably. This is one o f the 
problems apophatic theology attempted to address, focusing on what God is not, or 
what God is beyond. 
The other problem with Augustine's approach, which is also evident in 
Origen's writings, is the exclusion o f the body f rom the image o f God within man: 
"Imago Dei intus est, non est in corpore... ubi est intellectus, ubi est mens, ubi ratio 
investigandae veritatis est, ibi habet Deus imaginem suam" 9 3 (the God-image is 
within, not in the body... Where the understanding is, where the mind is, where the 
power o f investigating truth is, there God has his image). Origen had presented a 
similar view in Contra Celsum: "To KCIT' sncova xcro Kxioavroc; viruxn uev %(opei, 
ovda\i&>q 8E TO aQuxx"94 (the image o f the Creator is imprinted on the soul, not on the 
body). This obviously porresponds to the rational part o f the self, Augustine's anima 
rationalis, a concept that has been seen95 to have a strong resemblance with the 
enovpavioQ avOpamoq o f St Paul. 9 6 Christ in Augustine's thought, on the other hand, 
is identified wi th the image o f God, as opposed to having been created in/after God's 
image: "Unigenitus... tantummodo imago est, non ad imaginem" (the only 
begotten... alone is the image, not after the image). We have to note here, however, 
that Augustine formulated different views on this issue during his lifetime. In the 
previous excerpt he expresses an opinion that is in agreement with most Greek 
Fathers. 
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Two points o f high psychological interest can be deduced f rom the above: 
First, that the ideal self is situated within man, rather than in a remote and 
unapproachable world. The struggle towards the Good can therefore also be situated 
within man. Second, that the image o f God is not identified wi th the entire self, but 
only wi th its spiritual part. This view can also have a negative side: i f one part o f 
man is made in the image o f God, what can we say about the other part? Is there a 
divine and an anti-divine image within man, fighting against each other? This would 
directly imply a dualism, since the part o f the soul that is excluded f rom the anima 
rationalis and, therefore, from the image o f God, consists o f the uncontrolled wishes 
and desires, which often prevail upon the self. Still, we may be somehow assured that 
this is not what Augustine had in mind when he spoke o f the rational soul, because 
his writings in other places express a deep personal divine longing, a quite 
"irrational" passion for God. It would be important to recognize then, that the 
language o f Augustine was different from that o f modern philosophy and 
psychoanalysis, but the supremacy o f reason on theological grounds, which echoes 
similar views in the Neoplatonic tradition, influenced greatly the development o f 
Western thought. Certainly the models o f Plotinus and Origen give the intellect a 
privileged position, which was counteracted by Tertullian's sacrificium intellectus on 
the other extreme. The confession "Credo quia absurdum est" ( I believe because it is 
absurd) is attributed, probably wrongly, to Tertullian, 9 8 but it reflects more or less his 
attitude to faith and reason, for he at least wrote "Et mortuus est dei fi l ius, prorsus 
credibile est, quia ineptum est. Et sepultus resurrexit; certum est, quia impossibile 
est" 9 9 (And the Son o f God died, which is immediately credible because it is absurd. 
And buried he rose again, which is certain because it is impossible). At any rate, 
reason became the influential principle. The concept o f a separate, wholly and 
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consciously good part would suggest a fragmentation o f the self, a predictably 
unstable condition. The suppression o f a part o f the self, as opposed to its integration, 
would lead to a catastrophe, according to Jung's psychological rule that says that 
"when the individual remains undivided and does not become conscious o f his inner 
opposite, the world must perforce act out the conflict and be torn into opposing 
halves." 1 0 0 
The scorn for the body is also expressed in the suppression o f sexuality and 
its (direct or indirect) identification wi th evil. Augustine seems to be rather 
embarrassed by the fact that generation in this world cannot take place without "a 
certain amount o f bestial movement" and a "violent acting o f lust". The fact that 
sexuality is not under the control o f reason is a result o f the Fall, and in this, 
Augustine would be indeed supported by psychological information, i f he accepted 
that "sexuality" is a notion as tainted by the Fall as "reason" is. By identifying, 
however, the one part o f the self with God and the other with the "animal nature of 
man" (that part which does not reflect the image o f God within man), we enter into 
the perilous trajectory o f sexual suppression, guilt, shame for our "bestiality", and a 
kind o f psychological dualism that has haunted our culture after the liberal, relatively 
guilt-free disposition o f the ancient Greeks. 
The Eastern approach on the question o f sexuality, expressed among others 
by St Gregory o f Nyssa and St Maximus the Confessor, accepted that all bodily 
needs, including sexuality, are not part o f man's natural condition, but were 
superimposed on his nature after the Fall, something that is signified in the 
"garments o f skin" made by God for Adam and Eve in Genesis 3:21. In that sense, 
and although Eastern (monastic) practice has often tried to transcend the limitations 
of the superimposed condition, one cannot feel more shame for one's sexuality than 
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for one's hunger and thirst. There is no permanent evil lurking inside man. 
Nevertheless, in the East and the West alike, the problem of evil is very much 
connected with the (psychological) dualism man experiences. 
The Church's fight against Manichaeism made it necessary to deny the 
existence of evil as an entity real, separate, and as powerful as the good. Fathers like 
Origen, Athanasios, Basil and Augustine formulated the doctrine of the nature of evil 
as an absence, a deprivation of good, known as privatio boni or areprfaig ayaOov 
(sKxpomj aya&ov in John Chrysostom). This doctrine created almost as many 
problems as it attempted to solve, because it questions the eternal damnation of Satan 
and the sinners who follow him, both in Heaven and on Earth. Final restoration of 
all, catoKaxamaxjiq 7tdvrcov, seems, under this light, an enchanting idea, that quite 
effectively eliminates any doubts about the character of monotheism in Christianity. 
One has to keep in mind that a theological doctrine cannot always correspond to a 
psychological truth, because the object of the two disciplines, although comparable, 
is not always the same, something which is reflected in the division of theology into 
OeoXoyia and oixovofxia. The doctrine of the non-existence of evil was never 
understood or adopted by the masses, and the psychological reason for this could be 
the formulation of the doctrine itself, or at least its interpretation through the 
identification of ratio with good inside man. According to Jung's psychological rule 
mentioned above, it was exactly the suppression of the irrational part of the self that 
gave substance to evil as a psychological, although not metaphysical, reality. 
Furthermore, the formula "everything good comes from God and everything evil 
comes from man" is also problematic in relation to privatio boni, because i f man is to 
be credited with the practice of evil through the exercise of his free wil l , he would 
also have to be credited with the practice of good. Yet, what the writings of 
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Augustine and the other Fathers indicate, is that there is something inside man, 
wherever this is located and however it is identified, that still preserves the 
ccva/ivrjoiq of the divine image, which can thus be re-built. This view is further 
supported by the contemplation of the Xoyoi, the "principles in accordance with 
everything in the cosmos was created through the Word of God, the X6yoq"wl 
according to some Fathers like Origen, Evagrius and, foremost, Maximus the 
Confessor. I f the soul can discern the Xoyoi, it will be able to "see its own 
radiance,"102 revert to its natural condition, and, like a crystal mirror, it will reflect 
the divine image faithfully, clearing the mirror in St Paul's metaphor of our 
contemplation of the Father as the elusive Other. Christ, as the second Adam, the true 
image of God, expresses the true condition of man, the mirror made of perfect and 
unblemished crystal. Surprisingly similar, with the soul likened to a mirror that, 
under certain circumstances can reflect the divine, is Plotinus's view of the higher 
part of imagination or npom\ (ponncujia, discussed in Anti-Leonardo. 
The model of evil as a distortion of the good circumvents the problems posed 
by the identification of the divine image with the anima rationalis in man, discussed 
above, because evil can, be denied separate and real existence only i f the good cannot 
exist (in man) separately, either. Evil as the distortion of truth does not constitute a 
force complementary to the good, in the sense of the opposition/completion of yin 
and yang, which has to be conquered and suppressed, but as the opaqueness as it 
were of the soul-mirror, or, according to the thought of St Gregory of Nyssa, as what 
the mirror chooses to reflect. 
The metaphor of the mirror is also found in Gregory of Nyssa, but he applies 
it to the human nature as a whole. Free will directs man towards good or evil, which 
is in turn reflected in him: 
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When you put gold in front of a mirror, the mirror takes on the 
appearance of the gold and because of the reflection it shines with the 
same gleam as the real substance. So too, i f it catches the reflection of 
something loathsome, it imitates this ugliness by means of a likeness, 
as for example of a frog, a toad, a millipede, or anything else that is 
disgusting to look at, thus reproducing in its own substance whatever it 
is placed in front of i t . 1 0 3 
For Gregory then, the entire man is capable for good and evil, or in other 
words, the mirror of human nature may reflect good or evil. It is in this context that 
he sees the likeness of God in man. His view of the human nature as a whole is quite 
high, and he makes sure when he discusses the wisdom of the fleshlM to associate it 
not with the body given to us by God when man was created in the first place, but 
with the garments of skin 1 0 5 given to us during the expulsion from Paradise. 
Subsequently, i f man avoids the wisdom of the flesh, the likeness of God will be 
restored in him. This model proposes a psychological balance perhaps not found to 
such a degree in other patristic writings. Gregory's concepts distinguish between 
matter per se and the material condition, and his thought is closely connected to the 
Platonic tradition of the image and its "participation" with the prototype. For 
Gregory, moreover, the "natural" condition of the human mirror is good. This is 
quite significant in relation to his mirror theory, because it suggests that the mirror of 
human nature, the entire human nature, will eventually turn to good and will reflect 
only good. 
Christ is, according to Maximus the Confessor, who expressed a view most 
helpful in the contemplation of Christ and iconography, a symbol of himself: 
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He accepted to be unchangeably created in form like us and through his 
immeasurable love for humankind to become the type and symbol of 
Himself, and from Himself symbolically to represent Himself, and 
through the manifestation of Himself to lead to Himself in His 
complete and secret hiddenness the whole creation, and while He 
remains quite unknown in his hidden, secret place beyond all things, 
unable to be known or understood by any being in any way whatever, 
out of his love for humankind he grants to human beings intimations of 
Himself in the manifest divine works performed in the flesh. 1 0 6 
Christ is something of a semiotic paradox: being the image and therefore the 
symbol of the one eternal God, he is at the same time God himself. His image is a 
mysterium coniunctionis, uniting the "circumscribed" and the "uncircumscribable," 
to use the language of the iconoclastic controversy. The word "symbol" here denotes, 
like in "ZuuPoXov rr\q niorecDc;," a truth that cannot be fully understood or 
articulated, and can thus be expressed only through a symbol. As Ysabel de Andia 
reminds us, "To cruuPoXov, in Greek, means a sign or token by which one knows or 
infers something. Originally cruuj3oXa (or tesserae hospitales, in Latin) were the 
halves or corresponding pieces of a bone or a coin, which two contracting parties 
broke between them, each keeping one."1 0 7 A symbol then, expresses a broken unity 
and the promise of a reunification. The parts take their significance from each other, 
and the contract they signify must some day be fulfilled. 
De Andia writes further down in the same article, "the symbol has always a 
reference to a missing part, which can be material or intellectual: the absence of a 
person or of a world, but also presence of another world behind or above the one 
which we perceive, like the visible behind the invisible and the intelligible behind the 
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sensible." Christ, as a symbol of himself according to Maximus, is at the same time 
the fulfillment of the contract the word symbol denotes. He is no ordinary symbol, 
because unlike the "absence of a world" ordinary symbols refer to, he embodies the 
presence of both worlds. Moreover, as the second Adam he is the symbol of the 
future of man, his eschatological fulfillment. In the person of Christ the unknowable 
God and the knowable human are united in a way that cannot be accounted for from 
within the Jewish tradition, which held that "nobody can see God's face and l ive." 1 0 8 
He is, for that reason, a scandal for the Jewish understanding of the image of God. As 
God-on-earth, however, he chose to be born in the Jewish culture and to bring into 
completion the issues and the questions inherent in it. The Incarnation is, among 
other things, a semiotic event that legitimated the representation of God and the 
paradoxical transcendence of his hiddenness, but as such an event it could be 
meaningful only on the basis of the Jewish concept of the uncircumscribable God. It 
would not constitute a semiotic paradox in pagan cultures, where gods were routinely 
represented. Christ could only be seen as the fulfillment of the symbol i f the absence 
of the "other" and the need for the symbolic are understood. Interestingly enough, St 
Paul noted the significance of the "Unknown God" of Athens as a God that could 
now be revealed to the world by an act of grace. The "Unknown God" was an empty 
sign, perhaps the closest analogue of the formless God who cannot be represented in 
carved (and painted) images in Greek theo-mythology. This represents an entry point 
that draws our attention to the importance of the elusiveness of the Other in Lacanian 
analysis. The revelation in the person of Christ and the Incarnation can be effective 
only inasmuch it reaches the unconscious and even beyond, and makes knowable 
what was always central in the psychological and spiritual life of a culture but had 
always remained unknowable. 
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The paradox of the image of Christ seems to be, at any rate, one of the 
reasons that led to the iconoclastic controversy, although it is difficult to locate and 
identify all the reasons that led to it. Many religious cultures faced similar issues that 
resulted either to an iconoclastic denial of images altogether, or to a confirmation of 
the importance and the significance of the image and its veneration as a religious 
practice. 
This section has examined Christian religious art, and the discussion of 
Muslim beliefs would initially seem irrelevant. We have to consider, however, that 
what we call conveniently "the Byzantine world" was a complex society that 
consisted of many ethnic and religious groups. The discourse of religious art we are 
interested in, had, indeed, little to do with those religious minorities, but insofar as 
we are interested not only in official doctrine but also in the psychological 
background of this discourse, it would be useful to approach Islam as a "sister 
culture" that shared a lot of its religious mythology with Judaism and Christianity, 
and developed in the same place, at the same time with them. This brief exploration 
of Muslim ideas is, indeed, a sidetracking venture, but the presence of characteristics 
and views on religious art that can also be found in the Christian world, would 
strengthen the position of these similarities within the main exploration of Byzantine 
religious art. 
Although the Koran does not contain a direct prohibition against images, the 
prohibition is stated quite directly in several Hadiths (selections of the words of 
Mohammed, that belong to the Islamic Holy Tradition), such as this: "Artists, the 
makers of images, will be punished at the Last Judgement, for God wil l impose on 
them the impossible task of resurrecting their works." Nevertheless, some tolerance 
for painted images exists, but there is no acceptance whatsoever for an image that 
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"casts a shadow." Islamic tradition shares the Jewish taboo of representation of 
God, for God is as uncircumscribable and indescribable for Muslims as he is for 
Jews. No created image could even attempt to describe the uncreated God. The 
created world should not be represented either, because such representations could be 
seen as a demonic "mimicry," 1 1 0 what C.G. Jung often refers to as izvsv^a avrijuijuov. 
It is conceivable that Islamic influence was one of the factors that started the 
iconoclastic movement, as the iconoclastic, or rather uniconic, Arabs were expanding 
quite successfully in the seventh and eighth century.111 Islam faced the question of 
religious representations more or less at the same time as Byzantium, and in a way 
went occasionally even further than the Jewish tradition in that even the written word 
of Mohammed constitutes a necessary temporary other which will disappear just 
before the end of time. According to Shiite Muslim eschatology the Mahdi, or 
twelfth Imam for Shiite Muslims, will appear shortly before the end of the world to 
govern the earth, and then the copies of the Koran will turn into blank pages,112 
having become unnecessary and obsolete by the presence of the infallible Guide. 
What is at stake here, as well as in the iconoclastic disapproval of icons, is the 
position of God within human history and society, and the ability of sacred art to 
express his presence. The deeper difference between the acceptance or rejection of 
religious art, that is, the acknowledgement of the presence of the Other and the 
subsequent veneration of religious art, or its denial, parallels the divide between 
mystical theology and social ethics, which can be observed both in Islam and 
Christianity. In that way art demonstrates a mystical quality, which is quite evident in 
the traditions of the Islamic brotherhood of Mawlana (or Mevlana) founded by Rumi 
in the thirteenth century. Their rituals are such a wonderful example of religious art 
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that deserve a brief reference, even though they are ostensibly outside the Judeo-
Christian tradition: 
The dance of the whirling dervishes has a cosmic and theological character, 
strongly reminiscent of neoplatonic philosophy, which represents the final union with 
God. Its shape "represents the planets turning around the sun and around themselves. 
The drums evoke the trumpets of the Last Judgement. The circle of the dancers is 
divided into two semi-circles of which the one represents the arc of descent, or the 
involution of the souls into matter, and the other the arc of the ascent of the souls to 
113 
God." The writings of Rumi describe a direct connection between humanity and 
God through sacred art: 
In the musical cadences is a hidden secret; i f I were to reveal it, it 
would overturn the world... We have all descended from the body of 
Adam, and we have listened to these melodies in Paradise. We recall a 
little of them to ourselves, even though the water and the clay have 
covered us with doubt.1 1 4 
The views of the dervishes are quite interesting, as they ascribe a very special 
role to sacred art, or rather, to the art of the sacred. Yet, although the Mawlana may 
be seen as particularly liberal vis-a-vis religion and art within Islamic tradition, the 
ascent towards God seems a human affair, an ascetic or mystic movement of the soul 
that has no counterpart in the side of God beyond the revelation through the words of 
the prophets. The unique significance of the Christian icon is the presence of God 
among humans manifested in the incarnation and the divine Passion, which 
transform the icon into a field of a double movement, from both sides of the mirror: 
the divine Other has made itself visible and circumscribable. This can be seen as a 
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first step towards the final divine apocalypse: a face has appeared on the surface of 
the mirror, although it is still "enigmatic," being the premonition and the promise of 
the time when the image wil l be clear and the communication will be direct, "face to 
face." The significance of the icon, therefore, can be thought to be closely 
interrelated with Christian eschatology. A signal question that naturally arises from 
the discussion of the icon as a mirror is whether the aforementioned human and 
divine movements parallel each other in any way, like the movement of an object and 
its reflection on the mirror. It cannot be denied that it would be a little dangerous to 
suppose that there is an unequivocal and automatic relationship between the two, 
because it would seem as i f the one could cause the other, as a reflection that follows 
the movement of the original. The danger here is that one could assume that a divine 
movement could be caused by a movement from the human side. Nevertheless, the 
iconoclastic debates never went as far as to follow this perilous line of thought, and, 
to my knowledge, this idea has not been approached in patristic writings. 
Fortunately, it would be inconceivable at the time to argue that the use of the icons 
could affect our perception of the divine. On the other hand, it is easy for us to 
conceive how divine acts can elicit human action. 
The Art of Prayer 
In the centuries following the iconoclastic movement and the restoration of 
the icons, a difference in the style of icons can be observed. It is reasonable to 
assume that the religious painting was consciously and officially elevated as an art 
form, as its narrative and religious functions were widely proven through the wars of 
the icons. At the same time, its stylistic evolution has been interpreted as one of the 
first signs of the Renaissance, in that some of the last Byzantine paintings, such as 
the mosaics and the frescoes of St Saviour in the Chora at Constantinople (Kariye 
A Religious View of the History of the Arts 68 
Camii) from the early fourteenth century, although quite Byzantine in style, can be 
compared only to the works of Cavallini, Giotto and Duccio 1 1 5 inasmuch the change 
in the representation of space and the change in the features of the figures, which 
appear less stern, are concerned. 
The so-called "new style of icons" is, technically speaking, characterized by 
two things: more refined presentation of the figures and more elaborate pictorial 
syntheses, something that constitutes a conceptual evolution from the simple 
representations of Christ and the saints as they were made during the previous 
centuries. In addition to these stylistic features, post-iconoclastic art seems to have an 
altogether more carefully defined role. Captions became a necessity; it was quite 
more important that the represented saint was identified correctly. Repetitions of an 
icon in the same church, something that was happening in the pre-iconoclastic era, do 
not occur any more. Instead, a system of syntagmatically consistent features, such as 
the degree of movement of the represented persons or the viewing angle, seems to be 
pointing to a hierarchy among the icons of a church. Particular saints assume a 
standard way of being represented, with certain features which identify them 
consistently in any context. 
These changes reflect more than an evolution in the representational language 
of the time. The status of the icons had been firmly asserted and their power clearly 
defined "after the iconoclastic crises, therefore their function as objects of veneration 
became more specific. The great semiotic difference is that the weight had shifted 
from the icon as a material object of veneration to the icon as a way to pray and 
venerate God, Christ and the saints. It was made clear that veneration was due to 
them because of their representations, and not because of their inherent supernatural 
powers. The representation itself then became, in some cases, more elaborate in order 
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to portray their theological content more clearly. This can be observed in 
representations of Christ, for instance, which became more detailed and more 
expressive. Icons of Christ intended to demonstrate Christ's dual nature, his divinity 
and his humanity, and representations of his life and passion were meant to be 
accessible to the viewer who would direct his prayer to them. It was quite important 
that Christ's representations reflected events that were meant to be taken as unique 
and very specific, as opposed to representations of saints, that intended to 
demonstrate the generic circumstances of the saints' lives, with which the viewer 
could identify "from the inside", and contemplate the universality of the special 
persons who had divine napprjoia (proximity). 1 1 6 The nature of prayer was different 
in those two cases and the nature of the icons was reflecting exactly this. Therefore, 
whereas icons of Christ tended to become more complex, icons of saints became 
simpler. Icons depicting the miracles of St Nicholas for instance, one of the more 
popular saints in Byzantium and Eastern Christianity, often omitted many of the 
persons directly associated with the miracle or the action in question, such as the 
three daughters of the pauper aided in secret by St Nicholas, who do not appear in 
any icon, although they are quite central in the account of the event.117 In contrast, 
icons of Christ, such the Crucifixion, or even more so the Lamentation (which, not 
being included in the canonical Gospels, makes up by providing more actors than 
required by the canonical story), often include a number of unnamed and 
unimportant characters118 whose only role in the icon is to intensify its dramatic 
quality. The viewer is expected to feel as i f he were included in the icon, and identify 
with those unnamed characters who witness the Crucifixion or mourn over the body 
of Christ, 1 1 9 whereas in the case of the elliptical icons of the saints he is expected to 
address the saint directly, as the saints were intercessors to God. Again, this shows 
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that although the content of each category of icons was quite different, the icon was 
based on its function as an aid to prayer. 
It has been suggested120 that this particular development in style was 
instigated by the increased influence of literature and hymnography on iconography. 
I t is not easy to evaluate the significance of the integration of the narrative 
expression into iconography, because one could present equally valid and profound 
arguments on both sides, arguing in favour or against it. It can be argued that the 
introduction of the analogue of speech into what had been the mirror of God and 
everything unspeakable, was a backward step, a psychological and religious 
devolution, because it reduced the psychological significance of its predecessor, the 
"pure" icon, and, in a way, prepared the way for Renaissance art and the subsequent 
rationalization of art. On the other hand, the icon, or any other medium, can 
effectively assume the psychological weight of the mirror only so far as it also 
assumes its properties and reflects accurately and convincingly the world and the 
person(s) who reflect in it, otherwise the recognition of the self and the Other 
through the mirror is not possible. It would then be reasonable to assume that the 
icon-as-mirror had to take into account the rational part of the psyche as well, which 
was finding a renowned interest and expression in the East and the West. In that 
sense the new style of icons and the subsequent Eastern and Western humanism are 
justified as formal advancements in the development of sacred art. The question that 
arises is whether art in general, in its new capacity as a more precise mirror, still 
acted as the metaphysical mirror/door-to-the-other-world it had been. 
At any rate, the new style of icons shows an evolution in the conscious 
understanding of the icons. In that sense we should not be surprised by the affinity of 
the post-iconoclastic icon and the hymns or the rhetoric of the time, because the 
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greatest part of the changing perception about the role of the icons acquired during 
the iconoclastic debates, was a result of the logical and systematic arguments of both 
parties who brought the issue to the conscious level in order to analyze it and defend 
their position. Rhetoric, and to a lesser extent hymnography, verbal expression in 
general, is more closely associated with rational, left-brain functions. The 
acknowledgement of iconography as an art that can be equally valid and effective as 
the art of words, led naturally to the comparison of the two genres, and iconography 
drew material from verbal expression. 
The problem with this procedure was the challenge it was presenting to the 
function of the icon as the mirror of God, because two opposing elements appear 
simultaneously, although perhaps initially in a balanced way. Rationalization and a 
degree of illusionist or naturalist aspirations were counter-weighted by the stressed 
importance of prayer and the use of art for spiritual ends. It is true that in the late 
Middle Ages we see an increasing humanism, something reflected in the transition 
from anagogy and the theocentric universe to the heliocentric, anthropocentric 
universe of the Renaissance, as discussed in Anti-Leonardo. Still, to describe the 
situation more accurately in the East, we would have to acknowledge the presence of 
the opposite trend as well. Hesychasm, a theological trend and practice that places 
the utmost importance in the essential unity of Heaven and Earth, became a major 
theological issue in the fourteenth century Byzantium. It is fair to say that 
Byzantium, and to a great degree Russia, as its spiritual descendant, responded in its 
own way to the challenge of the changing paradigm. Even today, in the 
contemporary secularized world, spiritual tradition has preserved the insistence to the 
unity of the visible and the invisible world. The Holy Mountain of Athos, for 
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instance, one of the main spiritual centres of Orthodox Christianity, maintains to date 
an unbroken monastic tradition since the tenth century, inspired by such concepts. 
Regardless of the reasons we may list to account for the change in the style of 
icons during the late Byzantine period, we have to acknowledge the underlying 
change in religious expression. After the exoneration of the icon through the 
iconoclastic wars and the doctrinal definition of its liturgical function, we see that the 
attention shifted from the mere presence of icons to the prayer they elicit. Everything 
in the new style of icons points at this change, and the hesychastic movement in late 
Byzantium and Russia gave a new raison d' etre to the icon. 
The hesychastic tradition is based on the continuous repetition of what is 
known as the Jesus prayer or prayer of the heart: Rupis Inaou Xptcrce, Yts Qeov, 
eA£naov ue (Lord Jesus Christ, Son of God, have mercy upon me). This short prayer 
was repeated to such a degree that it became internalized; hesychast monks could 
even feel themselves praying during sleep, something expressed in the saying 
"Ka0eu6(B Kour| Kap5ia uov aYpwtvei" ( I sleep but my heart is awake).121 It is hard to 
say exactly when hesychasm starts. Although certain allusions to the "remembrance" 
or "invocation" of the "Holy Name of Jesus" can be found in the correspondence of 
St Nilus of Ancyra 1 2 2 in the early f if th century, the first Father to assign a central role 
to the Jesus prayer was St Diadochus of Photice in the f i f th century.123 The writings 
of St Diadochus discuss prayer and contemplation of God, but also awareness of the 
intellect and the heart. This, as well as many older patristic sources are consistent 
with the spirit of hesychasm, but perhaps what links St Diadochus with hesychasm as 
a practice is his occasional use of the phrase " T O R6pi£ Incou" (the O Lord Jesus), 
which suggests that a prayer identified as the Lord Jesus prayer was fairly common 
by the fifth century.1 2 4 Later references to the Jesus prayer and hesychasm can be 
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found in several sources, but Nicephorus the Solitary in the thirteenth century, was 
the first to describe the methods of hesychastic prayer in his treatise On the Care of 
the Heart,125 which are strongly reminiscent of Indian meditation techniques. 
Although the hesychastic tradition flourished for many years in Mount Athos 
(one could also note Gregory of Sinai in the thirteenth/fourteenth century who spoke 
of the memory of God,126 an idea surprisingly close to the Platonic ava/uvnaig, but in 
an inverted sense as we saw earlier), it only developed into an apologetic theology 
with St Gregory Palamas in the fourteenth century, when its basic concept of the 
possibility of seeing and uniting with God was challenged by Barlaam, a Greek 
monk from Calabria, who represented the "humanist" views of the t ime 1 2 7 and the 
belief that God can only be known indirectly, through his works and through 
symbols. After a series of animated conflicts between Palamites and Barlaamites, the 
Orthodox Church finally adopted officially the hesychastic doctrines in the Councils 
of 1341, 1347, and 1351. Hesychasm subsequently spread to Romania, Eastern 
Europe and Russia. After the fall of the Byzantine Empire, it survived mainly in 
Russia, and exerted a great influence within Russian theology between the fifteenth 
and the seventeenth century. 
Several techniques are associated with hesychastic prayer. A certain way of 
breathing, a correct posture, an appropriate rhythm and an inward exploration are 
methods the hesychastic tradition has employed, but it would be wrong to identify 
the prayer with these methods. St Gregory Palamas made it clear that the external 
methods are of secondary importance, and could be of use to a beginner, but the 
important thing of the Jesus prayer is "the inner and secret Invocation of the Lord 
A Religious View of the History of the Arts 74 
There is something common to hesychasm and iconography. After the 
iconoclastic controversy it became clear that the icon could not be thought of as an 
object of worship (but as an object of veneration), although the grace of the 
DTiocrracnx; it shares with the represented saint is extended to the material of the icon 
as well. Nevertheless, the religious use of icons, their presence, can only be put to 
use i f they help the communion of the believer with Christ or the saints. Icons, relics 
and prayers would be useless i f they do not correspond to the movement of the heart 
and the soul. The theological content of the veneration of icons and hesychasm is 
similar in this way. The icon and the Jesus prayer can be compared to a Buddhist 
mandala or mantra (there is some literature comparing the Jesus prayer with 
techniques from Yoga and Sufism 1 2 9), in that in both cases the artifact or the 
technique is an aid the believer uses in order to enhance his contemplation of the 
divine, in a very conscious and directed way. Hesychasm can be seen as the art of 
contemplation, an art very similar to iconography. Instead of colours and figures, it 
uses certain techniques, that lead to something much deeper. Contemplation of God 
in the hesychastic tradition, is similar in many ways, especially from a psychological 
point of view, to the contemplation of the iconographic Other, although there are 
certain differences between them, that will be discussed later. 
The inner technique of the Jesus prayer can be described in three 
interpenetrating rather than successive stages: prayer of the lips (oral prayer), prayer 
of the intellect (mental prayer), and prayer of the heart (or of the intellect in the 
heart).1 3 0 This describes an inward journey that begins with a mechanical repetition, 
but ends in something that transcends the mind. The word "heart" here is not to be 
confused with the exclusively emotional content given to it in contemporary culture. 
As Bishop Kallistos Ware points out, 
A Religious View of the History of the Arts 75 
'Heart' in this context is to be understood in the Semitic and biblical 
rather than the modern Western sense, as signifying not just the 
emotions and affections but the totality of the human person. The heart 
is the primary organ of our identity, it is our innermost being, 'the very 
deepest and truest self, not attained except through sacrifice, through 
death'.1 3 1 According to Boris Vysheslavtsev, it is 'the center not only of 
consciousness but of the unconscious, not only of the soul but of the 
spirit, not only of the spirit but of the body, not only of the 
comprehensible but of the incomprehensible; in one word, it is the 
absolute center.'132 Interpreted in this way, the heart is far more than a 
material organ in the body; the physical heart is an outward symbol of 
the boundless spiritual potentialities of the human creature, made in the 
image of God, called to attain his likeness.133 
The goal of the hesychast monk is union with God, deification, something 
that is based on writings of a number of Eastern Fathers such as Gregory of Nyssa 
and Maximus the Confessor. The end of the journey is the participation in the divine 
energies, sometimes evident in the uncreated light the hesychast is graced to see. The 
goal of the journey is the realization of the "likeness of God", and it can be achieved 
through a difficult integration of the mind and the heart: 
To accomplish the journey inwards and to attain true prayer, it is 
required of us to enter into this 'absolute centre', that is, to descend 
from the intellect into the heart. More exactly, we are called to descend 
not from but with the intellect. The aim is not just 'prayer of the heart' 
but 'prayer of the intellect in the heart', for our varied forms of 
understanding, including our reason, are a gift from God and are to be 
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used in his service, not rejected. This 'union of the intellect with the 
heart' signifies the reintegration of our fallen and fragmented nature, 
our restoration to original wholeness. Prayer of the heart is a return to 
Paradise, a reversal of the Fall, a recovery of the status ante peccatum. 
This means that it is an eschatological reality, a pledge and anticipation 
of the Age to Come - something which, in this present age, is never 
fully and entirely realized.134 
The "intellect in the heart" sounds like one of the closest things we have 
towards a coincidentia oppositorum. The psychological trajectory towards union 
with God is comparable to the contemplation of the icon: in both cases we are talking 
about a presence, the presence of God either by the invocation of his Name, or by the 
representation of his human form. To find one's "center" through the movement of 
the intellect in the heart, is to find, or rather to re-awaken, the image of God within 
man. It is no surprise then, that Ouspensky claims that the Russian and Byzantine 
iconography after the fourteenth century reflects and is engendered by the theology 
of hesychasm.135 
Having analyzed two different kinds of religious art, namely two different 
ways of practicing religion through art, we come to wonder about the relationship 
between the two modes, the icon-as-mirror and the icon as aid to prayer, and the 
transition from the one to the other. What is the psychological layer that underlies the 
iconographic issues we have examined? 
We have to remember that the first style of painting found its interpretation in 
the psychological stage of the child's identification in the mirror, which takes place 
from around the sixth to around the eighteenth month. There is a great difference 
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between the mirror and the icon however, which I have not commented on until now: 
the child sees his own image in the mirror, and it is through this image that he can 
identify the correspondence between iconic reality and the objects around him. 
Through the mirror he realizes that he is also an object to be seen, and that others see 
him in the way he sees his own image in the mirror. Yet in the icon his own image is 
missing. The adult who gazes at the icon has passed through the mirror stage and can 
grasp the symbolic meaning of representation. As a matter of fact, an infant of that 
early age would certainly not be able to understand what an icon is, let alone 
comprehend its deeper religious meaning. Iconography is then, by definition, already 
at the symbolic stage. The viewer knows already who are the depicted persons and 
what is their importance for religion. What can we say has replaced the image of the 
self in the mirror? With what can the viewer identify? 
The self cannot be perceived on the surface of the icon, it is only the other 
that is being perceived. The viewer has withdrawn into a perceptually privileged 
space where he is not perceived but all perceiving. When we look at an icon we 
employ a dual kind of perception: on the one hand we know that we are perceiving 
something which is not really there (Christ or St Nicholas), and this is why we can 
look at the terrible images of the Passion and the Crucifixion and not let them disturb 
us as they would i f we physically witnessed them, but we can use this distance in 
order to contemplate on their religious significance instead. On the other hand we 
know that we are the subject of the looking act; we know it is the / that perceives the 
images. We know that we are actually contemplating an icon, that there are some 
external stimuli there, such as the shapes and the colours chosen by the iconographer. 
This dual knowledge enables the viewer to construct a perceptual field that includes 
both the icon and himself in their respective roles, and finally identifies with himself 
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as the perceiving self. As this identification takes place, the viewer implicitly 
realizes that he has entered the discourse of the icon at the expense of perceiving it 
"objectively" from without. The engagement with and acceptance of the symbolic 
presence of the depicted person, ultimately instigates the absence of the viewer, or 
rather his absorption into the realm of the signified. 
The icon is a reminder, or a manifestation, in symbolic/psychological terms, 
of the continual presence of Christ and the Holy Spirit in this world. Although the 
Incarnation occurred only once, its echo is still resounding within the religious soul 
in the same way its icons are there to allow us to enter that event again and again. 
This is not inconsistent with the social dimension of religious practice: every year we 
celebrate the birth of Christ, the divine Passion and the Resurrection, that is we 
observe circular religious time, without losing track of the linear ascent towards 
God. This, however, is the very difference between the two modes of religious 
artistic expression. The icon-as-mirror is a continuous statement of the proximity of 
the invisible world, and at the same time a reminder of our creation in the image and 
likeness of the Creator, a reminder of our relative position to Christ and the divine. 
Still, this artistic statement remains firmly situated within the realm of the symbolic, 
and has the power of a psychological ritual, a symbolic praxis that precedes and 
prepares us for the real praxis, the direct communication with God. 
The second mode of iconography traverses those concerns and focuses on the 
presence of the viewer in, or his transition to the world of the invisible. We could 
argue that the icon assumes a somehow social function, which is expressed by the 
iconography of the church. The prayer icon, on the other hand, commences where the 
social function ends, with the withdrawal of the self and its absorption into the 
numinous world. In this case we have a transcendence of the icon as symbol, a kind 
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of withdrawal of art in favour of the signified, that renders the signifier obsolete. As 
long as an icon is a prayer and meditation aide, we cannot forget that it is only 
secondary to the ascending course of the soul. 
In this section we examined some semiotic issues in iconography, with 
special references to the inverted perspective. The idea of the icon as a mirror that 
implies the presence of the divine, emerged in a psychological extension of the 
semiotic discussion of iconography and the inverted perspective. It has been 
demonstrated that several central theological issues, such as the image of God within 
man, and the doctrine of evil as a privatio boni, are closely connected to iconography 
and the religious/psychological premise of the icon as the mirror of the divine. As a 
device that facilitates the connection of man and God, the icon has been also 
compared to the art of prayer and the hesychastic tradition. 
It is fair to say that iconography reflects the theology of the Eastern Orthodox 
Church on a very profound level. It is probably the sacred art that fulfills its religious 
task in the best possible way, at least within the Christian tradition. Yet, from a 
religious perspective we can note that the art of prayer, regardless of whether it is 
practiced through iconography or not, fulfills the religious and psychological role of 
sacred art better than the art of icon-as-mirror, although this does not mean that these 
two kinds of art have to be mutually exclusive. This simply indicates that 
iconography is an art that prepares one for the contemplation of the divine, and i f 
there was to be an evolutionary step beyond it, from a religious point of view, it 
would involve an even greater contemplation of the divine, a tighter unity of art and 
the sacred, something consistent with Maguire's views on the new style of icons and 
the enhanced role of prayer it implies. 
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Unfortunately, what transpired in the West was exactly the opposite. The de-
sacralization of art and life brought about several problems that will be addressed in 
the following chapters. In that we may remember Belting's assertion of the loss of 
the sacred character of art, and the emergence of art in its modern form, after the 
Reformation. I think, however, that the "wrong turn" can be pinpointed much earlier 
than the Reformation. 
The Aesthetics of the West 
The West followed a distinctly different religious and cultural development 
from the East after some time in the eleventh century, although differences can be 
observed as early as the fourth century. The year of the Great Schism (1054) between 
the Orthodox and the Roman Catholic Church is something of a conventional 
landmark for this divide, although it is difficult to say when the actual separation 
took place. The thirteenth century provided many chances for cultural interactions, 
but it also delivered a quite powerful blow to the psychological unity of East and 
West, with the disgrace of the fourth crusade and the occupation of Constantinople 
by the crusaders of the Fourth Crusade in 1204. Furthermore, we have to keep in 
mind that several European kingdoms which influenced greatly the future of Western 
Europe, were increasing in power; these had never really been in close cultural 
contact with the Byzantine East, at least not to a degree that would allow us to say 
that they had any common religious, cultural or psychological heritage. At any rate, 
the West had always been indifferent to, or even somehow mystified by the worship 
of icons in the East. The iconoclastic war was exclusively an affair of the East, 
although it is true that certain popes like Hadrian took a stance against iconoclasm; 
there does not seem to be any evidence, however, to suggest that the people in the 
West shared the sensitivities of the Iconoclasts or the Iconophiles. Furthermore, and 
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this is even more pertinent to the present analysis, Western mysticism did not 
develop something comparable to the hesychast movement. Some interesting 
differences between Eastern and Western thought can be described as the difference 
between the hesychast East and the rational West (although this is hardly an accurate 
generalization). Yet some writers, like Mircea Eliade, 1 3 7 have characterized the 
famous conflict between Barlaam of Calabria and Gregory Palamas as a difference 
between the spirit of the West, which, between Aquinas and Ockham, was 
abandoning the hope for a unity between heaven and earth, and the East, the spiritual 
elite of which was focusing on experiencing this very unity. We can then say, with a 
great degree of certainty, that the kind of art that found its spiritual justification in 
prayer had no counterpart in the West. An opposition between devotion and art can 
be found in teachings like those of Bernard of Clairvaux. The tension between 
Cluniac and Cistercian monasticism has often been portrayed in terms reminiscent of 
the tension between Iconophiles and Iconoclasts, as the following passage from a 
study on twelfth century architecture demonstrates: 
The more the Cistercians, under the lead of St Bernard affected to 
despise the plastic arts, the more refinement did the Clunisians put into 
their constructions, their furniture and vestments; the dispute grew 
warm, and the Clunisians, like all men who arrive at a high degree of 
civilization in the midst of a rude state of society, saw in their rivals the 
merest barbarians, and fought against their extreme Puritanism by 
filling the popular mind with the love of art as far as it was 
practicable.138 
A full analysis of the analogy between iconoclasm and the Cistercians would 
be an interesting task, but not quite within the scope of the present study. Certainly 
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the iconoclastic puritanism of Bernard of Clairvaux was not as extreme as the 
iconoclasm of the emperor Constantine V, but one may suspect that some of the 
sensitivities behind the official arguments were similar. A thorough analysis on St 
Bernard's theory of art 1 3 9 argues that the Cistercian view was, in principle, as much 
fond of art as the Cluniac one, but, echoing Augustine's writings on art, it made it a 
point not to tolerate deviation from what was supposed to be the true task of sacred 
art. Not as extreme as to not tolerate any artistic innovation at all, since St Bernard 
himself was the composer of a "new" Office of St Victor,140 the Cistercian view held 
that the aesthetic should be subjected to the devotional.141 The similarity with 
iconoclasm ends here, because there is no evidence of the Iconoclasts reacting 
against something like the "secularized" character of icons. Quite the opposite; it 
seems that they rather wanted to prevent images from attempting to depict the 
supernatural. As far as the transcendental character of art is concerned, it would be 
more likely for a defender of icons in the Byzantine sense to align himself with the 
Cistercian rather than the Cluniac view; the former did not exclude art altogether, but 
made provisions for the kind of art whose character was truly devotional, whereas 
the latter anticipated the secularization of the icon. 
The pursuit of a philosophical or psychological continuity behind the major 
doctrinal disputes of the Church would be a major undertaking worthy of many years 
of study and many volumes of writing. Carl G. Jung occasionally touched upon such 
a venture, for example in his seminal work Psychological Types, where he delineated 
the problem of psychological types in the history of Classical and Medieval 
thought.1 4 2 In this work, he sees the ancient opposition between the Ebionites and the 
Docetists as the precursor of the conceptual opposition between the Arians and the 
Monophysites, then the disagreement between Eriugena and Radbertus on the issue 
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of transubstantiation during the Eucharist (although Jung was mistaken on this one: 
writings on the Eucharist believed to be written by Eriugena, as it turned out, were 
not written by him), and finally the contrast between nominalism and realism. One 
could feel tempted to connect this line of analytical thought to the iconoclastic war 
and its probable transplantation in the West of the twelfth and the sixteenth century. 
The issues at hand, however, are rather complicated for a straight comparison 
between East and West, to begin with. Moreover, the psychological and 
philosophical luggage of art has a quite focused nature, that is perhaps not explored 
in the best possible way with an approach as broad as the examination of the 
psychological types. It would be more sound, methodologically speaking, to seek a 
departure point common to the artistic/religious understanding of East and West, and 
follow the separating branches of thought. Certainly, by the twelfth century there 
appears to be a gap between the role of art as it was understood in the Cistercian or 
Cluniac West, and Byzantium, yet we have to assume that there is a common 
psychological inheritance between them. Therefore, we have to look for a common 
course at some point long before that stage. Not having any serious indications that 
the West had developed a separate understanding of religious art before the 
iconoclastic wars, we can assume that it shared the stage of the icon-as-mirror with 
the East. 
A work that will prove to be very helpful in the study of the representational 
art of the western Middle Ages in the current analysis is the Mirrors by Vincent of 
Beauvais, the great encyclopedist of the thirteenth century. The work is divided into 
four parts, studying four kinds of "mirrors" that can be used metaphorically to order 
the knowledge and the artistic understanding of the time: the Mirror of Nature, the 
Mirror of Knowledge, the Mirror of Morality, and the Mirror of History143 The 
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Mirrors reflect principles of representation, which have to do mainly with the 
decoration of the Western European cathedrals of the late Middle Ages. 
The Mirror of Nature reflects the created order of the world, organized 
according to the six days of creation. Natural elements, minerals, plants and animals 
are enumerated and described one after the other. The human being, as the work of 
the sixth day, is placed at the top of the order. The entire natural world is seen as 
reflecting the thought of God, and is charged with multiple layers of meaning that 
can reveal God's thought to us. Contemplation of the created order can lead to 
contemplation of the invisible world and God himself. Nature is seen as one of God's 
ways to teach us. A symbolic meaning is found even in animals or plants. Hugh of 
Saint-Victor saw the dove as a symbol of the Church: 
The dove has two wings, just as, for the Christian, there are two sorts of 
life, the active and the contemplative. The blue feathers of the wings 
signify thoughts of heaven. The wavering nuances of the rest of the 
body, colours as changeful as an agitated sea, symbolize the ocean of 
human passions on which the Church makes its way. And why does the 
dove have eyes of such beautiful yellow gold? Because yellow, colour 
of ripe fruits, is the colour of experience and maturity. The yellow eyes 
of the dove symbolize the look, full of wisdom, with which the Church 
considers the future. Finally, the dove has red feet, for the Church 
advances through the world her feet deep in the blood of martyrs.1 4 4 
This symbolist tendency, however, was only up to a point charged with 
theological meaning. Medieval artists gradually, but as early as at least the twelfth 
century, as noted by Viollet-le-Duc in his Dictionary of French Architecture,145 took 
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the liberty of representing flowering buds, then flowers, branches, rose stalks and 
vine shoots, with no particular concern for a symbolic underlying meaning. This 
decorative trend made no effort to interpret the mystery of the Fall and the 
Redemption, in contrast with the austere and always intentionally symbolic use of 
flowers in early medieval art. Flowers and images of the spring in icons of the 
Annunciation, for instance, are juxtaposed with the Virgin in order to express the 
idea that she is the life-giving source (£GOO86%OC; 7rnyr|),146 but in the case of the 
(mostly) Gothic stone flora the artists took a decorative rather than symbolic interest. 
This is quite important, because here we can observe one of the early cases where 
secular art acquires an existence independent from theological meaning, anticipating 
the emergence of the art object on its own. 
The Mirror of Knowledge is based on the idea that man can work towards his 
redemption through knowledge and the seven liberal arts, which correspond to the 
seven gifts, granted by the Holy Spirit. According to Vincent of Beauvais, the work 
of humanity's redemption starts with manual labor and the acquisition of 
knowledge.1 4 7 Manual labor mostly means agriculture. Its representation was usually 
arranged in representations that followed the yearly cycle of agricultural work, and 
we therefore see representations of June as the month of mowing, July as the month 
of harvest, and so on. Of course, different regions followed different patterns in their 
representations, according to their climate, and thus February, for instance, is a cold 
winter month when nothing much happens in northern France, whereas in Italy the 
peasants already prune their vineyards.148 
The representation of knowledge included, except the seven liberal arts, the 
representation of Philosophy. At the cathedral of Laon the representation of 
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Philosophy is inspired by its description by Boethius in the Consolation of 
Philosophy: 
The features of her face inspired the deepest respect. There was light in 
her glance, and one felt that it pierced deeper than any mortal gaze. She 
had the colouring of vigor and youth, though one was well aware that 
she was full of days and her age could not be measured as ours is. As 
for her height, one could form no very clear idea of it, for sometimes 
she reduced her stature to human proportions, sometimes her head 
seemed to touch the sky, and sometimes it seemed to pierce beyond the 
sky and disappear from the curious gaze of men. Her garments were 
woven with great art, of delicate and incorruptible threads; she told me 
later that she had woven them with her own hands. But time, which 
dulls all works of art, had dimmed their luster and obscured their 
beauty. On the lower fringe of her gown was woven the Greek letter %, 
and on the upper border the letter 0. To go from the one to the other 
there was a series of steps resembling a ladder, leading from the 
inferior to the superior elements. One could see that the garments had 
been rent violently by hands which had torn away all they could. In her 
right hand she carried books, and in her left hand a scepter.149 
Indeed, the statue of Philosophy at Laon follows this description strictly, 
except for the Greek letters, which are said to represent the practical (ri) and the 
theoretical (0) aspects of Philosophy.150 It is important to observe that this 
representation contrasts with the criticism of philosophy as the "outward" or pagan 
wisdom for Byzantine theologians from St Basil in the fourth century to St Gregory 
Palamas in the fourteenth. This is an indication of how widespread this difference 
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between Eastern and Western thought had become by the late Middle Ages. We only 
have to remember that the series of confrontations between St Gregory Palamas and 
Barlaam of Calabria, one of the central issues of which was exactly the contrast 
between inward and outward wisdom, took place in the fourteenth century. 
Knowledge and philosophy are, in a sense, the continuation of the apotheosis of the 
mind as the anima rationalis. By that time the interpretation that was given to the 
supremacy of the mind was quite evident. 
The Mirror of Morality does not differ much from the Mirror of Knowledge, 
in that they both comment on the human effort towards perfection. The former, 
however, focuses on the specific knowledge of Virtues and Vices according to their 
anthropomorphic description in the Psychomachia of Prudentius151 and, in that sense 
it is much closer to the "inward wisdom." We can detect an important change since 
the Psychomachia, however. The Virtues are still represented anthropomorphically, 
as seated women, but the Vices do not enjoy the same status, and are represented 
through the depiction of human actions. Discord, for instance, is represented by a 
man beating his wife, and Inconstancy is represented by a monk leaving his 
monastery. The placement of good and evil within the domain of human action is an 
important psychological step, as it illustrates a more responsible approach of 
morality. Perhaps echoing the patristic aphorism "everything good comes from God 
[from outside] and everything evil comes from man [from inside]" the Vices in the 
Mirror of Morality are treated in a more mature way, being identified with human 
passions and not represented as independent demons who prey on the innocent, but 
the Virtues are still represented as external agents, almost beyond human control. 
This one-sided representation projects a rather negative view of the concept of 
morality. According to it, one needs to subdue the negative side of the self and 
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conquer one's passions, but there does not seem to be an analogous positive side to 
the moral work that would somehow balance the account; the battle against evil and 
the Vices is what one does actively, whereas Virtue seems to merely happen to one. 
This is a break from the earlier ascetic tradition where the negation of evil and the 
progression into good assumed equal importance. John of Damascus on the other 
hand, wrote in the eighth century on the Virtues and the Vices, and presented them 
both as conditions of the soul, which one has to actively avoid or actively pursue. 
Examining these issues in relation to the Mirror of Morality, it is hard not to 
see the connection to the troubled doctrine of privatio boni and its connection to the 
privileged position of reason. Since evil does not have an existence separate from the 
good and is its mere absence, it is rational to assume that to subdue what is evil 
means to walk towards the good. The problem with this assumption is that although 
evil does not have a real existence in the metaphysical world (something like this 
would not only cast a considerable doubt on monotheism, it would also suggest that 
man has to fight - in vain - against an adversary much more powerful than him), it 
does in the psychological world. This seems to be C.G. Jung's main objection to the 
doctrine of privatio boni: it is not corroborated by the experience of the 
psychoanalyst, quite the contrary. Jung seems quite eager to accept the metaphysical 
truth of the privatio boni in works like Aion, but in his capacity as a psychoanalyst 
he states that "psychological experience shows that whatever we call good is 
balanced by an equally substantial bad or evil."i52 What we see in the Mirror of 
Morality is perhaps an earlier stage of the discrepancy between metaphysical and 
psychological truth on the nature of evil. As I argued earlier, the problem was not in 
the doctrine itself, but in its connection to reason as the only locus of the image of 
God in the human nature. Reason alone cannot assist us in the exploration of the 
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numinous, but observation of the kind of rational arguments articulated in the late 
Middle Ages, suggests that what was taking place was not the emergence of the pure 
rational mind, but an orientation towards it, of rather psychological content; 
arguments such as Anselm's ontological proof for the existence of God 1 5 3 may not 
have much value as rational structures, but they are quite indicative of a trend to 
incorporate reason into faith. Such an attempt must have seemed quite alluring at the 
time, because it could promise the final victory of good over evil. I f there is no doubt 
whatsoever for the existence of God, i f his existence can be proven in the objective, 
scientific terms of a rational argument, man would easily subdue his irrational self. In 
that sense, reason as it was conceived and given to the religious tradition by Origen 
and Augustine, would succeed in transforming man into the true image of God. The 
problem is that it is, and was, debatable whether reason alone can contribute towards 
knowledge of God. Of course theologians as Thomas Aquinas have generally 
supported the power of the rational mind, arguing that it is possible to prove the 
existence of God by reason, whereas others, as William of Ockham, insisted that 
logic alone cannot prove it. It would be a massive task to review the theological 
literature on this issue, but at least from a psychological point of view we can see a 
connection between the writings of Origen and Augustine, and the subsequent 
importance given to reason, which is too complex to be explained as a kind of 
theological or philosophical continuity alone. Yet, since the issues of imago Dei and 
privatio boni were translated into a practice that went beyond official doctrine, and 
contributed in the psychological development of Western culture, logic surfaced 
again in the late Middle Ages after the re-discovery of Aristotle, as the highest, 
holiest part of the self, for reasons that cannot be explained on the basis of 
theological argument alone. In a kind of dramatic irony, I think that the motives 
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behind the domination of reason in the time after the Middle Ages, are more of 
psychological rather than of rational nature. 
The last Mirror to be examined by Vincent of Beauvais is the Mirror of 
History. It follows naturally after the more general view of the world, and it presents 
the history of humanity, sometimes choosing virtue and sometimes choosing vice. 
History of the world means, for Vincent of Beauvais, the history of the Church, 
which includes the Old and the New Testament, as well as the history of humanity 
since the Incarnation. Pagan history exists only marginally, to the extent that it can 
be somehow connected to the history of the Church. 
The Mirror of History interprets the Old Testament more or less through the 
New Testament, as its prefiguration, and places a lot of importance in allegory. In the 
words of Emile Male, 
that which the Gospel shows men in the light of sun, the Old Testament 
showed them in the uncertain light of the moon and stars. In the Old 
Testament truth is veiled, but the death of Christ rent that mystic veil 
and that is why we are told in the Gospel that the veil of the Temple 
was rent in twain at the time of the Crucifixion. Thus it is only in 
relation to the New Testament that the Old Testament has 
significance.134 
The image of the veiled truth of the Old Testament is as old as Origen and 
Augustine's City of God. We see no deviation from the medieval view in principle as 
far as the importance of the Old Testament is understood exclusively through the 
Gospels. The way this prefiguration was expressed however, reveals a split which, 
although by no means a product of the late Middle Ages, is quite evidently 
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manifested here, as early as the third century. There is a difference of opinion as to 
how is supernatural biblical imagery to be interpreted. Origen was probably the first 
writer who supported a metaphorical or "allegorical" interpretation of the Creation, 
whereas St Basil in E^a^juspov maintained that the book of Genesis has to be 
understood literally. Origen, characteristically, asked the rhetorical question "who is 
stupid enough to believe that God like a gardener made plantations in Eden, and 
really placed there a tree named the tree of life which could be seen by the bodily 
eye?"155 This view was taken up by writers like Hilary, Ambrose, Augustine, and 
Gregory the Great, and it is fully manifested in the "pure" Western art of the 
thirteenth century, although Roman Catholicism eventually decided against it at the 
Council of Trent. 1 5 6 At this point we can witness the flourish of the allegorical, 
especially in conjunction with a more realistic view of the life on earth as it was 
described in the agricultural life of the Mirror of Knowledge. 
It is interesting that the Mirror of History includes a large portion of 
apocryphal writings, mostly the ones that relate to the New Testament. The Gospel of 
Nicodemus, for instance, has been used extensively in the East and the West as a 
source of inspiration for the events surrounding the divine Passion. Although the 
long-held view of the Gospel of Nicodemus as the exclusive source for the Eastern 
image of Resurrection has been recently disputed by Anna Kartsonis,1 5 7 the 
similarity between them is telling, and certainly not coincidental, at least after the 
seventh century. Gothic art showed, on the other hand, a preference for the Gospel of 
Pseudo-Matthew and the details pertaining to the Nativity. 1 5 8 The Adoration of the 
Magi, described in later sources such as the Golden Legend of Jacobus de 
Voragine 1 5 9 also became a favourite theme of the West, perhaps reflecting the 
submission of temporal to ecclesiastical authority, although it would be foolhardy to 
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conjecture a simplistic interpretation of what is actually a rather complex issue. In 
the Golden Legend it is related that the Magi were also kings, and thus the image of 
their Adoration assumed a different meaning. The difference of opinion as to the 
theological preeminence of the Nativity or the Resurrection in the East and the West 
however, has been alluded to in other parts of this study, but putting the theological 
arguments aside for the moment, we may observe that the taste of iconography was 
drawn towards the depiction of the visually impossible, the representation of the 
victory of Christ over Hades, whereas later art attempted to expand on the images 
that resonated with a kind of familiarity with the everyday human experience. We 
may remember at this point that the contrast between the Jewish and the Greek 
concept of religiosity was expressed earlier in this chapter by the view that the center 
of religious consciousness was there for the Jews and here for the Greeks. The same 
kind of contrast may be observed in a comparison between the Middle Ages and the 
Renaissance which was, after all, a rediscovery of the Greek tradition. 
Having considered the four Mirrors of Vincent of Beauvais, we can wonder 
about the psychological line that started with the icon as the mirror of God, and 
concluded with the cathedral art as a detailed mirror of nature, knowledge, morality, 
and history. What are the differences or the similarities between the two cases? 
A fundamental difference is that iconography attempts to reflect what is 
beyond the visible world, to somehow imply the uncircumscribable through its 
relation to the circumscribable. Western cathedral art, on the other hand, seems to be 
quite focused on everything but the world of the invisible. The four Mirrors reflect 
the visible world, perhaps stressing how much it was shaped by God and his actions, 
but the focus lies undoubtedly on the earth and not in the world of the invisible. What 
we find in the art of the Gothic cathedrals is an expansion on biblical stories in a way 
A Religious View of the History of the Arts 93 
that aligned them with the popular understanding of the universe. What could be seen 
and experienced in this world was, especially after the controversy surrounding the 
thought of William of Ockham and its contrast to the thought of Thomas Aquinas, 
the only possible testimony of God we may have in this life, whereas the East 
allowed for the possibility of a more direct connection with the divine. It is not 
important that deification and the contemplation of the uncreated light could be 
achieved by only a small number of hard-praying monks; the mere possibility of such 
divine grace was enough to suggest a model of the universe where the visible and the 
invisible exist side by side. Maybe God could not be viewed directly, but, as another 
Medusa, he could at least be viewed indirectly, through a mirror. The mirror of the 
soul could be turned directly towards God, and this is exactly what the icon tried to 
accomplish. A mirror always reflects what it is turned to, however. The mirror of the 
West reflected the world as it appeared from the outside, and the humans as part of it, 
but it then began to reflect an internal psychological world. 
It is obvious that the Mirrors demonstrate what will be described later {Anti-
Leonardo) as the anagogic view of the world. Nature, Knowledge, Morality and 
History are all interpreted through the presence of God, and this is characteristic of 
the Middle Ages. We examined the four Mirrors in some detail here, because they 
illustrate an important moment in the development of religious ideas. The universe 
was still very much theocentric, but art had started to posit some rules and demands 
of its own, something rather different from Byzantine iconography, even the 
iconography of the so-called Renaissance of the Paleologians. To make the 
connection with the psychological significance of the icon as mirror of the soul, 
behind which the divine Other was seeing the viewer as much as the viewer was 
seeing the icon, we see that in late medieval art, the art described by Vincent of 
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Beauvais, in the Mirrors of Nature, Knowledge, Morality and History, does not have 
the same psychological-religious content. Nothing that can be described in religious 
terms exists behind the mirror. The Other behind the mirror of art was reduced to its 
psychological dimension, and it continued to exist in this dimension until now. 
Anagogy, in science and in art, was a device used by the people to understand the 
world as a creation of God better, but it was a mirror turned towards the visible, 
tangible world only. 
An iconographer once told me that the study of old icons shows that 
Byzantine iconographers sometimes used more colours than the ones the eye can 
distinguish - but always with an austere style, never resulting in explicitly multi-
coloured fancy paintings. Although I was not able to verify this piece of information, 
I have to say that it sounds plausible on the grounds that the colours used by 
Byzantine iconographers, as well as the particular mixes between them, often had a 
deeper religious meaning that corresponded not only to the colours, but sometimes 
also to the materials.160 Perhaps not even the iconographers themselves could tell the 
difference, but this intriguing piece of information describes very effectively the 
essence of iconography, regardless of whether it is true or not: icons were not made 
to be admired by human eyes for their art, as much as they were made to correspond 
to the invisible, supernatural world, which they never attempted to represent in a 
naturalist manner. There is a huge artistic gap between this kind of art and the art of 
Western medieval cathedrals, and unfortunately most histories of Western art start 
with the latter understanding of art, ignoring the art of icons, or dismissing it naively 
as "symbolic", as i f iconography has no place in Western art tradition, although it is 
widely known that it was by no means the art of the East only. The examination of 
the Mirrors shows that a huge change in the understanding of art took place in the 
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late Middle Ages. Artistic anagogy here, in contrast to iconography which is the art 
of divine presence, shows that there is a distinction between what thought or art can 
conceive and describe, and what really exists outside representation (God). Anagogy 
seems to infer the existence of God, and it can create meanings taking images from 
the earthly world only. Even when biblical or supernatural characters are portrayed, 
their features are as naturalistic as in the representation of any human being, perhaps 
with the exception of the representation of mythological monsters like gargoyles and 
griffins. The shift from the representation of the unseen and the metaphysical 
dimensions of the icon to the representation of life on earth signifies a replacement of 
the ancient opposition between Good and Evil by the opposition between Heaven 
and Earth. These four constitute a Quartemio that describes the entire Cosmos. 
Conclusion 
The two previous sections have dealt with art in the medieval East and West, 
respectively. A general comparison between the two would be impossible here, 
because the historical, ethnographical and sociological differences in the 
development of East and West are too many to allow us perform such a task. On the 
other hand, Eastern art has been often interpreted and criticized from a Western point 
of view, because the history and philosophy of art as we know it has been based on 
the scientific spirit of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment. For the purposes of 
this study, however, we have adopted a religious perspective which has been 
consistent with the concept of art as it emerged from the metaphysics of the Jews and 
the art of the Greeks, and as it evolved into the kind of sacred art that has been best 
represented by iconography. Contemporary art, or rather a strand of sacred art that 
has survived, mostly within religious music, will be also discussed later (The 
Religious Artist). In the following chapters (Anti-Leonardo, The Death of Art) we 
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shall discuss some of the problems of post-medieval Western art from a religious 
perspective. 
The metaphor of the mirror with its psychological extensions has been used 
extensively for the interpretation of Eastern and Western art, providing a common 
level of reference for both cultures, a yardstick as it were, to measure the position of 
each kind of art vis-a-vis the inherited dichotomy between the Jewish and the Greek 
mode of art. In Byzantium and Russia we saw that the main representative of 
religious art was the icon as a mirror of the soul and a window to the metaphysical 
realm. Even when the East faced the Renaissance paradigm shift, in the so-called 
Renaissance of the Paleologians but also in the numerous iconographic crises of 
Renaissance Russia, it tried to maintain the link between religious art, and 
metaphysical inspiration and mystical theology. It is noteworthy that Renaissance in 
the East coincided with the rise of hesychasm. Despite the various changes in the 
iconographic style of the time, or maybe because of them, the function of the icon as 
an aid to prayer and contemplation was maintained and strengthened. 
Moreover, it is important to state that iconography of this period did not 
attempt to employ the kind of visual illusion that became popular and almost 
synonymous with Renaissance art in the West and its emancipation from sacred 
models. There are great differences between the art of Cimabue or Giotto and 
Byzantine art from the Renaissance of the Paleologians. One has to keep in mind 
that, in spite of any "humanist" tendencies that can be detected in late Byzantium, the 
theological concerns of the fourteenth century (the hesychast controversy) focused 
on the relation of man and God, and culminated in the doctrine of deification. Leonid 
Ouspensky argues that Eastern Renaissance gave more weight to hesychasm and the 
search for the "wisdom within" rather than to humanism and the "external wisdom", 
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in an entire comparative chapter (Hesychasm and Humanism: The Paleologan 
Renaissance) of his Theology of the Icon.161 Furthermore, hesychasm and 
introspective theology proved to be the element that more than others illustrated the 
difference between West and East (Russia) in the sixteenth century. The next chapter 
in Ouspensky's Theology of the Icon (Hesychasm and the Flowering of Russian 
A r t 1 6 2 ) examines the debt of Renaissance Russian iconography to hesychasm. 
Perhaps exaggerating a bit, Ouspensky claims that all the leading iconographers of 
that time were hesychasts themselves, or somehow associated with the hesychast 
movement.163 Even i f his claim is not historically accurate, it definitely reflects how 
important was the issue of the unity between the spiritual and the material. 
Iconography in East and West alike reflected this by representing the humanity of 
Christ as an indication of the potential proximity of man and God and, in that sense, 
the more "naturalist" an icon was, the heavier the metaphysical message it contained. 
At the same time, no concession was to be made to the representation of Christ's 
divinity. This premise was not developed in the same way in the East and the West, 
though. The human nature of Christ became, as we shall see in Anti-Leonardo, a 
central theme of Western Renaissance painting, but the Renaissance and the late 
Byzantine concepts of the representation of Christ's humanity were diametrically 
opposed. Despite the technical developments of the Paleologan Renaissance, the 
metaphysical character of iconography and the practice of addressing God through 
the icon were still essential to what icons were about. The iconographers of the late 
Byzantine period were able to maintain a conceptual balance between a convincing 
representation of the visible and of the imaginary - reminiscent of the Greek popular 
and demotic literature, where horses and birds speak, the dead come back to visit the 
living, and the hero of the tale often has to find his way back from the underworld. A 
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moderate naturalism as well as belief in the supernatural, nurtured by the hesychastic 
tradition, can be observed: 
The last Byzantines - in contrast to the Italians - made room for the 
natural, but without developing a naturalism; made use of depth 
without imprisoning it in the laws of perspective; and explored the 
human without isolating it from the divine. 1 6 4 
The Mirrors of Vincent of Beauvais, on the other hand, show a quite different 
treatment of the mirror theme. The Western mirror is opaque, compared to the mirror 
of the icon. The semiotic point of convergence for the iconic figures is the "Eye of 
God", which corresponds psychologically to a real presence of the divine, to the 
psychological Other, whereas there is no counterpart for the "Eye of God" or any 
other kind of divine presence in the Western painting. It is true that the art of the 
large medieval Cathedrals illustrates an anagogic understanding of the world, 
because everything it represents receives its meaning only through reference to God, 
but this kind of reference seems weak compared to the presence of God inferred by 
icons. Along with theistic epistemic anagogy, which seems to fulf i l l a rational need 
(because the connection to God is used to make meaning out of the world), through 
an observation of a more psychological nature we can detect a growing chasm 
between Heaven and Earth. The images described in the Mirrors of Vincent of 
Beauvais show an increasing physical resemblance to the objects they represent: 
anagogy may still be the dominant epistemic order, but the shift towards analogy and 
the gradual shift from a theistic universe to an anthropocentric one, further discussed 
in Anti-Leonardo, is already evident. 
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This view is corroborated by Mircea Eliade's observation that Romanesque 
art combined images from "two opposing universes"165, Good and Evil. Hideous, 
deformed monsters and demonic beings that provoked the reaction of St Bernard 
who wondered "What do these ridiculous monsters signify in our cloisters, these 
horrible beauties and these beautiful horrors?"166 were brought to the same 
syntagmatic level as images of Christ, the saints and the Virgin. What we can see 
here is the weakening of a dividing line that separated Good and Evil in Heaven and 
Earth alike, and its replacement by another dividing line, separating the beings of the 
visible world from the beings of the invisible world. The acknowledgement of the 
latter separation reflects a society that, although it was not atheistic, it was seeing a 
greater distance between the material and the metaphysical world, and was thus 
becoming increasingly secular. Subsequently, within this framework it would be 
meaningless for religious art to maintain its significance as a sign of the presence of 
God and the unity of the physical and the metaphysical. Art, originating in the 
material realm, could only become more secular. 
From a religious perspective, this secularization of the work of art can be 
interpreted as a loss of the essentially spiritual nature and function of art. Our 
discussion of the icon showed that the thematic of art is only one of the many factors 
that contribute in its religious work. The psychological understanding of religious 
symbols may, ultimately, play a more important role in the work of religious art. An 
important difference between Medieval and Renaissance aesthetics as far as the 
relationship of art and religion is concerned, is that whereas art in Byzantium seems 
to be vivified and motivated by religion and by a personal connection of the self with 
the divine, Renaissance art can sometimes be described as only superficially 
religious, even when its thematic is religious. Renaissance saw the withdrawal of 
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spirituality in favour of the independence of the art object, and this affected 
profoundly the structure and the essence of art proper. Secular art was, more or less, 
at the fringes of the artistic vanguard in the Middle Ages, but the roles of religious 
and secular art were reversed in the Renaissance and it is the religious element that 
passes to the fringes of an art which was from then on led by secular concerns. 
It is interesting to note that the work of art in the East, or perhaps in the 
common tradition of East and West, had a direct relationship to the doctrines and the 
ideas surrounding the issues of privatio boni, and the image of God within man. The 
West, following a line that extends at least as back as Augustine and the importance 
he gave to the anima rationalis, developed scholasticism more or less at the same 
time the East was elevating hesychasm and the possibility of deification within one's 
natural life at the level of doctrine. Accordingly, the work of art in the West 
developed rules that corresponded to or were inspired by science and rationalism. On 
the other hand, the fascination of the East with the icon and the iconographic and 
iconoclastic issues that were often revived in Byzantium but also in Russia, that is, 
the exceptional importance the East gave to non-verbal symbols, may be connected 
with its theological strife for unity of the rational with the emotional part of man. 
From a certain historical point on, the split between East and West reflects an 
opposition between the sacred and the profane, at least in art. Development of art in 
terms of building on the accepted conventions and the expectations of the audience, 
the continuous creation and transcendence of artistic and conceptual schemata, a key 
concept in Ernst Gombrich's view of art history, reflects the philosophical 
framework of Western science. This will be explored further in Anti-Leonardo, 
where the conceptual kinship between Gombrich and the philosophy of Karl Popper 
will be discussed. 
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On the other hand, sacred art of the East was, and still is, informed and 
engendered by religion. A development of art in such terms would accept and 
encourage any changes that would allow art to perform its religious role better. Such 
development can be said to be reflected in the new style of icons, but also in the 
development of the iconostasis, discussed by Ouspensky.167 The secular orientation 
of the West would be seen from an Eastern perspective as a sterile path that separated 
the intellect from the heart, something that would inevitably produce the problems 
that brought about the discourse on the death of (secular) art. As we saw in the 
discussion of hesychastic ideas, in the journey towards deification one must enter 
into one's "absolute centre" and unite the intellect with the heart. This practice 
contradicts the psychological repression that resulted from the Western line of 
thought that would tend to identify as "not good", therefore somehow evil, the part of 
man that does not fall under the divine image that was identified with the anima 
rationalis. Ultimately, something that could be indicative of the relationship between 
the concept of art as it was developed in the West after the Middle Ages, and the 
modern fragmentation of the, self, is that in the modern age we see a profound change 
of our understanding of the self at more or less the same time the conditions for the 
death of (Western) art appeared. Virtually every school of psychology, from Freud 
and Jung to Carl Rogers and popular psychology, recognize the need for a 
reunification of the self and a kind of acknowledgement of the non-rational part of 
the psyche. I f we accept that this has become a general, genuine psychological and 
cultural trend of our society, we may suspect that it is not unconnected with the crisis 
of the art that was based on the separation of the intellect from the heart. 
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Anti-Leonardo 
Historical Definition of the Function of the Religious Work of Art 
In several places in this study it has been mentioned that the medieval artists 
did not feel they had to make their name known to the public that enjoyed their art. 
Not without a degree of humour, it is known that the most prolific composer of (as 
late as) the fourteenth composer is "Anonymous". The role of the artist at the time 
was no different from the role of a craftsman, in the sense that the occasional artistic 
innovations, such as the much discussed "new style of icons" of the late Byzantine 
period, were not so much an affair of artistic creativity and originality, but rather an 
issue of what needed to be expressed at a particular historical point; it was not up to 
the artist to define what needed to be expressed or represented, but it was up to the 
people and the institutions concerned with the function of art instead, namely the 
Church and the (religious) intellectuals. Most of the art produced in the Middle Ages 
was commissioned by the Church, which was accordingly setting the rules for it. The 
role of the artist, technically speaking, was to follow the guidelines set out by the 
Church and carry out the work assigned to him. Ultimately, what was important was 
the functionality of art, regardless of its artistic merit as we would understand it 
today.1 This is an important issue, which has been touched upon in several other 
places in this study, and it deserves a short discussion. 
The definition of the function of art, religious art in specific, became an issue 
in the Renaissance, both in the West and in the East. As Michael Baxandall observes, 
discussing the art of the early Renaissance Italy, the term '"religious pictures' refers 
to more than just a certain range of subject matter; it means that the pictures existed 
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to meet institutional ends, to help with specific intellectual and spiritual activities."2 
In fact, the function of the "religious pictures" could be defined only by the Church, 
which is responsible for these intellectual and spiritual activities. In that sense there 
was no academic or artistic challenge to the function of the religious work of art 
independent from its religious role, as far as the Church was concerned. Baxandall 
cites a few texts that are quite illuminating as to the role of religious art. First, from 
what was a standard dictionary of the early Renaissance, John of Genoa's 
Catholicon, written in the end of the thirteenth century: 
Know that there were three reasons for the institution of images in 
churches. First, for the instruction of simple people, because they are 
instructed by them as i f by books. Second, so that the mystery of the 
incarnation and the examples of the Saints may be the more active in 
our memory through being presented daily to our eyes. Third, to excite 
feelings of devotion, these being aroused more effectively by things 
seen than by things heard.3 
Moreover, demonstrating that the view of the Church was quite consistent 
well into the spirit of the Italian Quattrocento, Baxandall adds the following text, 
from a sermon published in 1492, written by the Dominican Fra Michele da Carcano: 
Images of the Virgin and the Saints were introduced for three reasons. 
First, on account of the ignorance of the simple people, so that those 
who are not able to read the scriptures can yet learn by seeing the 
sacraments of our salvation and faith in pictures... Second, images 
were introduced on account of our emotional sluggishness; so that men 
who are not aroused to devotion when they hear about the histories of 
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the Saints may at least be moved when they see them, as i f actually 
present, in pictures. For our feelings are aroused by things seen more 
than by things heard. Third, they were introduced on account of our 
unreliable memories... Images were introduced because many people 
cannot retain in their memories what they hear, but they do remember i f 
they see images.4 
From both these texts we can see that the function of the religious images was 
to instruct, to stir the religious emotions of the people, and to inspire feelings of 
devotion. Baxandall observes that these demands leave space for, although they do 
not depend on, aesthetic goals, as far as the aesthetic did not present a problem for 
the religious function of the image. In fact, Baxandall implies that one of the ways to 
explain the stylistic transformation of the style of religious images from traditional 
icons to Renaissance paintings was that images in their new, Renaissance style, were 
more "lucid, vividly memorable, and emotionally moving" for the religious public.5 
In the East, on the other hand, Leonid Ouspensky describes a more difficult 
situation, but perhaps even more illuminating as to the issue of the role of religious 
images. For a number of reasons, seventeenth century Russia was in an iconographic 
crisis. For one thing, an increasing demand for icons led to a substantial increase in 
the number of iconographers, many of which did not have the necessary technical 
knowledge.6 Texts of the time show that there was an overall attempt to address the 
problem of cheaply made icons, but it seems that nobody was able to tackle the 
problem without stumbling on the question of whether the artistic merit of icons is 
irrelevant to their religious function or not. Unfortunately, as Ouspensky notes, these 
texts are not descriptive or technical enough, and we cannot really understand the 
aesthetic problem of the time.7 One of the texts of the time, a letter written by the 
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iconographer Joseph Vladimirov, criticizes bad icon painting fiercely, but with no 
real indication as to what the particular iconographic problems were: 
Where else can we see such indecencies as can be recognized here and 
now? The lowering and profanation of the venerable, sound art of the 
icons have been caused by ignoramuses for the following reason: 
everywhere in the villages and hamlets, wholesale merchants bring 
icons by the basketful. They are painted in a most ridiculous manner. 
Some of them do not even resemble human images; their aspect is like 
that of savages.8 
It is possible that one of the factors that created the artistic problem was an 
increasing Western influence, evident in the taste and the art of the upper classes, 
whereas the simple people still followed the Byzantine iconographic style, that was 
in decline as it was not supported by the secular state, which was gradually limiting 
the independence of the Church. This hypothesis could perhaps explain Vladimirov's 
attack on certain icons as "ridiculous", with figures that "do not even resemble 
human images", looking like "savages". It is also noteworthy that among the 
documents of the time there are some that oppose what they see as a new trend in 
iconography, without saying anything about the quality of the icons directly.9 Among 
those is the Life of Archpriest Awakum, who died as a martyr of the Old Believers, 
the sect that opposed the changes of the Patriarch Nikon, arguing that it reflected 
dangerous Western influences. Awakum's writings are more explicit about the kind 
of art they oppose - he wrote against images of Christ made obviously in the 
Western style, with "a puffy face, red lips, curly hair, fat hands and muscles", 
looking "like a German, pot-bellied and corpulent" - but it could be contestable 
whether we should deduce a general idea about the opponents and supporters of "bad 
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icons" from his writings. Western influence was almost certainly an important issue, 
but we do not know i f it can be identified with the issue of the artistic quality of 
icons. Nevertheless, it is possible to imagine such an opposition between a people-
rooted traditionalism and the upper classes that were adopting Western artistic 
techniques and standards, dismissing traditional iconography. An additional reason I 
find this hypothesis possible is that, as Ouspensky points out, we do not know of any 
such "unsuitable icons" today, although it is hard to imagine that they have all 
disappeared since there was no attempt to destroy them, and, as it is obvious from the 
texts of the time, they were made in great numbers.10 
We have to accept however, that the identification of the Byzantine tradition 
with the art of the poor is not important for the issue of the definition of the function 
of the icon - furthermore, although it would explain some aspects of this seventeenth 
century minor mystery, we do not have any proof that this was the case. What we are 
interested in is the evident difference of taste between an artistically educated portion 
of the Russian people, and another portion which seemed to be content with "bad 
icons". Another writer, G.M Dmitriev offers a helpful hypothesis along those lines: 
[Opponents of bad icons fought the production] of cheap icons used by 
the people, the simple folk. It goes without saying that the authors of 
these documents viewed the painting of icons as poor, as not 
corresponding to what they required of art. However, we are in fact 
dealing here with two different arts existing side by side: that of the 
leading classes and that created by the people, or, at any rate, spread 
among the people and accepted by them. The struggle against that art 
was but a manifestation of the class struggle. It was not only the 
pretext, but the reason behind the first Russian 'treatises' on art history 
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- treatises that justify and praise the 'superior' art of the leading classes 
as their struggle against the art used by the common people. To a 
greater or lesser degree, the authors of the 'treatises' (not only Simon 
Ushakov, but also the others) were advocates of the new style of 
painting that was established at this time. 1 1 
Whatever the reasons for this iconographic split, as Ouspensky observes, "by 
its very nature, the art of the Church sacred art, did not and could not have a class 
character... it obeyed only one criterion; and in it the doctrinal aspect was not 
differentiated from the aesthetic. The aesthetic appreciation of a work, as we have 
stated, coincided with its theological appreciation."12 
The "new trend" in Russian iconography, expressed in a quite extreme way 
by Vladimirov, would welcome a split between art and theology, which is what 
happened later. Most writers of the time, however, even among the ones who were 
supporting the "new trend" and were writing against the "bad icons", as Symeon, 
bishop of Polotsk, accepted that even badly made, artistically unworthy icons could 
ful f i l l their theological function. 1 3 The seventeenth century was a turbulent time for 
Russia, especially for the Church. The discussion on icons and their significance 
continued, and we shall review some more of it later, but this part of the debate we 
examined touched exactly on the relationship of art and theology vis-a-vis the 
function of the work of art. Despite numerous other differences, we can see a 
consensus on this issue, with few exceptions, with voices that range between the 
moderate modernist Symeon of Polotsk, and Paul of Aleppo, who offered the 
perspective of the simple people, for whom the aesthetic content of an icon was 
irrelevant to its religious function: "As all Muscovites are known for their great 
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affection and love of icons, they consider neither the beauty of the image nor the art 
of painting. For them, all icons, beautiful or not, are the same."14 
The identification of the function of the religious work of art with theology 
and the submission of art to theology, as well as the overwhelming ratio of religious 
versus secular works, were some of the things the Renaissance changed radically 
however, and the artist has been enjoying a rather distinct social status since then. 
The artist as creator, intellectual, and cultural forerunner, has dominated the history 
of culture since the Renaissance. One may go as far as to say that traditional art 
history since then consists exclusively of the history of the evolution of artistic forms 
and the history of the artists that instigated it. Indeed, most contemporary art histories 
organize their content based on the individual artists who expressed their personal 
views and subsequently influenced the way people perceived art. Accordingly, what 
we would call the sociological perception of art, or the relationship of the majority of 
the people with art, withdrew in favour of the pioneering artists and the work of art 
as a distinct entity, until recently, when the social environment of art emerged as a 
powerful factor in our understanding of art. This is discussed in some detail in The 
Death of Art, The Religious Artist, and A Religious View of the History of the Arts, 
and it would be redundant to repeat those points here. 
The figure of the artist is quite central in the present study. In many ways it 
circumscribes the distinct, and eventually marginalized position of art in relation to 
life, because it is largely connected with the idea of the gifted human being who 
perceives the world for the rest of the people and, through his art, teaches them how 
to perceive it. This concept is problematic on many levels, not the least of which is 
the question of the special vantagepoint of the artist, or his claim to an original and 
personal creation. The status of the artist as creator has been recently challenged to 
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the point that some writers have proclaimed the "death of the author", as discussed in 
The Death of Art, which can easily be extended to include the "death of the artist". 
The concept of the death of the artist is of signal importance in the 
examination of art. It is made particularly interesting by the fact that in this, as in so 
many other issues, postmodernist thought approaches the legacy of the Renaissance 
with a critical eye, and finds unexpectedly common ground with the thought and 
practices of the Middle Ages. The absence of the distinct status of the medieval artist 
is discussed in A Religious View of the History of the Arts and The Death of Art. It is 
essential then, to examine the portrait of the artist as a Renaissance man, which has 
remained influential to date, as well as some of the issues connected with the artist. 
This chapter is titled "Anti-Leonardo", because I chose to focus the critical review of 
the Renaissance using mainly, somewhat arbitrarily, the persona of Leonardo da 
Vinci, although references to other artists are made as well, for two reasons: First 
because he is considered to be the par excellence Renaissance man, the genius who 
was at the same time an artist and a scientist. Second, because of the study of 
Sigmund Freud on him, which I have used here. This little-known study poses some 
challenging questions and sheds some light on Leonardo's personality, and thus 
made it significantly easier for me to approach the psychological aspect of the 
Renaissance artist. We have to recognize that Freud's approach in general, and his 
work in Leonardo in particular, have been criticized severely. Perhaps one of the 
greatest faults of Freud's study was that a great part of his study was based on a 
mistranslated word that appears in the writings of Leonardo da Vinci, where 
Leonardo recalls being visited in his cradle by a "nibio": nibio, a word that means 
"kite", had been wrongly translated as "Geier", vulture in English, in the German 
translation of Merezhkovsky that Freud used.15 Unfortunately, Freud built quite a lot 
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on this dream, and was, of course, misled, through no fault of his own. Moreover, 
Freud's methodology, approach and philosophy have been under attack, mostly 
correctly so, in the last few decades. Although in Freud's discovery of the 
unconscious and his decisive contribution to thought we find one of the first breaks 
with the epistemic paradigm that denied its own subjectivity and sought an 
"objective" view of the world, his westernocentric values still express that paradigm 
very much. At any rate, as an old professor of mine, the late Richard Courtney, used 
to say, Freud has to be read not as a scientist, his thought is too inconsistent and his 
methods too inductive for that, but he should be read as a poet instead, in a manner of 
speaking, the reader keeping in mind that the author projects a lot of himself in the 
work. I can see here the appeal of studying the work of a contemporary poet of the 
mind on the mind of the Renaissance man. 
Breaks with the Past 
The Renaissance artists introduced some radical, for the age, perceptual 
breaks with the past, which deserve a close examination. Some of those breaks, 
which reflect fundamental concepts of our culture, include our perception of: 
• God 
• The body 
• Image and Recognition 
God 
The traditional religious directive on the representation of God, stated 
explicitly and unequivocally in the Ten Commandments, forbids any representations 
of him. Accordingly, representations of God the Father in medieval iconography are 
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extremely rare. This kind of specific prohibition was, as mentioned elsewhere, 
challenged and settled as an issue in sixteenth and seventeenth century Russia, as far 
as the Eastern concept of the icon is concerned. The conventional depiction of the 
Holy Trinity follows the description of the visit of God to Abraham, in the form of 
three angels. Andrei Rublev's famous icon of the Holy Trinity is the most well 
known example of an icon of this type. The sixteenth century saw a dispute over the 
correspondence of each of the three angels to a person of the Holy Trinity in Russia. 
It was a quite widespread practice in the later Byzantine period and in Russian 
iconography to identify the central angel as Jesus Christ, at least according to 
Ouspensky's view. Perhaps the earliest piece of evidence for the identification of the 
middle angel with Christ can be found in an icon of a tenth-century Greek Bible, 
where the halo of the central angel is cruciferous.16 Sometimes the inscription "IC 
XC" was also inscribed above or next to the central angel. As a reaction to the heresy 
of the Russian Judaizers in the fifteenth century, sometimes, although rather rarely, 
each of the three angels appeared with cruciferous halos and with the inscription "IC 
XC" above them, in an effort to emphasize the equal honour of the three persons.17 
The implication of the identification of the central angel as Christ was that the other 
two were representing the other two hypostases of the Trinity, the Father and the 
Holy Spirit. This was amplified further by the juxtaposition of the angels with 
symbols that denoted their respective identity: The house of Abraham, as a symbol of 
the Church, was depicted above the first angel, identifying him as the Father, the oak 
of Mamre - tree of life and wood of the cross - above the central angel, identifying 
him as Christ, and a mountain, a symbol of spiritual ascent, above the third angel, 
identifying him as the Holy Spirit. 1 8 
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We have to mention here that the previous interpretation, supported by 
Ouspensky, is by no means the only one. Paul Evdokimov reads Rublev's icon in a 
very different way, based on an older icon of the Holy Trinity, owned by St Stephan 
of Perm, which was said to identify by inscription the three angels, from left to right, 
as the Son, the Father, and the Holy Spirit. 1 9 Evdokimov developed a quite 
interesting interpretation of Rublev's icon under this light, reading the symbolic 
language of the posture and the gestures of the angels, as well as the colours and the 
lines of the icon, in a way that reveals most of the Orthodox theology on the Holy 
Trinity. 
It is not important at the moment to decide which of the two interpretations is 
correct. The issue we are interested in is whether all three persons of the Holy Trinity 
can be portrayed separately or symbolically, and this problem arises with both views. 
The identification of the angels as the three separate hypostases of the Holy Trinity 
was dealt with in the so-called "Hundred-Chapters Council" (Stoglav) in 1551 in 
Moscow, which concerned itself extensively with issues of iconography. The first 
question of the 41 s t chapter reads: 
On icons of the Holy Trinity, some represent a cross in the nimbus of 
only the middle figure, others on all three. On ancient and on Greek 
icons, the words 'Holy Trinity' are written at the top, but there is no 
cross in the nimbus of any of the three. At present, 'LX X C and the 
'Holy Trinity' are written next to the central figure. Consult the divine 
canons and tell us which practice one should follow. The Reply: 
painters must paint icons according to the ancient models, as the 
Greeks painted them, as Andrei Rublev and other renowned painters 
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made them. The inscription should be: 'the Holy Trinity.' Painters are 
• • 20 
in no way to use their imagination. 
For some reason the issue was not put to rest after the Stoglav. Although the 
Stoglav included a ruling 2 1 which made a distinction between representations of 
Christ in the flesh (which were acceptable) and in his divinity (which were not 
acceptable), perhaps because the language of the text was unclear, as some scholars 
posit,22 images of God the Father, which should have been as unacceptable as 
representations of Christ in his divinity, kept appearing in the following years. 
Pictorial syntheses known as the New Testament Trinity or the Paternity from as 
early as the fifteenth century, depicted God the Father, as the "Ancient of Days" and 
the "Lord Sabaoth." It has been suggested23 that the restriction on the representation 
of Christ "in his divinity" was aimed exactly at such images. At any rate, after a 
tumultuous period in matters of iconography, the Great Council of Moscow in 1666-
1667 finally ruled unequivocally on the depiction of God the Father: 
Let all vanity of pretended wisdom cease, which has allowed everyone 
habitually to paint the Lord Sabaoth in various representations 
according to his own fantasy, without an authentic reference... We 
decree that from now on the image of the Lord Sabaoth will no longer 
be painted according to senseless and unsuitable imaginings, for no one 
has ever seen the Lord Sabaoth (that is, God the Father) in the flesh. 
Only Christ was seen in the flesh, and in this way he is portrayed, that 
is, in the flesh, and not according to his divinity. Likewise, the most 
holy Mother of God and the other saints of God... 
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To paint on icons the Lord Sabaoth (that is, the Father) with a white 
beard, holding the only-begotten Son in his lap with a dove between 
them is altogether absurd and improper, for no one has ever seen the 
Father in his divinity. Indeed, the Father has no flesh, and it is not in 
the flesh that the Son was born of the Father before all ages. And i f the 
Prophet David says 'from the womb, before the morning star I have 
begotten you' [Ps. 109/110:3], such generation is certainly not 
corporeal, but unutterable and unimaginable. For Christ himself says in 
the Holy Gospel 'No one knows the Father except the Son'... This is 
why the Lord Sabaoth, who is the Godhead, and the engendering before 
all ages of the only-begotten Son of the Father must only be perceived 
through our mind. By no means is it proper to paint such images: it is 
impossible... Besides, Sabaoth is not the name of the Father only, but 
of the Holy Trinity. According to Dionysios the Areopagite, Sabaoth is 
translated from the Hebrew as 'Lord of Hosts.' And the Lord of Hosts 
is the Trinity. And i f the Prophet Daniel says that he has seen the 
Ancient of Days sitting on the throne of judgement, that is not taken to 
mean the Father, but the Son at his Second Coming, who will judge all 
the nations with his fearsome judgement.24 
The representation of God the Father as an old man was commonplace in the 
West by the time of the Great Council of Moscow, but it had never really spread 
roots in the East. As part of a particular pictorial type of the West, which also 
included the crucified Christ on the lap of the Father and the Holy Spirit as a dove, it 
can be dated back to the end of the eleventh or the beginning of the twelfth century. 
Ouspensky reads its character as initially mostly liturgical, intending to show that the 
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eucharistic sacrifice, in analogy to the sacrifice of Christ, is offered to God the Father 
as a means of reconciliation between God and man. The Eucharist then is 
symbolically offered to the Father through the crucifixion and the Holy Spirit.2 5 On 
the other hand, it was quite frequent in the East, whenever the presence of God the 
Father had to be directly suggested, as in images of the Epiphany, to see the hand of 
God the Father depicted at the top of an icon, usually holding a scroll. Only the eye 
of God was consistently represented above the Royal Doors of the iconostasis. The 
representation of God the Father was criticized as a Western practice, not consistent 
with Holy Tradition. 
The iconographic issues the Russian Orthodox Church dealt with in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth century are, in a sense, the reprise of the iconoclastic wars 
of Byzantium. The iconoclastic wars raised the issue of representation in general, 
and, simply put, whether man-made images could be used for religious purposes. The 
Russian Councils dealt with the other extreme and put a limit on what could be 
represented. It is interesting to note that in both periods that iconography was a major 
issue in the East, Iconoclasm and the Russian Councils, the West remained 
uninterested. Religion through art never had the same meaning in the East and the 
West, at least inasmuch we are able to detect religious and cultural differences 
between them. The iconoclastic character of the Reformation was, perhaps, no more 
than the logical conclusion of the secular character western art had from much 
earlier. It should then not be surprising that the renewed interest in religious art in 
our days comes again mainly from the East, with Orthodox composers as Arvo Part, 
Giya Kancheli and John Tavener. 
What are we to make of this observation? The medieval artist did not use his 
material as a means of personal expression, where his imagination could assume the 
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pivotal role in the originality of the work. The work of art was, instead, an 
opportunity for the artist to participate in the work of the church and help express its 
teachings and its ideas in a didactic and/or liturgical fashion. The concept of 
representation, therefore, was not necessarily interpreted as reproduction of physical 
likeness, at least not in the way of the mechanically objective reproduction of 
physical likeness we think of at present, but it had to do with adherence to and proper 
expression of the particular religious meaning the icon was meant to convey. God the 
Father was not a Being one ought to think of in an anthropomorphic way, and this 
rule is evident even in its exceptions. The few icons that include the figure of the 
"Ancient of Days" are either made in a way that attempts to demonstrate the triadic 
nature of the one God, something we see in representations of Christ as a child seated 
on the knees of the Father, with the Holy Spirit in the form of a dove painted on the 
chest of the young Christ, where the alignment of the three persons is the main 
signified, or in pictorial syntheses that correspond to a psychological quarternio 
including the Theotokos and sometimes John the Baptist. The representation of God 
the Father is secondary in those cases; I do not know of any Byzantine icons 
depicting the Father on his own. 
The prohibition of the representation of the Father cannot be explained on the 
basis of rational theological thought alone. As it became evident in the iconoclastic 
crisis, the restrictions of the Jewish legacy did not necessarily need to be observed in 
the practices of the Christian era, because a new meaning could be found in the New 
Dispensation. The taboo on representations of God was somehow lifted by the icons 
of Christ, but the figure of the Father, God in himself, remained elusive because it 
was not only theologically but also psychologically sound to avoid representing the 
Creator in the form of a person. The kenosis of God in the person of Christ would be 
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meaningless i f the Father were to be thought of in an anthropomorphic fashion in the 
first place. God is formless because he is beyond being and form; he is 
conventionally known as "the Father" because of his creative nature and because of 
his fatherly relation to Christ, but theologically speaking he cannot be thought of 
possessing any characteristics that make him appear more like a father than a mother. 
Sigmund Freud, however, has produced a plausible hypothesis as to the cultural roots 
of the conventional gender of God and his "fatherhood" in his works Totem and 
Taboo and Moses and Monotheism, showing that it is based on a quite complex 
primordial psychological background. Some attempts of the fourth century to 
distinguish between the person of the Father and the formless Ovaia behind it were 
severely criticized by St Basil the Great as a form of Sabellianism. A paradox 
concerning the nature of God is that he has been consistently delineated as formless 
and personal at the same time. This indicates a great divide between pagan 
philosophers like Plotinus and Christians like Origen: their philosophy could be 
similar in many ways, but the great chasm between them is brought to light by their 
different concept of a personal or impersonal Supreme Being. The psychological 
background of the elusive nature of God can perhaps be traced to Yahveh who 
identified himself as " I am who I am" 2 6 to Moses, because he could not be compared 
with or explained through anything else. In the Book of Genesis, on the other hand, 
there is not much to suggest that God is not anthropomorphic, rather the opposite can 
be claimed more easily. The importance of the concept of God as an entity formless 
yet personal, which survived well into the Christian era, was reflected in the 
relationship of the believer, and vis-a-vis iconography in the relationship of the 
believer, the artist and the viewer, with a transpersonal God. 
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Nevertheless, during the late Middle Ages, in anticipation of the Renaissance 
revolution, the forbidding avaton was broken in the West and images of the Supreme 
Being were painted (perhaps most prominent among them being Michelangelo's The 
Creation), for the first time in Judeo-Christian tradition after the time of strict 
adherence to Mosaic Law. However, the tradition that held the icons and the images 
responsible for their spiritual meaning was not discarded immediately. The images 
did hold their spiritual meaning, only now this meaning was subtly changing. Not 
only it became possible to actually see the Father in the flesh, as a venerable human 
being and not through the strictly metaphorical apparitions of the past (as a burning 
bush, as three angels, etc.), but the features of the Son became increasingly human as 
well. The proportions of the work of art ceased to represent the moral dynamics and 
the spiritual and metaphysical quest of the represented and the viewer, and became a 
mirror of the existing world instead. The door that used to connect this world to the 
other was closed and the orientation shifted towards another world, material or 
psychological, instead.27 Art did not have a functionally religious role anymore, at 
least in the sense of the connection with the supernatural. The center of the universe 
was moving to the earth, in a psychological sense. The meaning of the images and 
the symbols was changing subtly, and this was bound to affect the way this meaning 
was expressed and signified. 
The Body 
With the metaphysical dimension lost, the self had to be withdrawn to the 
domain of immediate experience. The self became identified with the body, and 
painting did more justice to the representation of the body than ever before, but at the 
expense of the attempt to depict the spirit, or rather the transcendental understanding 
of the world and the self as something which includes the invisible. Even the halos in 
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the icons became solid and three-dimensional: i f they were to remain part of the 
painting repertoire, they had to be materialized and to conform to the rules of proper 
perspective, like flat hats worn by saints and angels, as it can be observed in 
paintings by Giotto, Verrocchio, Rosselli and other painters. As the self became 
solidified in the body, it became the object rather than the subject of perceiving. The 
body gained new attention as something to be studied and understood better. On an 
external level that would mean the withdrawal of what we could describe as the 
iconographic gaze in favour of the medical or mechanical gaze. The former would 
look at the body and see its spiritual content, hoping that the way of the saint would 
be imitated and deification accomplished, whereas the latter would look at the body 
and see a wondrous machine that should be studied so that the ways of nature and 
God be understood. It is tempting to detect an underlying dualism in the case of the 
body as an object, reflecting perhaps the contrast of the medieval theologian and the 
Renaissance philosopher: the former would attempt to ascend through the created 
order with his body, realizing the unity of the cosmos and allowing divine grace to 
bless even lowly matter, whereas the latter would attempt to circumvent the created 
order and aim at the highest spiritual principles, understanding as it were the mind of 
God. 
Once the self was identified with the body, the way numinous truths were 
expressed was affected. The body became a topos to be displayed and celebrated, and 
the Incarnation of God in Christ assumed an outstanding significance. The difference 
on this issue between East and West, or between early Middle Ages and Renaissance, 
is widely known. In the East the Divine Passion, which includes the Crucifixion and 
the Resurrection, is thought of as the most important feast, because it is through the 
sacrifice of Christ on the cross that humanity was saved. In the West, on the other 
Anti-Leonardo 124 
hand, the Incarnation is more important, as the moment God became human in the 
flesh. The Patriarch Photios wrote in the ninth century that "wondrous was the 
manger at Bethlehem which received my Lord... as he had just emerged from a 
virgin's womb... Yet a far greater miracle does the tomb exhibit... in the latter is 
accomplished the end and the purpose of God's advent."28 Conversely, John 
O'Malley in a study of the papal sermons of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries 
wrote that the Renaissance preachers emphasized the Incarnation holding that "all the 
subsequent events of Christ's life are articulations of what was already inchoately 
accomplished in the initial moment of man's restoration, which was the incarnation 
in the Virgin's womb." 2 9 One cannot really find a doctrinal difference between the 
two views. It is rather a difference of emphasis, and I believe it has to be attributed to 
the different psychological rather than theological background of the two views. Of 
course we must keep in mind that there are quite a few historical reasons that played 
a role in this difference between the two Churches, although this does not diminish 
the psychological significance of the (difference between the) two feasts. 
The human body, ^especially the body of Christ, has been seen as a 
hierarchical system from at least as early as the third century. In Origen, for instance, 
we find the convergence of the Platonic idea of the World Soul and the idea of the 
personal God, in a way that suggests that the higher spheres of existence correspond 
with the upper body parts of the imaginary body of God. In JJepi Apxcbv he accepts 
that the universe is something like "an immense, monstrous animal, held together by 
the power and the reason of God as by one soul."3 0 And then he portrays somewhat 
graphically the relationship of the universe and God quoting scripture extracts where 
God is said to have "heaven for his throne and the earth for the footstool of his 
feet."3 1 Later writers identify Christ's head with his divinity and his feet with his 
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humanity, in an almost polarized manner. Eusebius wrote that "the nature of Christ is 
twofold; it is like the head of the body in that he is recognized as God, and 
comparable to the feet in that for our salvation he put on manhood as frail as our 
own." 3 2 Maximus the Confessor wrote: "Whoever says that the words of theology 
'stand at the head' because of the deity of Christ, while the words of the dispensation 
'stand at the feet' because of the Incarnation, and whoever calls the head of Christ 
his divinity and the feet his humanity, he does not stray from the truth." 3 3 St Symeon 
the New Theologian in the eleventh century taught that the body of Christ 
corresponds with the body of the Church, and the members of the body of Christ 
correspond with the saints who fulf i l l the respective role of the body of the Church. 
The head of the Church corresponds with Christ himself, but the hands, shoulders 
and the other members correspond with the saints. The thighs, for instance, 
correspond with the ones who "carry in themselves the fecundity of the concepts 
adequate to God of the mystical theology, and engender the Spirit of Wisdom upon 
the earth, i.e., the fruit of the Spirit and his seed in the hearts of men, through the 
word of their teaching."34 Finally, Bernard of Clairvaux deduced rationally the 
polarity between head and feet arguing that " i f it seemed right to St Paul to describe 
Christ's head in terms of his divinity, 3 5 it should not seem unreasonable to us to 
ascribe the feet to his humanity."36 
The stress to the body of Christ and the body of the Church existed for quite 
some time then, but it used to symbolize a kind of unity rather than an opposition. In 
writings like those of St Symeon, for instance, emphasis is given to how every 
member of the Church can contribute in his own way, while the total is as 
harmonious as the body that consists of many different parts. Bernard, on the other 
hand, lived in a time of dissent, when faith and reason seemed to be almost 
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irreconcilable. It is only in the late Middle Ages that we see the body itself being 
used as a statement of the humanity of Christ, and for this reason it is the naked body 
that receives the honour. Accordingly, the baby Jesus appears increasingly less 
dressed in the late Middle Ages, and very often completely naked in the Renaissance. 
Emile Male wrote on the gradual undressing of Jesus: 
In the twelfth century, the Son of God, seated on the lap of his mother, 
is robed in the long tunic and the philosopher's pallium; in the 
thirteenth, he wears a child's dress; in the fourteenth, he would be 
entirely naked did not his mother wrap his lower body in a fold of her 
mantle. This nudity of Christ is, as it were, the mark of his humanity; 
he now resembles the children of humankind. He resembles them 
further in his whims, his lovable infant capers, whether caressing his 
mother's chin, or at play with a bird. He resembles them, finally, in his 
subjection to nature: the Son of God feels hungry, and the artists show 
the Virgin giving him suck.37 
One wonders though, whether the Virgin conceals or unveils the lower body 
of Christ. What may appear as a motherly gesture of protectiveness, expresses at the 
same time the presentation of the body of Christ to the world and the manifestation 
of his human nature. From the early Crucifixes where Christ was dressed in a long 
tunic, to the naked Christ of the Renaissance, the tendency was to present God-made-
Man with increasingly human characteristics and behaviour. The trend to depict the 
nakedness of Christ went so far that many paintings between the fourteenth and the 
seventeenth century present, quite centrally, the unveiling, presentation, touching or 
protecting of the genitalia of the baby Jesus. Such an emphasis can be also observed 
in paintings of the dead Christ. Andrea del Sarto, for instance, painted the naked 
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Christ touching his genitals as a child (the Tallard Madonna, 1515) and as a (dead) 
man, after the Crucifixion (Pieta, 1520). 
One of the most famous images to present manipulation of Christ's genitalia 
is Hans Baldung Grien's woodcut Holy Family (1511). The divine infant is held by 
Mary and shown to her mother, St Anne, who touches Christ's genitalia with her left 
hand. The traditional explanation for this shocking gesture is given by Carl Koch, 
who attributed it to an underlying folk superstition. Koch wrote that Baldung 
displays "insight into arcane popular customs believed to possess magical powers. 
Thus, under pretext of representing the pious companionship of the Holy Family, he 
dares make the miracle-working spell pronounced over a child the subject of a 
woodcut composition."38 
One could posit that the point Koch is trying to make attempts to explain 
away the gesture as a folk symbolism that has little to do with the identity of the 
represented persons. This is a little difficult to accept, however, because this image 
would have been rather unacceptable as an image of ordinary peasants under the 
circumstances. Such images were said to draw their inspiration from ordinary 
settings, reflecting the life of ordinary people. Philippe Aries actually cited 
Baldung's woodcut to argue that playing with the private parts of a baby was once a 
"widespread tradition."3 9 
The problem with interpretations such as Koch's, who saw the woodcut as a 
popular portrayal of an ordinary family, is that they seem to ignore that Renaissance 
art is not renowned for the representation of realistic situations. Religious images 
especially, held very often an allegorical meaning, and at any rate treated the divine 
child as the incarnate God, doing things no other babies do, such as handing the keys 
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of the kingdom to Peter, examining a book, placing a ring on St Catherine's finger, 
etc. It seems more likely that the intention of innumerable such images was to stress 
the human side of Christ, or rather the humanation of God, his descent into manhood. 
In this picture, St Anne as the grandmother of Christ is the one who guarantees his 
human lineage and holds the tangible truth. In Renaissance images we can detect a 
shift of focus: Medieval paintings often, as a reaction to Jews, Monophysites, 
Muslims and Iconoclasts, aimed to demonstrate the simultaneous presence of the 
human and the divine natures of Christ, but for the Renaissance West, where the 
main opponents of ecclesiastical doctrine were the dualist Cathari, some of which 
maintained that the body of Christ was only an illusion, 4 0 the issue was not so much 
the divinity of Christ, but the declaration of his humanity. Christ's humanity is a 
constant theme in Renaissance pictures of the Nativity, Adoration of the Magi, and 
the Holy Family. 
Leo Steinberg has grouped many of the representations discussed above in a 
very influential book,4 1 exploring the sexuality of Christ as a sign of his humanation. 
As Caroline Walker Bynum has noted however,42 Steinberg's approach perhaps 
relies too much on modern views on nudity and sexuality. Without denying the value 
of Steinberg's work, Bynum argues that when representational art was demonstrating 
a fascination with the genitalia of Christ - which, she agrees is a sign of humanation, 
yet not necessarily of (male) sexuality - another group of texts and representational 
works depicted the body of Christ with feminine characteristics (Christ lactating or 
giving birth); the body of Christ was often identified with the Church, as we saw in 
the writings of St Symeon the New Theologian. Bynum may disagree with some of 
Steinberg's arguments, but she agrees with, and actually strengthens his 
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interpretation of the nudity of Christ as a stress on his humanation, albeit in a way 
that transcends (male and female) sexuality.43 
The problem with the stress on the human nature of Christ, especially in a 
medium so much indebted to the mirror and its psychological significance, was that 
his humanity, and by implication humanity as a property or condition, became 
glorified to such an extent that it gradually took personal characteristics and 
dimensions. Not unlike the soul that descended into matter in order to govern it as 
described by Plotinus,44 or as we would say in a Christian framework, in order to 
save it, and then focused on the particular and lost the way back to the divine, the 
Renaissance artists celebrated the Incarnation and the body, but this led to the 
gradual secularization of the numinous image. Demythologization of the deity led to 
the profanation of sacred art, and now most viewers stop at the level of the prominent 
visible, not seeking to make the connection with the invisible and with the mysteries 
of faith. 
I t has been known that Renaissance painters were using live models for the 
depiction of religious images. This indicates a conceptual break with iconographic 
tradition, because the identity of the depicted person becomes problematic. 
According to St Theodore the Studite, an icon partakes of the holiness of the depicted 
saint because it shares his/her vnooTcujiq (identity). Apart from the theological 
arguments in favour or against the use of models, painting in the iconographic 
tradition, according to certain guidelines that ascribed particular characteristics to 
particular saints, somehow implied a unity of the visible and invisible realm. Even 
though not through direct experience, it was possible for anyone to know what Jesus 
or a saint looked like. The point was that they were recognized when they were seen 
in visions or in the afterlife, based on the stereotype of their appearance and the signs 
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that described their earthly vocation (military saints or doctors) or ecclesiastical 
position (monks or bishops). The use of models, although allowing for far greater 
illusionist realism (the realism of appearances), posited that there can be no direct 
connection between heaven and earth, and at best the earth could try to look like 
heaven as convincingly as possible. The true identity of a painted person was 
subsequently of no great importance, because what mattered was only his/her 
conventional name: i f a painter painted Venus and then decided to name her Virgin 
Mary, the painting became Virgin Mary. 
The effects of the humanization of Christ and the realistic illusionism of the 
figures had their counterpart in the psychological realm. These changes correspond 
to a profound change in the relationship of the self with religious art, that reflect the 
difference in meaning of (pavcatjia or imagination between the early Middle Ages 
and Renaissance. Imagination, for Fathers like John Damascene, is what enables the 
viewer (and the artist) to make the connection between the visible image and its 
invisible counterpart. It is directed outwards, to something completely independent 
of the viewer and as real as the tangible visible world. Later we find that the meaning 
of the word has changed to mean contemplation of the personal, perhaps fictional, 
certainly not necessarily corresponding to any outside truth. Girolamo Savonarola in 
the fifteenth century was writing that "every painter, one might say, really paints 
himself. Insofar as he is a painter, he paints according to his own idea."45 The 
Renaissance artist, as we will see, plunged into his self and his unconscious to draw 
inspiration. 
What can we say is the difference between the one kind of imagination and 
the other? At the one end we can find a concept of imagination as a way of 
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revelation, something Plotinus was very much aware of when he used imagination to 
grasp a purely intellectual, divine image: 
Let us, then, grasp with our mind (Sidvoia) this cosmos, each member 
of it remaining what it is, distinct and apart, yet all forming as far as 
possible, a complete unity, so that whatever comes into focus, say the 
outer orb of the heavens, shall bring immediately with it the image 
(cpavracia), on the one plane, of the sun of the other planets, with earth 
and sea and all living things, as i f exhibited upon a transparent globe. 
Let there be, then, in your soul the gleaming image {(pavtcurid) of a 
sphere, a picture holding all the things in the universe whether in 
motion or at rest, or rather, some at rest and others at motion. Keep this 
sphere before you, and from it imagine another, a sphere stripped of 
magnitude and of spatial differences; cast out spatial conceptions and 
the image (<pavnxojua) of matter within you; do not simply substitute an 
image reduced in size, but call on God, the maker of the sphere whose 
image you now hold, and pray him to enter.46 
At the other end, we find Sartre's quite blunt definition of imagination as "the 
ability to think of what is not", 4 7 although, interestingly enough, he identified 
imagination with human freedom. At any rate, our age does not tend to respect the 
invisible, and the usual measure for the value of imagination is the visualization 
towards a more or less practical goal, something that brings Sartre impressively close 
to Anthony Robbins. 
Imagination has been defined and evaluated in many different ways since 
Plato, for whom (pavtacria refers to knowledge that is "tentative (Philebus), 
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sometimes fake (Republic), and in any case second rate, inferior (Timaeus). It is 
Plotinus, however, whose writings on imagination provided a template for its 
understanding in the Christian era. Plotinus discusses the imagination in Ennead IV 
3, 23-32. For Plotinus imagination is based on memory and, like memory, it belongs 
to the higher as well as to the lower level of the soul. It can, therefore, perform two 
distinct imaginative faculties, one serving either level of memory.49 
In Ennead HI 6, 4, 19-21, Plotinus distinguishes between "imagination in the 
primary sense (icp6ivr\ cpavtaaia), which we call opinion (86£<x)", and a lower 
imagination, av87ri,Kpixo<;, which involves no judgement or synthesis, and apparently 
just absorbs images. The first faculty is what synthesizes the data of sensory 
perception and produces an opinion. John Dillon, in his essay Plotinus and the 
Transcendental Imagination,50 compares the two imaginations of Plotinus to two 
levels of imagination defined by Immanuel Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason. 
Kant describes two imaginations, the "productive" or transcendental, and the 
"reproductive" or empirical. Commenting on the transcendental imagination, Kant 
wrote: 
What is first given to us is appearance. When combined with 
consciousness it is called perception... Now, since every appearance 
contains a manifold, and since different perceptions therefore occur in 
the mind separately and singly, a combination of them, such as they 
cannot have in sense itself, is demanded. There must therefore exist in 
us an active faculty for the synthesis of the manifold. To this faculty I 
give the title imagination.51 
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Dillon writes that Kant's transcendental imagination seems to be very similar 
to Plotinus's 7ipd)Tr| (pavxacria, yet he identifies a great difference between them. For 
Plotinus imagination is also the recipient, the "mirror" of the operations of the 
intellect,52 in a way that is reminiscent of Maximus's Xoyot, as discussed in A 
Religious View of the History of the Arts: (pavxacria for Plotinus is a mirror for 
intellectual activity, which is operative only when the surface of the soul is smooth 
and harmonious. On the other hand, 
when this is broken because the harmony of the body is upset, thought 
and intellect operate without an image, and the intellectual activity 
takes place without imagination. So one might come to this sort of 
conclusion, that intellectual activity takes place with the 
accompaniment of imagination, though it is not identical with 
imagination.53 
Although on the psychological level imagination as conceived by Plotinus 
and as conceived by Kant is very similar, the difference is its ability to possibly 
understand something of the divine. As we saw above, Plotinus thinks that 
imagination is a worthy tool that can be used to construct mental images that can 
grasp the Idea of God. For Kant, on the other hand, as he argued in the Critique of 
the Pure Reason, the idea of God, as well as the ideas of freedom and immortality, 
are beyond human understanding. Therefore, somewhat simplistically put, Kant's 
transcendental imagination cannot contribute in our knowledge of God. 
Notwithstanding several other differences among Plotinus, Kant and Sartre, one of 
their main differences is that Plotinus's 7ip(bxr| (pavxacria is very much connected 
with the contemplation of God, perhaps it can provide our closest possible 
understanding of the divine, save for a direct union with it, whereas Kant's 
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transcendental imagination is not theistic at all, but has a psychological orientation 
instead. In a sense, the age expressed in Sartre's aphorism was bound to follow, since 
imagination can no longer reveal anything beyond the senses. What we see in the 
change of imagination is reflected on the focus in the human aspect of Christ instead 
of the divine, the tangible instead of the spiritual, the visible instead of the invisible, 
both in art and in metaphysics. 
Sigmund Freud has illustrated in his relatively little known work Leonardo, 
that Leonardo da Vinci projected himself and his childhood memories with his 
mother and the second wife of his father, in the image of Christ in Leonardo's St 
Anne with Mary and Christ. We would never go as far as to assume that he could 
ever suspect this himself, yet even the unconscious basis for such an occurrence 
would be guarded against by a medieval iconographer, as much as possible. One's 
psychological assumptions were quite important, and as it has been stated before, the 
medieval artist was focusing, consciously and unconsciously, on the very real world 
of the invisible: it was mostly the invisible world the icons sought to represent. When 
the theological, philosophical and psychological connection with the numinous was 
broken, the invisible was replaced by the (personal and) psychological, perhaps the 
closest possible kin to the numinous. The work of art was becoming, from then on, 
an increasingly personal affair, and the artist assumed the role of the Creator of a 
mini-universe, corresponding to the mini-universe of his personal subconscious, 
whereas in the past the artist was a humble servant of the divine will and, as Jung 
could have put it, was more overtly influenced by collective archetypal images. It is 
only recently that, in postmodernity and the New Age, we have tried to re-establish 
our position in the universe and we have conceived of a holistic, harmonious 
Anti-Leonardo 135 
coexistence with it, accepting that we are not truly the masters of our world, but mere 
guests on this planet. 
Leonardo's penetrating gaze goes beyond the surface of the human body. 
However, at the same time, it seems that he endistanced himself extremely on a 
personal level from it, as the records he has left indicate that his sexual activity was 
non-existent, and, as the following statement of his illustrates, he was evidently 
frigid: "The act of procreation and everything connected with it is so disgusting that 
mankind would soon die out i f it were not an old-established custom and i f there 
were not pretty faces and sensuous natures."54 It seems it was impossible for him to 
feel any attraction for what only appeared as a dissectable object, and the admiration 
and study he devoted to it through his work is the admiration and the fascination for 
the work of art and the God-made engine. Still, his subjectivity could not be placed 
on the same plane as the object he observed; does not the mechanistic paradigm of 
medical science start here? The obj edification of the body has an additional effect, 
which has changed only on the outside since then. The work of art assumed gradually 
an autonomous existence, without necessarily referring to a signified outside the 
system of signification. , An image in the Middle Ages .was thought of as a depiction 
of an existing object. Even allegorical syntheses as the paintings of Hieronymus 
Bosch in the late fifteenth - early sixteenth century, allude to a reality that justifies 
the orgiastic fantasy of the artist. Bosch's paintings however, can be thought of as a 
border between the metaphysical and the psychological. 
The self was at the same time identified and endistanced from the body, as we 
already see in the case of Leonardo da Vinci. A few centuries after the foundation of 
internal anatomy and its pictorial study, we find the effect of this act described from 
the reverse angle as the psychological problem of "the Body without Organs,"55 the 
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"F that denies its own subjectivity. In their monumental work Anti-Oedipus: 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Grilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari attempt a synthesis 
of political and psychological economy, and identify the tension between the concept 
of the body as a locus of the organs that desire in a quite mechanical way, and the 
self which identifies itself as a body without organs, a materialist self but without the 
need to exist in the material world. The body without organs is repulsed by the 
desiring machines that lurk in it, and attempts the intelligible or imaginary separation 
of its organs. This image, so fundamental for the understanding of the contemporary 
concept of the self and its ontology (or, more accurately, its pathology), is closely 
connected with the perception of the self in terms of solid flesh, which we can 
identify, perhaps for the first time, in Renaissance painting. 
In the case of Leonardo da Vinci's sketches of the body, it is rather "the 
Organs without Body" we see, something that expresses subjectivity being denied to 
the Other, and the Other's subsequent objectification. The gaze of the artist/scientist 
penetrates beyond the surface, but in doing so it separates and defines the surface and 
the interior in material terms. What lay beneath the surface for the medieval 
iconogfapher, was divinity itself: to go beyond the icon as a symbol would be to 
penetrate into the unknowable, into what could only be revealed in mystic symbols 
and metaphors. It is no surprise that the Iconophiles accepted that symbols and icons 
became redundant within the divine Oeokoyla, the kind of theology that examines the 
existence of God in himself, while they saw the need to maintain the language of 
symbols and icons in the divine oimvofiia, the kind of theology that examines the 
relation of God with the world. 5 6 For Leonardo, on the other hand, the interior of an 
image adheres to an analogy with the depicted body and its organs, that in turn reveal 
themselves in the beautiful complexity of their hydraulic and muscular systems. This 
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way of looking seems to transform humans into machines, and does not differ much 
from the similarly "objectifying" gaze of de Sade, who portrayed men and women as 
totally Others, with a functionality for pleasure, machines that could be used in a 
variety of ways in order to produce pleasure for the somehow transcendental, un-
subjective self. 
The psychological dynamics that correspond to the Renaissance painting are 
quite different from the dynamics of iconography. As we have seen elsewhere in this 
study, the viewer of sacred images at some point pulled back from them, and became 
conscious of the act of gazing, embracing the role and identity of the spectator, 
which was initially reserved, as far as the theological interpretation goes, for the eye 
of God alone. The effect of the icon was at the same time experiential and 
conscious/rational. We can later detect a break into two different directions: while art 
maintained its psychological power, its discourse shifted to the rational, consisting of 
objectified rules of what art should be and how it was to be appreciated. This 
coincides with the emergence of the artist/genius, the artist who comprehends the art 
of the past and, first of all, advances into the future. 
The experiential dimension of iconography with its effect on artists, laymen 
and theologians alike, was suppressed after the humanistic revolution. According to 
Jung's frequently cited psychological rule, a suppressed part of the self will sooner or 
later express itself on a large scale. Thus, eventually the taste of common people 
became disassociated from the avant-garde, but this is further explored in another 
chapter of this study. What is more relevant to the present examination is the 
experiential demand that art inherited from iconography, and what happened to it 
once it had to be translated into the level of the solid, material body. 
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We usually think of the objectification of the human body as an act of 
pornography, a demotion of the self to the level of thing, a voyeuristic act of looking 
without being looked at. We also think of a fetish as an object that replaces and, in a 
way, obstructs a genuine pleasure. Pornography and fetishism are usually associated 
with sex, but their origins can be traced well beyond it. After all, it is not the 
association with sex that makes pornography offensive, but what it does to sex. It 
would be equally offensive i f pornography were connected to any other form of 
pleasure, food for instance, and in fact one can easily extrapolate the exploitation of 
the self from the sphere of sex to the sphere of consumerism. Advertisements have 
dominated the media world of the twentieth century in a way of promised 
gratification and symbolic pleasures reminiscent of sex, as the early school of French 
semioticians who followed Roland Barthes in the fifties and sixties, and analyzed 
advertisements, films, dress codes etc., amply demonstrated. Nevertheless, 
pornography of the body has to be recognized as the conceptual archetype of the 
mechanistic/objectifying paradigm wherever it is expressed, because of the (relative 
or absolute) identification of the body and the self, especially in the period we 
examine. 
The history of pornography as we know it today starts in the late Middle 
Ages. One could claim that its precedent can be found in ancient Greece and Rome, 
but the naked body and the representation of sexual scenes, rather frequent in ancient 
ceramics, was a quite different thing for the Greeks. The Greek gods were made "in 
the image and likeness" of humans, instead of the other way round. The gods 
themselves, Zeus most of all, often indulged themselves in human passions. The 
concept of right and wrong was, therefore, fundamentally different in ancient society. 
The idea of sin does not appear anywhere in the ancient world with the metaphysical 
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meaning it has in the Judeo-Christian tradition. The only comparable concept is that 
of hybris, which meant disrespect to the gods and their paradigm, excess, offence to 
nature, rather than disregard for the God-given law of morality. Because of the 
liberal ethics of the ancient world, there is no evidence to suggest that its erotic 
statues and representations had the effect of pornography, as we understand it today. 
It would be more fruitful and consistent with psychological information to look for 
the beginning of pornography at the end of the decline of iconography and the 
emergence of the materialist depiction. We can, for instance, note some examples of 
early pornography in two different cases in the paintings of Leonardo da Vinci: his 
aforementioned sketches of the body with their objectification effect, and all the 
paintings he made with the famous enigmatic smile of the Mona Lisa. 
The portrait of Mona Lisa del Giocondo has drawn a great amount of 
attention from critics and audiences that line up before it in the Louvre. Its prominent 
and most famous feature is the smile on the face of the depicted woman, something 
that makes her appear mysterious, inviting and seductive, yet cruel and distant at the 
same time. Sigmund Freud used a quite descriptive source in his study of the 
Gioconda and the effect she has on viewers: 
What especially casts a spell on the spectator is the demoniac magic of 
this smile. Hundreds of poets and authors have written about this 
woman who now appears to smile on us so seductively, and now to 
stare coldly and without soul into space; and no one has solved the 
riddle of her smile, no one has read the meaning of her thoughts. 
Everything, even the landscape, is mysteriously dreamlike, and seems 
to be trembling in a kind of sultry sensuality.57 
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This is a characterization that foreshadows Freud's view on the painting. Not 
surprisingly, the scientist who coined the term "Oedipal complex" argues that the 
representation of Mona Lisa can be read on a deeper level as the representation of 
Leonardo's mother. This possibility of a subtext may have indeed had a certain place 
in Leonardo's life and work, however its significance for us here lies in the 
painting's refusal to reveal its secrets; the woman on the canvas wants to remain a 
two-dimensional image, one with whom the viewer will never be able to relate in any 
other possible way. The painting becomes a mirror of the passion of the viewer, as it 
was a mirror of the passion of Leonardo himself. However, and this is one of the 
reasons I locate the beginning of contemporary pornography in the Renaissance 
paradigm shift, it is not a painting that could have been created by a woman, nor 
could it have been enjoyed by a woman in the same way as by a man. It exploits, in a 
way, the sexual mystery of the surface and its appeal, and at the same time it 
signifies the lack of true contact between the passionate narcissistic viewer and the 
woman on the canvas. The passion of the painting is the passion of absence, whereas 
the passion of the medieval icon was the passion of presence. The icon reminds us 
that God is present, among us, and he gazes upon us from behind the surface of the 
icon, from where his eye was painted before the colours were placed. It was this very 
discourse of presence that made the icon itself a holy artifact that participates in the 
honour and the glory of the depicted saint or of Christ.58 
It is interesting to note here that the icon and the pornographic image are both 
functional representations, rather than symbolic ones. The viewer has a direct and 
personal relationship with them, and the meaning of their function lies in this 
affective relationship. They have no substance whatsoever without the response they 
try to elicit. Pornography has no meaning without the libidic instinct that supports it, 
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and the icon does not convey any meaning to someone who has no understanding of 
the sacred and of the religious feeling. In fact, the idea that an icon or any other 
religious object can be viewed as a cultural artifact only, without the reverence its 
creation presupposed, would be offensive to most believers, perhaps even 
blasphemous. The seventh Ecumenical Council of Nicea in 787 declared that 
religious images ought to be venerated, and this is the meaning attached to the icons 
by the Orthodox Church to date. The Roman Catholic Church also accepts the 
declarations of the Nicea Council, although in practice it has maintained the more 
indifferent attitude towards icons of the Libri Carolini. The icon is succeeded by the 
pornographic image as an object of direct personal relationship that eludes and 
transcends the artistic evaluation. Yet, they co-exist today, representing the two 
opposite poles of an imagery that can only be described as meta-art. 
It can be fruitful to examine pornography and the icon simultaneously. They 
share the nature of a trajectory, a discourse of desire in the first case, a soteriological 
one in the second. Yet, the similarity of their nature tempts us to discover an 
ontological connection between them, somehow decreasing the gap that places them 
to the opposite ends of a Freudian trinity. Desire and its mechanics can be, exactly 
like the faith in a divine plan, all-inclusive and all-encompassing in their intended 
holism. They both have an end destination on the individual and on the social plane, 
and they can both be extended to metaphysics. The main common characteristic is 
the promised salvation at the end of the trajectory. We may be fast to point out that 
pornography and the psychological states (neuroses) that are related to it, often 
appear to be a static condition, as the pornographist substitutes reality with an 
artificial fantasy. However, my hypothesis is that this halt is due to the plane of 
lesser desire the pornographist is caught on, and attempts to escape from, acting out 
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the fantasy over and over. Moreover, the equivalent of the sexual neuroses could be 
found in the area of religion as well. I feel strongly that the immeasurable crimes 
committed in the name of the institutionalized religions throughout their history, 
should not be blamed on the needs and the insight that inspired them, but on the 
occasional lack of metaphysical faith and the pleasure it can provide. It should be 
possible to describe religious neuroses using the terminology of libidic neuroses 
(religious fetish, religious sadomasochism, and so on). 
Both pornography and iconography owe their existence to the acceptance of 
an "as i f alternative reality, yet they aim to reverse it through their respective 
trajectories. Religion and desire both retain the memory of a blissful care, a womb 
and a mother or Paradise; they both register the attempt to return to it, as the aim of 
the neurotic, according to the Freudian psychology, is the attempted identification 
with the mother, which at a certain point he realizes it cannot happen. Still, it is 
possible to view neuroses of this nature as stages in an interrupted development, at 
least to the extent that every psychological stage and trial, like the enigma of the 
Sphinx, leads to a broader knowledge. The resolution of each stage leads to a 
different level of awareness with its own challenges,59 yet the final stage, or rather 
the desired destination, is usually not clearly visible to the one that undergoes the 
trajectory. 
However, both the pornographic and the iconographic praxis are part of a 
therapeutic process, an internal healing that intends to compensate for the creation of 
the "as i f reality, by providing paths to the deeper parts of the psyche, the id and the 
superego, according to the Freudian classification, and bring as much as possible to 
the light of the conscious mind. Still, it is a very good question whether the structure 
of the psyche preceded the alternative reality, which filled in the two opposing voids 
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it found (the superego and the id), or whether there is something in the nature of the 
triadic separation of the psyche that connects it ontologically to the alternative reality 
that haunts the human race since its birth in this particular way. In other words, was 
it the compartmentalized structure of the psyche that resulted in the two worlds of 
imagination, or was the creation of the multiple structure and imagination 
simultaneous, both being symptoms of the same step humanity took at a certain point 
in history? 
We may not be in a position to answer this question conclusively, yet a major 
characteristic of the present age is the resolution of the opposites, and C. G. Jung 
offers psychological data affirming that this stage was to be expected and is part of a 
greater trajectory of the human race, that reflects on our traditions and our religions. 
This religious wallowing is relevant to art and its investigation, because art, in a way, 
exists as a play of the opposites. First, art is a tool that allowed us to exist in the 
fantastic ("as i f ) reality, because it manufactured a world analogous to the real one, 
with the modifications that would appeal to us according to our moral, mental and 
psychological frames of reference. However, art has always been the guide out of the 
labyrinth of the simulations, as well; it is the connection between the projected and 
the perceived, the expression of the artist as well as the pleasure of the audience, 
fantasy and realization at the same time. 
interestingly, one of the ideals and the fixations of the Age of Reason 
(especially the Enlightenment) has been the development of the psyche in a way that 
would circumvent the Ego (evident in the myths of the "wild child": reason was 
becoming conscious of, and at the same time was trying to deny, its negative face). 
The age was witnessing the emergence of a new aspect of the psyche, and in a 
maturing process, it was becoming conscious of its negative potential. The 
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Renaissance was, undoubtedly, the age of the Ego and the age of individuality. 
However, technology, the breakthrough in communications and transportations, and 
the discovery of the subconscious mind in our century, have allowed individuality 
and the ego to flourish and extend considerably;60 it is now possible to observe how 
the individual is becoming increasingly responsible for the world, and how it is 
imperative to become more independent in a changing economy. The job - training 
institutions of the present are not sufficient and the fast adjustments to new 
technological environments in the workplace, as well as the fact that most of us must 
now be prepared to change our vocation quite frequently, have become some of the 
biggest contemporary social problems, but are also indicative of a change in the 
social role of the individual. One's identity was largely defined by one's vocation, 
however the present turmoil promotes an as wide as possible view of society and its 
needs, and this reflects a change in the identity of the New Age person. The 
extension of this evolution in the condition of individuality reaches inevitably the 
spiritual domain. The ideals of contemporary society include racial and religious 
tolerance (it is characteristic that the Pope spoke recently of other faiths and asked 
that they be respected). Difference is becoming less and less controversial, because 
everyone's culture, religion, and worldview is, eventually (even i f ideally) accepted 
within a postmodern world. However, the moral conventions of a society cannot be 
multiple, but they have to allow for the coexistence of everyone's freedom, and at the 
same time demand everyone's commitment. Ultimately, this process is going to place 
certain demands and expectations to the human psyche.61 
The psychodynamics of the New Age person suggest that he has, finally, 
come in terms with his ego by adopting and nurturing it, and that the collective has to 
be re-negotiated on new terms, not within the community, the family or the factory, 
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but within the psyche itself. The work of Rupert Sheldrake provides a biological 
basis for Jung's theory of the collective unconscious. The ego becomes the receiver 
and the transmitter that connects us to the internalized collective conscious. The 
desired goal of the ego is to compromise the memory of the primal Paradise (the Age 
of Innocence, and the womb), with the knowledge it has acquired after the Fall (birth 
and the subsequent socialization/rationalization). This is reflected equally on 
iconography and on pornography, and describes, I believe, their profound 
connection. I can see them as two parallel discourses of ego transcendence, which, 
although so different in nature, they are nevertheless driven by the same psychic 
desire. 
It is important here to finally recognize the functionality of art that is neither 
pornographic nor iconographic, but personal/psychological. It can provide a safety 
valve, a balance mechanism, and a meditative technique for the artist and the viewer 
alike. An old music teacher of mine6 3 used to say that art proves we are handicapped, 
because we need it as a helping cane. We are not strong enough to face the world 
without it, which, according to the religious tradition, we only do it now "through a 
glass, darkly". We can see the religious dimension of this problem in the fact that the 
Bible and the biblical apocrypha present a complete account of the trajectory of art 
within human civilization, something that supports on a psychological/archetypal 
plane the previous statements, from the Fall of the angels who taught the arts and 
sciences to humans, to the end of the arts announced in the Apocalypse, as discussed 
in the beginning of A Religious View of the History of the Arts. 
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Image and Recognition 
As it has been discussed elsewhere, icons were made in a way that defied 
natural perspective, as well as "natural" colours, shapes, angles, sizes and ages of the 
depicted persons, etc. Although, as we have seen, no formal painting guidelines from 
the Middle Ages survive, one should not assume that the reason for the unnatural 
depictions was the limited technical ability of the artists, or that the technical 
language of the time was primitive. After all, the bases of iconography and its super-
real, distorted reality, were laid by the direct descendants of the people who invented 
the plastic arts, the study of proportion and perspective, and all the classical rules of 
duplicating reality "precisely and correctly". The shift to iconography was a 
conscious moral choice, and it had to do a lot more with the mission and the function 
of art, rather than with its artistic appreciation and critical acclaim. Relevant to this 
point, the issue of inverted perspective has been discussed elsewhere in this study 
from a semiotic perspective. It is also noteworthy that inverted perspective, as well as 
the rest of the non-realist devices of iconography, did not prevail, as it were, as a 
result of a series of technical and/or religious semantic decisions on the conscious 
level, but came about gradually, through the constant effort of iconography to 
express the spiritual, the supernatural and the super-rational. 
One should keep in mind that, according to the artistic expectations of the 
Byzantines, iconography was producing quite convincing life-like portraits. Henry 
Maguire devotes a lengthy chapter (Likeness and Definition64) on this issue, in his 
book The Icons of their Bodies, arguing that icons were convincingly life-like to 
those who looked at them at the time. Maguire sites several cases of icons whose 
similarity to the depicted persons had been proven by the recognition of those 
persons (St Nikon Metanoeite, St Irene of Chrysovalanton, and the Virgin in the 
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vision of St Stephen the Younger) after their images. The most famous example is 
the recognition of Saints Peter and Paul by the emperor Constantine the Great, who 
had seen them in his dream, in the icons shown to him by pope Sylvester. Yet, it is 
understandable that the modern observer can be somewhat apprehensive to accept the 
characterization of icons as life-like portraits, compared with images of 
contemporary naturalism. 
Portrait types even older than the icons, such as the Hellenistic funeral 
portraits found at Fayoum, employed a technique much closer to the naturalist 
approach than iconography. It is doubtful, however, whether the external likeness of 
a person can always be considered as a convincing representation of this person, 
especially i f we are not familiar with the person in real life. A photograph of 
someone we know can be considered a satisfactory reminder of his or her 
personality, but we cannot expect someone who is not familiar with the depicted 
person to have the same response. The question is what can an image tell us in order 
for us to have an understanding of who that person is, what were his/her thoughts, 
and, ultimately why it is important to look at his/her picture. Every age sets its own 
conventions about what is expected in an image and how life is to be captured in it, 
depending largely on the relationship of the viewer with the image, the viewer's 
expectations. The convincing representation for the Byzantines had to do with the 
successful entry of the icon into the discourse of hagiography. It is perhaps not a 
coincidence that the word used then to describe iconography (and still used by 
iconographers) is hagiography. The saint was successfully depicted i f certain signs 
associated with him or her, such as the liturgical vestments of the bishops, medicine 
boxes of doctors as St Panteleimon, etc., were clearly depicted as well. Maguire 
describes this as an issue of definition6* A saint was accurately portrayed when he or 
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she could be identified not by virtue of an illusionist technique that presented a 
person in a way comparable to natural vision, but when he or she could be 
recognized for the person they were. The icon was attempting to capture the identity 
instead of the surface. We can find an example of how important this was, in the 
account of the impression of a Byzantine cleric of the fifteenth century, Gregory 
Melissenos, when he entered a Western church granted to the Greeks during the 
Council of Ferrara (1438): 
When I enter a Latin church, I do not revere any of the [images of] 
saints that are there, because I do not recognize any of them. At the 
most, I may recognize Christ, but I do not revere him either, since I do 
not know in what terms he is inscribed. So I make my own [sign of the] 
cross and revere it. I revere this sign that I have made myself, and not 
anything that I see there.66 
Development after the Middle Ages 
It is only in the Renaissance that we came across the concept of the artist as a 
different, charismatic person the name of whom has to be known and to be passed on 
to the next generations. The artist, just as the scientist and the thinker, became the 
prophet of the new era, i f not its saint. It is generally agreed that by the term 
humanism we mean a cultural shift that emphasized the personal worth of the 
individual and the central importance of human values, as opposed to religious 
belief. I t can be seen as a shift of focus from Heaven to Earth, and the replacement of 
the theocentric universe by an anthropocentric one. The notion of the charismatic 
person that transcends the limits of his age, something like a predecessor of 
Nietzsche's Ubermensch who replaces the dead God, can be found here. It can 
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perhaps be observed for the first time in the philosophy of the "renegade Dominican" 
as Balthasar called him, 6 7 one of the best-known writers of the Italian Renaissance, 
Giordano Bruno. 
Bruno's much studied cosmology can be also described as the dream of a 
Jungian psychologist, the cosmos, according to Bruno, consists of two 
"unfathomable" trinities, a trinity of Darkness (chaos, abyss and night), and a trinity 
of Light (pater-pleroma, primus intellectus-nous, light-spirit) 6 8 As was the case with 
some dualist views, as well with Jung, Bruno does not speak of a final conquest or 
absorption of darkness by light (or the reverse), but of a balance between them. The 
two trinities are "unfathomable" because they correspond to the "intoxicating 
experience of the bottomless height, depth and glory of Being". 6 9 The universe 
depends on the union of the opposites. Moreover, Bruno sees the spiritual strife of 
man as an attempt to be in union with the cosmos, to comprehend or possess the 
coincidentia oppositorum, even if, as Balthasar says, "it tears him apart".70 A theme 
from pagan mythology Bruno used to illustrate the power of this danger was the 
myth of Actaeon and Diana. It is interesting that Artemis/Diana has a special 
significance for Bruno, being the shadow of her brother Apollo, who, being 
identified with the sun, cannot be seen directly. Although C.G. Jung had an extensive 
knowledge of medieval sources, I am not aware of any writings of his on Bruno, but, 
having based a great part of his psychology on the psychological concepts of the 
shadow and the coincidentia oppositorum, it is certain that he would find statements 
as this very interesting from a psychological point of view: 
For no-one can see the sun itself, the universal Apollo and the absolute 
light in its highest and most withdrawn form, but one can see his 
shadow, his Diana, the world, the universe, nature, which is in things, 
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the Light which is reflected in the darkness of matter, that which shines 
in the darkness.71 
In Bruno's philosophy the ascendance of the soul and the union with the 
cosmos has little or nothing in common with the neoplatonic concepts of return to a 
(Father) God. Eliade sees in Bruno a revival of Egyptian magic Hermeticism72 with a 
simultaneous shift from an anthropocentric and geocentric universe to a heliocentric 
one. On the other hand, whatever the cultural roots of Bruno's beliefs, they 
demonstrate a change of the locus of spiritual activity from Heaven to Earth, since 
man cannot rely on divine intervention, and even i f it were to happen, it could be 
catastrophic, as in the myth of Actaeon who was devoured by his own dogs after 
Diana transformed him into a stag. Balthasar, therefore, observes that in Bruno's 
philosophy prayer does not have a place, it is up to the individual - the hero - to 
attempt cosmic union. Bruno's philosophy was quite influential, and it can be 
reasonably said that humanism is very much indebted to his ideas. As Balthasar 
wrote: 
Bruno becomes secretly father of the modern religion of the cosmos, 
Spinoza and Leibniz are decisively indebted to him, on him Schelling 
will build further, and when Herder and Goethe say 'Spinoza', they 
really mean Bruno. 7 3 
Bruno signifies the emancipation of human spirit from religion, which is 
almost synonymous with the secularization of the world and the secularization of art. 
His ideas express the Renaissance spirit and they became the basis on which later 
writers and artists based theirs, but perhaps we should push this investigation a little 
further, from a sociological point of view, and examine the humanistic turn from 
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another perspective. It would be useful at this point to sketch a brief account of the 
development of perception from the Middle Ages to date. To this end, we shall 
follow mainly the thought of Michel Foucault in his signal work The Order of 
Things. 
Perception and art in the Middle Ages was ordered by the epistemic rules of 
anagogy.74 According to anagogy, every kind of knowledge depends on God, but the 
difference between the infinite God and the finite world means that, since there is no 
possibility of immanent knowing, anagogy bridges the gap and translates the 
immutable being into the transient becoming: every kind of becoming is created by 
and can be known only by reference to the transcendental being. The world was, as it 
were, a set of signs emanating from God, and intellect had to be firmly grounded in 
faith. Anagogy therefore, was "the set of epistemic rules which ordered the 
intellectual knowledge of becoming in terms of faith in God's absolute being. 
Knowing the immanent from the standpoint of the transcendent, the medieval 
intellect delighted in the play of signs as figure, metaphor, analogy, symbol, and 
vision." 7 5 
The open structure of the medieval Universe corresponded with an emphasis 
on oral culture, or, more precisely, the mentality of oral culture applied also to 
writing and painting. Oral culture is open to constant interpretation, in a sense it 
depends on (anagogic) interpretation for its meaning. The icon could only be 
understood through reference to the divine. The meaning of what is to be 
communicated was beyond the words or the images, and in this sense truth and the 
meaning of art could only be expressed from within subjectivity. 
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The "epistemic order of the Renaissance", to use Foucault's expression, 
replaced the rules of anagogy with the rules of resemblance or similitude: In the 
epistemic order of the Renaissance "to search for a meaning is to bring to light a 
resemblance. To search for the law governing signs is to discover things that are 
alike... The nature of things, their coexistence, the way in which they are linked 
together and communicate is nothing other than their resemblance."76 Replacing the 
medieval anagogic subordination of the transient becoming to the absolute being, the 
Renaissance proposed a "converging, centripetal world of order".77 
Foucault tells us that the model of Renaissance understanding was based on 
an analogy between the macrocosm and the microcosm, with the human being 
located at the center of the universe (an idea that can be traced to Plato's Timaeus, 
which passed to the West through John Scotus Eriugena's elaboration on the writings 
of pseudo-Dionysios the Areopagite and Maximus the Confessor). Analogy, 
however, as it was developed in the Renaissance, implied a kind of separation 
between the microcosm and the macrocosm, or Earth and Heaven, as opposed to the 
pseudo-Dionysian concept of hierarchy, a concept that "connotes inclusion and 
union" throughout the entire Cosmos. In the discussion of the Mirrors of Vincent 
of Beauvais in A Religious View of the History of the Arts we saw how the separation 
of the two realms was evident since the late Middle Ages. 
The four essential kinds of the Renaissance similitude were convenientia, "a 
resemblance connected with space in the form of a graduated scale of proximity," 7 9 
aemulatio, "a sort of 'convenience' that has been freed from the law of place and is 
able to function without motion from a distance,"80 analogy, in which "convenientia 
and aemulatio are superimposed,"81 and sympathy, which "excites the things of the 
world to movement and can draw even the most distant of them together."82 
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The hierarchical, centripetal Renaissance Universe corresponded with a 
separation of the subject and the object of observation. Since the late Middle Ages, 
written word was gaining importance over the spoken word. Michael Clanchy 
presents a series of cases from the eleventh to the thirteenth century that demonstrate 
the increasing significance of writing, especially in matters of law. 8 3 Perhaps the 
most revealing example is the Magna Carta, "the great precedent for putting 
legislation into writing." 8 4 It is particularly interesting that by 1300 significant 
emphasis had been put to seeing the document instead of it just being read to the 
people. Clanchy mentions the case of the Archbishop Pecham of Reading, who had 
ordered a copy of the Magna Carta to be posted in every cathedral and collegiate 
church, "so that it can be read by the eyes of everyone entering".85 Seeing was 
gradually replacing hearing and, despite the persistence of an underlying popular oral 
culture, the advent of typography tipped the scales decisively. This meant that the 
body of knowledge or the work of art became an object to be gazed upon. A dynamic 
distance can be observed between the reader and the text, as well as between the 
viewer and the picture. The icon became incomprehensible according to the rules of 
resemblance, because that which it represented could not be seen by the eye, or to 
recall the psychological analysis of the icon from A Religious View of the History of 
the Arts, because the divine Other behind it was lost in the hierarchical, 
anthropocentric Universe of the Renaissance. The immediate reference to the divine 
was also lost, as we saw in the discussion of the philosophy of Giordano Bruno, and 
this meant that the perceptual rules of resemblance presented the same emancipation 
from theistic reality as Bruno's philosophy did. 
The order of similitude was replaced, in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, by an order of representation in a dynamic space: "The circular world of 
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converging signs is replaced by an infinite progression." Modern science as we 
know it emerges here, and it is no coincidence that what Foucault calls the "Classical 
time and thought" corresponds to what is generally known as the "classical", golden 
age for the arts. Reason, comparison and measurement, replaced the Renaissance 
hierarchy of similitude. Similarly, the semiotics of the Universe was based on forms, 
magnitudes, quantities and relations of objects, everything that could be measured 
and calculated. The work of art had become a text with many variables that had to be 
connected with each other as the parts of a machine, something that can be observed 
especially in music. The classical period saw the rapid flowering of the sonata form 
and the first maturity of the symphony, the solo concerto, the solo piano sonata, the 
string quartet, and other forms of chamber music. During this time the orchestra was 
expanded, in both the number and the variety of instruments. 
In the epistemic order after the industrial revolution, time gained a more 
central position. "The logic of identity and difference was enhanced by one of 
analogy and succession."87 The new epistemic order was based on development-in-
time, transformation, and / evolving structure. Art, accordingly, attempted to 
incorporate the element of time, and it is no surprise that this era ends with cubism 
(one of the basic principles of which is representation-in-time) and cinema, the 
"moving pictures". Cinema critics have pointed out that a kind of non-photographic 
moving picture could have been invented as early as in antiquity. Andre Bazin 
argued that the invention of the moving pictures in the nineteenth century instead of, 
say, the sixteenth, cannot be explained on grounds of scientific, economic, or 
industrial evolution, but it has to be seen as part of a wider artistic trend towards 
"total cinema", a complete representation of life, and it is only in the nineteenth 
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century that this trend reached the maturity, as it were, to combine image and 
88 
movement. 
The last of the epistemic orders corresponds with a revolutionary change in 
the twentieth century, and is still the epistemic basis of the contemporary world. The 
culture of typography was replaced by electronic culture, in which sound, image and 
word converge. This change brought about many difficulties in the old order. The 
modernist claim that analytical reason can develop connections with the objective 
concepts of time and space does not reflect the relativity of the new epistemic order. 
However, although Kant in the eighteenth century had already posited a similar 
restriction of reason in relation to absolute time and space, the postmodern order 
addresses this restriction more radically. Knowledge is reduced to something very 
reminiscent of the observations and interpretations of a mathematical chaotic system; 
it recognizes the inherent tendency of constructing units, independent from time and 
space, towards larger systems. Those units, moreover, are identified only by their 
difference from each other and, therefore, their relative ability to form a system, with 
no reference to a central, absolute point. Postmodern art has shown comparable 
tendencies. The problem of differentiation between subject and object, as well as the 
question of the possibility of objective knowledge have returned, and the structure 
and the conventions of art acknowledge the new reality. It would be redundant to 
attempt an overview of postmodern art theory here; art in the modern and 
postmodern age is discussed in The Death of Art and The Religious Artist. 
As expressed repeatedly by several writers like Ernst Gombrich, artistic 
expectation translates itself into perceptual expectation. Art, and especially 
representational art, should not be taken only as an expression of our present view of 
the world, but it should be considered one of the factors that create our 
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Weltanschauung and what we think the world looks like. Gombrich proposed that, in 
a way indebted to the scientific method, artistic conventions reflect the perceptual 
expectations of the people who accept them. As new developments from within art 
challenge the artistic conventions of the past, perceptual limitations themselves are 
challenged, and lead in turn to a new series of artistic conventions and perceptual 
limitations or schemata. Gombrich has illustrated that the naturalist perspective 
brought about a new series of problems to visual representation. Representation in 
post-medieval art is not independent from the expectations or from the visual 
education of the artist or the audience. Every artist or school of painting teaches us 
how to look, and in doing so establishes a different framework of implicit 
representational conventions. Even i f the desired goal is the faithful depiction of 
what one sees, it is hard to accept that in seeing one does not follow exclusively what 
previous generations of artists and representational conventions have taught. This 
mechanism is dynamic however, because the difference between "the image of the 
retina and the image of the mind", 9 0 the inconsistencies of every framework, are 
pointed out by the next generation of representational artists, who modify it in order 
to answer some of those inconsistencies. Yet, the framework remains, even modified, 
and it is not possible to ignore the pictorial tradition that dictates the way artists 
observe the world. 
One of the examples Gombrich cites to support this view is Diirer's woodcut 
of a rhinoceros (1515).91 Diirer had never seen a rhinoceros, and he had to rely on 
other people's descriptions. His representation, therefore, looks grotesquely unreal, a 
"dragon with its armoured body". Yet, this strange creature has been the basis for 
many subsequent sketches of a rhinoceros, even for sketches made by people who 
had seen one themselves, such as Heath, who drew a rhinoceros for Bruce's Travels 
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to the Source of the Nile (1789). Maybe Heath himself was not aware of the 
influence, but his drawing looks more like Diirer's woodcut and less like an actual 
rhinoceros. Gombrich seems to argue that had photography not been invented, 
offering a different kind of representational conventions, we would never be able to 
have the Essential Copy of a rhinoceros. 
This kind of perceptual/artistic development is comparable to Karl Popper's 
principle of the "priority of the scientific hypothesis over the recording of sense 
data" 9 2 Popper's influence is evident throughout Art and Illusion, as Gombrich 
himself recognized.93 The work of the scientist, as described by Popper in Objective 
Knowledge, is a "continuous cycle of experimental testing".94 A problem is followed 
by a trial solution, a hypothesis that can possibly explain it. An experimental 
situation can be devised, by which some aspects of the problem are explained, but 
new problems may be revealed from it. Art, according to Gombrich, proceeds in 
exactly the same way towards the Essential Copy. Norman Bryson has argued, 
however, that there is a weak link in the formula Problem-Trial Solution-
Experiment-New Problem;95 different trial solutions, intuitive even for science and a 
lot more so for art, can lead to different problems, or to different lines of scientific or 
artistic development altogether. As there can be no single trial solution, there can be 
many approximations to the Essential Copy, not better or worse from each other. 
Ultimately however, we cannot know i f the Essential Copy is actually approached: 
the only thing the scientific method can prove is that the trial solution was wrong, 
and we are not in a position to really know whether the new situation we start with is 
closer to the target. Bryson described this process as cyclical instead of linear, 
meaning exactly that there is no objective way of knowing whether the change 
consists a progress or not: 
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Between Cimabue and Giotto there is certainly change, but our decision 
to call it advance rather than to categorize Cimabue and Giotto as two 
equally invalid 'false starts' will depend on their degree of 
approximation to the Essential Copy: the latter is essential to the 
doctrine of progress, even when Giotto's advance beyond Cimabue is 
alleged to consist in the elimination of Cimabue's errors. And as long 
as the Essential Copy remains a necessary component in the 
theorization of painting, analysis of the image will continue to preclude 
the dimension of history.96 
The thought of Gombrich and Popper expresses the scientist and the artist 
who have placed their faith in the process of development itself, even i f the Essential 
Copy appears infinitely inaccessible. In that, they would conform to the epistemic 
rules of the modern age as defined by Foucault, while Bryson's criticism seems 
genuinely postmodern. 
On the other hand, our approach to representation and the Essential Copy has 
been profoundly affected by the invention of photography. Technology provided the 
means to attain an "objective" depiction, without the direct intervention of man, but 
this also meant that the concept of the "original" work of art was lost; it does not 
make sense to speak of an "authentic" or "original" photographic copy, since all of 
them are equally"authentic" or "original". Walter Benjamin discussed the loss of the 
"aura" of the work of art in the age of mechanical reproduction, in a very influential 
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essay. In a way that anticipated the discourse on the withdrawal or death of art, he 
noted that "the instant the criterion of authenticity ceases to be applicable to artistic 
production, the total function of art is reversed"98. According to Benjamin, the work 
of art has now transcended the Renaissance "cult of beauty" which has been 
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influential for three centuries, and entered the world of politics - a re-integration of 
the separated realm of art into life. 
The initial reaction of traditional art to the dangers brought about by 
photography was the movement of I'art pour I'art, understood by Benjamin as "a 
theology of art" 9 9 This movement towards "pure" art, the first instance of which is 
located by Benjamin in the poetry of Mallarme, believed in an art above social 
necessity, and it therefore denied any social function to art, and resisted any 
categorization of subject matter.100 Social necessity however, proved to be stronger 
than "pure" art, especially in our days. In the world of politics, which for Benjamin 
was the next arena of the work of art, both possible approaches, socialism and 
capitalism, attempted to define art according to the very social function "pure" art 
reacted to - be it via social realism or commercial art. The integration of art into 
general social practice can be observed here. Photography and cinema, by all means 
creations of humanism and the scientific revolution, established the framework 
within which art withdraws as a separate practice, in other words the death of art. 
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The Death of Art 
The problem of the "death" or withdrawal of the author has been approached 
in postmodern criticism so much, that it would not be inaccurate to say that it is one 
of those issues that identify postmodern thought as such. Western sense of culture is 
so much indebted to the concept of the author-creator, that it was impossible to 
criticize modern culture without stumbling on it. Yet, even postmodern thought with 
its often iconoclastic zeal, has not paid equal attention to the conceptual framework 
of authorship, with few exceptions. In this chapter I attempt to take the discourse on 
the death of the author a step further, and connect it with the discussion of the death 
of art, or rather, to use the discourse on the death of the author as an entry point for 
the examination of the death of art. Truly, the ramifications of such an induction are 
much more far-reaching than the examination of art, and one could develop similarly 
the concepts of "death of writing" or "death of science," or even "death of thought". 
Of course, the expression "death" has to be taken with a grain of salt. Death, in this 
sense, is what precedes a regeneration, a renaissance, on different grounds than the 
ones that made necessary and, finally, gave birth to the "dead" concept or practice. 
The present analysis cannot afford to be as expansive as to include the examination 
of all sorts of death, and will have to be limited to the examination of the concept of 
the death of art. The figure of the author in Western culture is connected to two 
things pertinent to the present analysis, that will be examined at some length. One is 
the meaning of the concept of the author and his authority in Western culture, and the 
other is the identity of the author as the initiator of art. The recognition of an author 
as a respected or renowned thinker entails some kind of intellectual or artistic 
authority that somehow precedes, or at least accompanies, his writing. 
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The concept of the author is as old as written language, or rather written 
thought. Even "texts" whose origin precedes writing, have been occasionally handed 
to us under the name of an author (such as Homer's epics) who validates them, i f not 
as an original writer, at least as an editor. When the phonetic alphabet was put into 
wide practice by the Greeks, thought passed from the ear to the eye: a text that could 
codify the thoughts of its writer in a way that allows itself to be examined, analyzed, 
dissected and criticized in an "objective" way (as an "object"), could not dissolve 
into oral collective tradition. Certain systems of thought committed to writing by 
certain authors deserved a grouping that was not possible earlier, but at the same time 
brought about the concept of an author as an initiator of a (world) view that could be 
expressed on many levels and developed into many fields. This is how we came to 
recognize Plato and Platonism, Aristotle, the Stoics and the Skeptics, and other 
schools of thought. Similarly, this is how tragedy and poetry became influential after 
their writers were long gone. Unfortunately, we cannot claim the same for all kinds 
of art. The visual arts were fortunate enough to maintain a continuity, from the 
statues and paintings of antiquity to the icons and paintings of the Middle Ages, the 
statues of Renaissance, and contemporary painting, even though not much remains of 
ancient Greek painting. Almost nothing remains from the musical tradition of 
antiquity on the other hand, and it is only much later, when a system of music 
notation practical enough to be read and studied by people who could not necessarily 
be given direct instructions by the composer of a musical piece, was invented, that 
we can talk about the composer as the author of music. The situation is even more 
dismal in dance; standard choreography systems were only recently developed, and it 
is questionable how accessible they are to lovers of the art without formal dance 
training. 
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It has to be said, however, that inspiration and the "gift of art" usually came 
from the outside in antiquity and the Middle Ages. The Iliad and the Odyssey for 
instance, begin with an invocation to the muse. The poet invokes the muse to sing the 
wrath of Achilles (Mfjviv dotSe, 9ed, A^Xecog...), and it is the muse who sings the 
adventures of Odysseus to and through the poet (Av8pa uoi evsrce, uoijoa, 
7toX\)Tpojiov...), not the other way round. It is only relatively recently, in the 
Romantic years, that the authorship was unequivocally identified with the artist. We 
cannot be sure, therefore, that the concept of the author always had the same 
meaning it does today. As such a concept, it is more an invention of criticism rather 
than an artistic idea. 
Nevertheless, as far as our civilization is concerned, the examination of a 
body of work in a critical sense, more or less as we understand it today, can be 
traced, according to Michel Foucault,1 to hagiography and the authentication of the 
writings of saints and Fathers of the Church, perhaps because fiorilegia before the 
Christian era were too eclectic to be compared to contemporary criticism. 
Foucault discusses the problems encountered by St Jerome, a forerunner of 
literary criticism in that aspect, and his critical methods. St Jerome addresses the 
concept of the author in terms that set its tone for the following centuries. In De Viris 
Illustribus he argues that texts which appear under a single name do not necessarily 
belong to one author; homonymy does not necessarily prove that several works can 
be attributed to a single author, since many writers may have shared the same name 
and since one might have composed a work under another writer's name or persona. 
A famous example that can be used to demonstrate Foucault's (and St Jerome's) 
argument can be found in the writings under the name of Dionysios the Areopagite, 
an Athenian saint of the first century AD, who according to tradition was converted 
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by St Paul, and became the first bishop of Athens. It is now generally agreed that 
these writings were written some time around the sixth century, probably by a Syrian 
monk who had assumed not just the name, but the entire persona of St Dionysios. 
The "assumption of the persona" of St Dionysios can explain why no references to 
events after the first century can be found in the writings of pseudo-Dionysios. A 
kind of literary investigation has to be carried out, therefore. Foucault observes that 
four criteria are employed by St Jerome in order to ascertain the authenticity of the 
works of an individual: a. works of lesser quality should not be considered as works 
of an author whose writing is considered to be of higher quality, and thus a kind of 
standard level of quality is accepted, b. Works that contradict the main body of 
writing in doctrinal matters should also not be considered being written by the same 
author; this implies that the beliefs of an author are supposed to be, or expected to be, 
consistent throughout his lifetime, c. Works written in a different style, using words 
or expressions not found in the recognized corpus should also be rejected; stylistic 
uniformity and consistency is a criterion. Finally, d. works that mention events or 
persons subsequent to the death of the author have to be rejected: the author has a 
particular place in time, he is a definite historical figure. 
What we see here is a method that has not radically changed throughout the 
centuries that followed. The needs of modern literature and medieval hagiography 
may be different, but the concept of the author as a source to examine critically and 
then use as an authority for an argument has survived. At this point we should keep 
in mind that the idea of authorship in the early Christian years took its value from the 
acceptance of something that was beyond words and language: the truth was received 
or attained by holy men and women who would then commit it to writing, but this 
process was compromising, because divine truth is beyond the realm of words, 
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beyond the realm of the ordinary. St Paul and St John the Theologian are two of the 
earliest Christian writers who described their transcendental experiences or visions, 
but their writing alone cannot easily guarantee that these were the visions of saints 
and not of schizophrenics. Any ancient or modern doctor would raise an eyebrow i f 
someone were to tell them that he found himself in the third heaven and did not 
know whether he were with or without his body, or that he had a vision of monsters 
with ten horns coming out of the sea. The text itself was therefore not enough to 
guarantee the truth of its meaning. That also means that the meaning of a phrase 
depended greatly on who said it and what we may infer about its context. A simple 
statement like "Christ is the Son of God" attains a completely different meaning, 
depending on whether it is attributed to Arius or to Athanasios. In that sense the 
personhood of an author maintained a primacy over the text that appears under his 
name, although once the authentication, translation and exegesis of the works of an 
author had been accomplished, there was no need to remember that the "author-
function" corresponded to an actual person, and the text itself was as revered a 
source as the saint himself. Of course, it can be argued that the text is more revered 
and valid than the author himself, because it has assumed a legal function, whereas 
personal truth tends to be elusive and subjective. The text, more than anything else, 
has been used to found institutionalized religion. Extreme as it may be, the example 
of the confrontation between Christ and the Grand Inquisitor in Dostoyevsky's The 
Brothers Karamazov makes exactly this point. 
This attitude was inherited by modern literary research. An anonymous piece 
of writing was an enigma whose solution had to be sought. Every effort had to be 
made to identify its author and the date, place and circumstances of its writing. A text 
had to belong to an author, and this belonging eventually attained the status of legal 
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property toward the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the 
nineteenth. Foucault argues that this occurred in order to harness somehow the 
transgressive nature of writing: discourse in our culture was not a thing, a product or 
a possession, but "an action situated in a bipolar field of sacred and profane, lawful 
and unlawful, religious and blasphemous."2 In other words, free discourse can 
present a danger to a rigid social structure, and the course of action in this case would 
be to identify the initiators of such discourse and hold them responsible for it, 
whether this meant that the text and the author were to be recognized as a (social) 
authority, or as subversive agents. Undoubtedly, the sociological nature of Foucault's 
approach is quite evident, because this observation supposes a social structure that 
attempts to contain the elements that may possibly harm it, in this case by 
appropriating or discarding them. The contrast between social structures and the 
individual is a recurrent theme in Foucault's writing (central in works like The Birth 
of the Prison and the History of Sexuality, for instance), which could be questionable 
as a basis for such a research, because it is almost exclusively interested not in the 
concepts as such, but in the way they reflect and provide the framework for the 
development of modern society. That means that although his view seems justified 
within post-antiquity Western society, it may not necessarily be impervious to 
criticism in a different social setting. 
Yet, Foucault recognizes that even within our civilization there is a kind of 
discourse that does not need an author. Stories and folk tales were accepted without 
any question about their author, their real or presumed age being a kind of guarantee 
for their authenticity. Still, such secondary discourse never rivaled the status of 
"authored" texts, even in the Middle Ages. Texts under the name of Pliny or 
Hippocrates, argues Foucault, "were not merely formulas for an argument based on 
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authority; they marked a proven discourse."3 It is only much later, in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries, that scientific texts emerged on the basis of their value 
alone, which initiated a different system of authentication and verification, although 
literary texts were still only acceptable under the name of an author. 
From the point of view of criticism however, the author is more or less a 
projection of psychological nature: although we may actually have very little 
information about the true identity, or the true opinions and feelings of a writer, the 
construction of an author, a persona behind the text, makes the handling of the text 
immensely easier. It is possible for a text to be completely misread under a falsely 
constructed persona of its author, maybe not so easily in scientific writing, but 
certainly in non-verbal discourse, the other end of the spectrum. Such an example is 
Dmitri Shostakovich, who although was the semi-official representative of Soviet 
music for many decades, reveals a completely different person in his memoirs, 
published under the title Testimony, one who deeply resents the communist system 
and fears for his personal safety on an almost daily basis. Whether this affects the 
value of his music is an open question for criticism; Shostakovich did not betray his 
musical ethics, but he tried to conceal them as much as possible in the ambiguity of 
his music, at least ambiguity with respect to the specific identifiable political ideas he 
had to juggle. Moreover, even with artists like Sergei Eisenstein who aligned 
themselves completely with the communist regime, one may discover different layers 
of meaning that rise above political discourse. The master of montage helped create a 
new language in cinema, and his films, like D.W. Griffith's racist The Birth of a 
Nation, cannot be judged on the basis of the (presumed) ideas of the author alone, but 
have to be taken as a multiple and complex text that may tell us more about itself 
than its author would. Another example from cinema is Fritz Lang, whose 
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Metropolis was admired by Hitler, presumably for all the wrong reasons. Thea von 
Harbou however, who was the original script writer of Metropolis, Lang's co-author 
at the time, never hid her Nazi sympathies, and when Lang emigrated for America in 
order to avoid working in Hitler's propaganda industry, she stayed back and worked 
under the regime. Metropolis, nevertheless, was thought by both Lang and von 
Harbou to express their respective views, and it would be therefore inaccurate to 
identify the text with the one or the other author. 
The author-function is not necessarily so much an invention for the 
convenience of the reader as an invention for the convenience of the critic: the author 
explains the presence of certain elements in a text, as well as their transformations, 
distortions and various modifications. The personal biography of the author, as well 
as the social conditions he lived and wrote in, in addition to any views he was known 
to have, even our psychological analysis of the personality of the author from what 
the texts allow us to use, all these constitute a persona criticism may take material 
from in order to interpret, connect and explain away the peculiarities of a body of 
work. In a kind of textual fetishism, the author's eccentricities or personal faults may 
assume a central role, in the reading of a text. It is, therefore, often said that 
"Baudelaire's work is the failure of Baudelaire the man, Van Gogh's his madness, 
Tchaikovsky's his vice."4 Still, inasmuch the presence of a personality behind the 
work is assumed, one of the most important functions of the author on that level is 
the resolution of any apparent contradictions in his work, as i f the presence of a 
single mind, responsible for the work, assures the reader or the critic that whatever 
incompatible elements can be found in a text must somehow be resolved on a higher 
level of reference. The function of the author here is to guarantee a kind of unity in 
the little universe that is the work, and therefore make it possible for the closeness of 
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the text to be maintained. The "closed" or "open" text in that sense has been a critical 
issue for almost forty years now, at least since Umberto Eco's seminal The Open 
Work. The question about the "closedness" or "openness" of a work is really a 
question about the internal (assumed) unity of a work so that the closed work exists 
in a self-contained space, whereas the open work first acknowledges the paradox of 
this practice, and then involves the reader not in an illusion of the unattainable 
completeness, but in a presentation of the process of writing itself, which, i f we 
follow Lyotard's call for the postmodern as that which constantly evolves and breaks 
the rules that set it as a paradox of the future,5 always attempts to evade 
textualization and become part of what is outside the text. I think all this alludes to a 
theological problem the historical beginning of which was discussed in Anti-
Leonardo: a closed text aspires to be a little independent universe and the author 
poses as its Creator. The work of art was not as distinct and independent before the 
Renaissance, when art in the Christian world assumed a more functional position, 
connected to a practical or liturgical role. In that sense, and since the analysis of the 
present forces upon us such a review of the past, I think the present condition has to 
include that theological insight: I believe that postmodernism will result in the 
biggest religious event since the Reformation. 
Still, there is something more to be said from the reader's perspective. The 
above questions are valid from the critic's point of view, or rather it should be noted 
that they are associated with the kind of semiotic criticism that focuses on the text 
itself. Rather than exploiting the old contrast between semiotics and phenomenology 
however, we should be interested in the analysis of the text, but also in the 
observation of the artistic process as a whole, and especially in its interaction with 
the reader. 
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First of all, it is not anymore accurate, or rather acceptable, to think of the 
author as the initiator of a discourse that flows exclusively out of his creative self. 
According to contemporary criticism, scientific writing as well as literature, music as 
well as the visual arts, are all indebted to previous writers who created a tradition in 
their respective field. Any piece of writing consists of a plethora of ideas that occur 
in previous writings, that blend and clash. Any text is "a tissue of quotations drawn 
from the innumerable centers of culture,"6 and the author is reduced to a compiler, an 
ingenious editor perhaps, who will assist the reader in his discovery of the material, 
or will , at best, propose a certain reading of older texts. To connect this thought with 
the previous point about the open text and the Author-Creator, it is not anymore 
acceptable to assume that the text contains a single "theological" meaning, as Roland 
Barthes put i t , 7 the message of the Author-God, but a much more complex and 
multidimensional field of ideas. 
This corresponds with evidence provided by the kind of psychoanalysis 
(especially Jungian psychoanalysis, which accepts that the psyche consists of many 
"splinter" psyches with a great degree of independence from each other) that 
demythologizes the concept of the self as a rational being with a solid identity. The 
self is not a static being, but is defined by innumerable actions and choices on 
conscious and unconscious levels that may not be consistent with each other. Put in 
simpler terms, a normal individual consists of many partial personalities or personas, 
behaving or rather "being" somewhat different with one's colleagues, family, friends, 
but this division extends largely to the unconscious. What Jungian psychology calls 
complexes (a characteristic of the normal psyche in Jungian psychology - splinter 
psyches - unless one or two of them "take over"), but similar concepts in other 
schools of psychology as well, are largely a product of ancient archetypes or social 
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factors, or other kinds of external influences. On this basis we cannot speak of a 
single total expression of the self into writing or art, because, leaving aside the 
problem of what can and what cannot be expressed, such a total personal expression 
is not feasible, at least not to the degree that one could say that the personality of the 
author as a single initiator of linear discourse is reflected in the text. 
The convention of the author-function suited, however, the practice of 
criticism extremely well. The removal of the author renders the aim to decipher a text 
futile. The presence of an author implies the closeness of a text, and corresponds to 
the presence of a final signified, which can ultimately explain, or rather explain away 
a text. Of course, in that sense removal of the author has been seen by postmodern 
criticism as the removal of the critic and criticism. As noted above, art and writing 
can function extremely well, and this has happened in the past, with no need for the 
professional author or the professional critic. 
Still, there is a kind of unity in any text, but it can be perceived and explained 
when we look for its center at the other end of the artistic process: the reader (or 
viewer, or listener) is the focus of the multiple diverse quotations from different 
cultures and times that make up a text, it is he who provides a hypostasis for the text. 
The reader however, and this is a great difference between the Author approach and 
the Reader approach, is impersonal, without biography, history or psychology. 
Postmodern criticism, accordingly, distances itself from the anthropomorphism of 
classic criticism, and defends the rights of the reader, so to speak. 
This point will be brought up again later, but at this stage I would like to 
discuss a special kind of author, not just the initiator of discourse in general, but the 
initiator of artistic discourse: the artist. The artist, or author of art, is the figure that 
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assumes responsibility and provides conceptual unity for the work of art, and should 
be considered conceptually identical to the author as far as the discourse on the death 
of the author is concerned, but most postmodern thinkers have generally developed 
their discourse using language borrowed mainly from literary or scientific critical 
tradition. The artist, nevertheless, is often seen as the creative, as opposed to just 
intellectual, genius whose insight marks great art. Art history, as it is still taught in 
schools throughout the world, owes its structure to the romantic ideas about art and 
the artist, and is almost synonymous with the history of the author as artist. 
One problem contemporary criticism had to deal with, with respect to the 
concept of the artist, is the possibility of a single individual responsible for the work 
of art. Contemporary art, perhaps with the exception of painting, is created, 
technically speaking, by many artists who collaborate towards the creation of a single 
work of art, each from a different perspective and a different role (composer, 
performer, director, editor, writer, etc.) and to such a degree that an artistic result is 
shaped by the input offered by all of them. The best examples for this view can be 
found in cinema, which has developed into an artistic industry where it is 
inconceivable for an artist to have sufficient technical knowledge or control over the 
entire process of filmmaking. A cinema student may discover a certain stylistic 
consistency in the films directed by John Ford for instance, but another kind of 
stylistic consistency may be also found in the films photographed by Gregg Toland. 
The name John Grisham, on the other hand, is usually enough to attract a certain kind 
of audience and to prepare it for the kind of fi lm it is going to see. The same 
overlapping can also be observed in music, or wherever art has evolved to a greater 
structural complexity, from the moment of the first inspiration to the moment art 
reaches the audience. John Tavener has composed having in mind the particular 
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sonority and the technical capabilities of the London Sinfonietta or the Tallis 
Scholars, for instance, while the Kronos quartet has commissioned a work by Phillip 
Glass, and in this sense, a work of art may owe its existence, strictly artistically 
speaking, both to the composer and to the performer. It is hard to say who is the 
author-artist in these cases, but it is probably not easy to claim that a work of art can 
be attributed to the creative force of a single individual anymore. The artists have 
formed a cast or guild of their own, as it were, which includes a structure of 
marketing and opinion polling, and can be said to be collectively responsible for 
contemporary art, generally speaking. Moreover, classical and popular art alike have 
long ago abandoned the maxim "Ars gratia artis" (which is, by the way, the motto of 
MGM!), and, quite consistently with the general observations on the discourse on the 
death of the author, have turned their interest towards the audience. Art is not, for the 
most part, supported by rich sponsors, as in the time of Haydn and Wagner. Instead, 
it is either supported directly by its wide audience, as in the case of commercial, 
popular art, or, at least partly, by government grants, which also reflect the interest of 
the audience, albeit in a different way. The feedback of the audience, directly or 
through arts councils, defines the course of contemporary art more than any creative 
artist could. Hollywood, for instance, has never been as powerful as it is today, and 
the marketing of companies such as ECM or Nonesuch obtains support for works that 
would otherwise be lost within commercial competition, by targeting a particular 
audience and building a trust-taste relationship with it. Although the stocks of the art 
market, so to speak, are still identified and measured by names of artists, it is more 
accurate to say that Arvo Part, for instance, was created by ECM as an author-
function - although definitely not as a composer - than to say that ECM is a 
company that became successful because of artists like Arvo Part. The case of ECM 
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is especially characteristic, because its director, Manfred Eicher, does not normally 
accept unsolicited material, but does actively and personally seek and promote artists 
that fi t the artistic profile of the company. Ultimately, the artistic choices and the 
taste of Manfred Eicher are more influential than the choices and the taste of a single 
composer. 
The concept of the author has been approached from various angles in 
contemporary criticism. Insofar as literary criticism is concerned (although this 
argument can easily be generalized to include music and the visual arts, any kind of 
artistic discourse), the physical person of the author and the cultural structure 
conventionally identified as the initiator of a body of work can, and may, be 
completely unrelated. The author exists by virtue of the text, or rather he exists in the 
text. As Michel Foucault put it, "in our culture the name of an author is a variable 
that accompanies only certain texts to the exclusion of others... The function of an 
author is to characterize the existence, circulation and operation of certain discourses 
within society."8 What Foucault has called the "author-function" is, then, no more 
than a social convention, and we could easily do without it. Elimination of the 
concept of the author does not necessarily mean a compromised creativity. 
What we have seen so far is not necessarily a set of rules that attempts to 
reconstruct the past, claiming that the way we have been looking at the past until 
now is completely wrong, although subject to criticism and revaluation, especially in 
the light of the postmodern condition. The death of the author is a contemporary 
phenomenon that can be observed in modernity and postmodernity. This means that 
it cannot be easily separated from the particular conditions that defined 
postmodernity: the recent revolution of information, communications and 
transportation gradually brought about a profound change in the way art and the art 
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market works. The technology of mechanical reproduction has given the audience 
the power to enjoy and own the art of its choice. The "aura" of the original work has 
been long lost, as observed by Walter Benjamin, and that means that for all purposes 
of artistic enjoyment everyone has more or less equal access to art, whether this 
means a good (photographic) copy of Leonardo's Gioconda, or Sting's latest CD. 
The media, television especially, on the other hand, provide an open line of 
communication with the outside world, that even i f it cannot be described as art, it 
includes and uses art constantly. Art then, appears to be transforming into an 
environmental event, so to speak, changing from the focused attention event it used 
to be. "Television is a cool medium" Marshall McLuhan used to say,9 meaning that it 
leaves much space to be filled in by the viewer, who assumes for this reason a 
relaxed, distanced position in relation to television, as he cannot be expected to give 
it his undivided attention, and provide the information gaps cutting the outside world 
off. What happens instead is that television withdraws as a source of information and 
visual and aural stimuli into the background. This observation can be generalized for 
other media, as well. McLuhan often wrote that we live in a "cool" age, where most 
stimuli around us give us a modicum of information and we provide the rest. 
McLuhan's observations on the hot and the cool extend many centuries back, and he 
describes many cases where a "hot" age succeeded a "cool" age and vice versa, 
depending on the dominant medium of the culture and the time. Still, it is difficult to 
see how the present course of the information age of the interactive user and 
environmental art could be reversed. For all we know, and for all we can observe and 
predict, art gradually recedes into life, reminding us of Hegel's prediction. The first 
step, the death of the author as the external initiator of artistic discourse, has already 
been accomplished. The next step is the altogether withdrawal and death of art. 
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Although the death of art sounds like a very novel postmodern idea, maybe 
the logical step after the discourse on the death of the author, it has roots in much 
older writings. Two contemporary writers who have commented on the death of art, 
Umberto Eco and Gianni Vattimo, trace the concept to Hegelian dialectics and 
Hegel's prophecy of the death of art through a "general aestheticization of 
existence."10 Neither writer however, understands Hegel's prophesy too literally, i.e. 
corresponding to a "historical end of art,"11 but rather as the "death of a certain form 
of art, part of a historical development in which the advent of a new idea of 'art' 
must appear as the negation of what the same term meant for the preceding culture," 
as put by Eco.1 2 Vattimo, on the other hand, seems to take this idea a step further, 
reading Hegel in an intentionally "perverse" way according to Adorno, and arguing 
that, for all intents and purposes the "universalization of the domain of information 
13 
could be interpreted as a perverted realization of the triumph of absolute spirit," m 
which case the general aestheticization of existence corresponds to postmodern 
"environmental" art. 
The methods of the two Italian writers differ significantly, and they use 
completely different methods in their philosophical investigations, but they both 
accept that the death of art corresponds to a transformation that takes place under the 
visible surface of the artistic procedure, not unlike the gradual death of the author. 
The significant difference between writings on the death of the author and writings 
on the death of art, is that the first describe a phenomenon that transformed primarily 
art itself, whereas the second consider the effect of essentially the same 
transformation on the relationship of art with the contemporary world, its philosophy 
and, even, its metaphysics. 
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One of the characteristics of contemporary criticism is that it focuses more on 
the how rather than on the what vis-a-vis the work of art. Contemporary criticism and 
contemporary art seem to be more concerned with the development of a certain 
poetics, something that in a sense followed naturally after the "open work". Criticism 
is not simply interested in the evaluation of the work of art, but also in the 
identification and interpretation of its methods, the choices that constitute its poetic 
language and the structure these choices reflect. Eco sees a distinction between the 
part that is meant to be "understood" and the part that is meant to be "enjoyed", and 
sees nothing wrong with the reduction of the work of art to an intellectual 
"whodunit" where the pleasure derived from reading corresponds mainly to the 
pleasure of identifying the poetics and the poetic structure. The work itself can be 
there to communicate things that "the mere enunciation of its poetics could not have 
told us, and this, in turn, helps us amplify and verify the enunciation of its poetics."14 
Eco identifies here an interaction between the two sides, and this is important, but he 
places thought hierarchically higher than feeling in his account; I do not see the 
reason for such a classification. 
This view of the, work of art poses a problem for the historiography of art. A 
history of art that consists of the description of the stages that explain how art 
accomplishes its task is completely different, as a conceptual structure, from the 
description of what the artwork is and how it evolves. Something is lost in the first 
case, although the interpretation of art, that is to say its demythologization, can have 
certain advantages, when it is used with respect to one particular work of art; it is 
conceivable that a work of art is, at some point, totally interpreted, and all the 
questions about its function are answered. I f this happens however, i f the 
significance of a work of art becomes finite, no more pleasure can be derived from it, 
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and it ceases to "do" the work of art. Eco does not dismiss the pleasure one may take 
in demythologizing a work of art, and he compares it to the intellectual pleasure a 
medieval reader derived from a text, looking for allegorical interpretations.15 To 
apply this measure to art in general, however, is catastrophic. The process of art 
would then be seen as a continuous mathematical transformation of the sublime, and 
the object of study would not be the sublime itself, but the fossils it has left behind, 
everything "pure" art had to jettison in order to maintain its sublimity. Art history in 
that sense is the science that attempts to study something alive by examining its 
excrement. 
Of course, art history and criticism as we know it today, is a child of the 
scientific revolution and rationalism, since it stems from the same Weltanschauung 
that sees progress as an achievement of linear nature, the same one that gave the 
power of artistic appraisal to the critic, the knowledgeable and specialized 
representative and interpreter of social codes. Art here is a phenomenon to be 
witnessed, described, analyzed and classified, something that helps us draw a cultural 
profile of ourselves, however it is not expected to be lived and unconditionally 
experienced. The nature of direct and immediate art eludes this circle; an artwork 
intended to communicate rather than to teach is perhaps seen only by the one(s) this 
communication was aimed at, just like a shyly written secret love letter, being a true 
artistic moment no one ever witnessed. A hypothetical discussion between the writer 
of such a note, describing his experience to a young pianist (for instance), might have 
resulted in the conscious choices this pianist later made in his life, and i f his name 
were Achilles Claude Debussy, for instance, this is something that could have 
influenced the music of the entire twentieth century. Which is the original, the 
archetypal artistic moment here? I believe it would be the secret love letter.16 
The Death of Art 181 
Art history is really trying to connect the evolution of the language of arts 
with the achievements of civilization, or with the conditions of life that provide 
inspiration and methods of a different kind to the artists of a certain age. However, 
apart from the scientific examination of the art tools and the discovery of the 
references to the past and the echoes in the contemporary environment, art history, 
practically speaking, cannot give a more complete account of the history of the 
content of art. Is there a change in how much people wanted to communicate with 
each other or with their god through art? Is there a shift towards any of those 
directions? Do people express more things now than in the past? Do they express 
less? What happened before art, and what is going to happen after it? Does art affect 
us more, less, or in a very different way? Do we need art more now, or do we need it 
less? Have the properties of art changed throughout the centuries? Is it becoming 
more therapeutic, or more metaphysical? It is hard to think of an art history that 
would address such questions. 
The question of historiography of art is quite complex. It is not exactly 
possible for us to speak of a development of the arts in a sense similar to the 
development of the sciences, although the science of art criticism has repeatedly 
attempted to do so. The basic problem stems from the fact that the transformation of 
art does not have to take into account something like "objective artistic truth." Unlike 
the development of science, as described by Thomas Kuhn in The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions, art maintains a much looser continuity with its past. Scientific 
paradigms usually take much longer to change, and even when they do, the new 
paradigm appears in hindsight as a rational progression of the old one, as it is usually 
bora out of some of the known inconsistencies of the old paradigm. Art, on the other 
hand, is not measured against an inert, objective reality, it does not have an 
The Death of Art 182 
uncontested base, so to speak, a stick by which to measure the degree of its progress 
or regression; the next step, therefore, can be much more unexpected. Moreover, 
artistic "paradigms" exist in the here and now, and their changes are usually abrupt, 
unlike scientific ones, where the Newtonian and the Einsteinian model can co-exist 
for some time. Eventually we can allow the old scientific paradigm to maintain its 
validity, as long it is confined to a limited part of the perceived world. As far we can 
limit our observations to everyday life, most of the scientific experience and the 
observations we acquired during the Newtonian model have survived. Scientific 
progress is measured by the fact that, with few exceptions, the science of the past is 
not discarded, but is perfected, even when the addition of new findings urges the 
creation of a broader scientific framework. 
We have to note that the above observations apply to the level of art as 
production and consumption. It is perfectly possible for a work of art to maintain 
recognition through many centuries, and for audiences of the twentieth century to be 
captivated and enchanted by a work composed in the fifteenth century. This, 
however, is not just the exception to the rule, but it can also be seen as an anomaly of 
the art production system. Continuity with the past has traditionally taken different 
overtones in art. The paradigm of formal artistic conventions has often been seen as a 
domineering and repressive rule, challenged by the new generation of artists, who 
often offer a radically different way of making art. By contrast, scientific revolutions 
tend to appropriate the knowledge and the experience of the past, and expand it 
further, creating new limits for the scientific universe as they go along. 
Still, we have to admit that there is some kind of cqnceptual continuity in the 
development of art. The paradox here is that the rules that define this development in 
art are obviously quite different from those that define the development of science. 
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Nevertheless, art criticism is practiced along scientific methods. I f nothing else, 
Kuhn's writings point out that a relativism of the artistic kind, although at a much 
smaller scale, is evident in scientific revolutions, as well. New paradigms do not 
usually prevail by proof, but by persuasion. Or, as put by Max Planck and quoted by 
Kuhn: "a new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and 
making them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new 
generation grows up that is familiar with i t . " 1 7 
I do not wish to argue that the traditional concept of art history does not offer 
anything. However, the analysis, the evaluation, and the understanding of the 
conceptually structural materials of art, can help us conceive of a small part of the 
nature and the history of the artistic process. Some of the trends and the revolutions 
that art history describes may reveal cracks and contours of an aspect of our 
evolution and history we would be profoundly interested in knowing. Very often, the 
most revealing instances may prove to be not the most obvious, but the most 
enigmatic ones. Such an enigma is the question of the appearance of the medium and 
the art of photography when this happened, although as a technological task it could 
have been achieved, or, at least attempted, centuries ago. We have to conclude that 
photography was not invented earlier because it would not have any meaning (or at 
least, not any meaning that would be appropriate) for someone living in the Middle 
Ages, for instance. It is only when "objective" technological capture of the similitude 
of an object and its mechanical reproduction became part of the art vocabulary, that 
photography could be conceived as a form of art. In this case, technology was 
employed when painting had reached a degree of abstraction which could not be 
bothered with superficial observation. Photography undertook the task of capturing 
physical likeness when it was abandoned by painting, but it soon developed an 
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artistic language of its own, based not so much on its technical, "naturalistic" 
capabilities, but on the way it could be used to produce literal or abstract meaning. 
We are left, however, with the question of the historiography of art. I f the 
study of the how, the mechanisms of art, can lead us nowhere, what could we say 
about what art is, and possibly how it evolves? To answer this question, especially 
after we have just dismissed the disembodied study of the materials of art, we would 
have to gain an understanding of the pleasure one derives from art. Eco's analysis 
distinguishes, as we have seen before, the art structure that can be investigated and 
understood, from the pleasure that can be derived by looking, reading or listening to 
a work of art. He dismisses "idealist aesthetics that broke down the entire Divine 
Comedy into 'structure' (tolerated as a nonartistic framework) and 'lyrical flashes' 
(the only enjoyable fragments)."18 Finally, he dismisses romantic aesthetics that 
defined the appreciation of art as "an art of intuition, precisely in order to underline 
the fact that the proper understanding of a form involved a number of factors that 
could not be reduced to a mere intellectual understanding - factors which, together, 
constituted an organic reaction that could be analyzed only a posteriori"19 
') 
I am afraid that art since 1962, when these lines were written, has followed i f 
not a neo-romantic path, at least one that has largely depended on the "aesthetic 
emotion" Eco dismissed. The difference is that in romanticism or in intellectualism, 
one part of art (to recall the dichotomist analyses of the Divine Comedy) is opposed 
to the other, whereas art since minimalism has attempted, with some success, to 
bridge the gap and see the work of art as an organic whole, whose mechanics are not 
the restraints of its emotion, and its emotion not the restraint of its intellect. 
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Minimalism, which can be seen as a counterpart of nihilism in art, is a 
phenomenon that started at about the same time Eco was writing the Open Work -
Terry Riley's In C, which is generally considered to be the first musical minimalist 
example, was composed in 1964. What followed after minimalism however, proved 
that art relied heavily on exactly what Eco dismissed as "intuition" or "beyond 
intellectual understanding", albeit not returning to the romantic ideal of emotion. 
New Age art has proved to be a quite enigmatic step as far as conventional art 
historiography is concerned. The evolution of the forms cannot account for meta-
minimalist art, where music has perhaps taken the lead, in contrast to the visual arts. 
A gap can be observed here: this analysis started with the presentation of the 
discourse on the death of the author, a phenomenon that can be manifested to such a 
degree that we could dare say it has been accomplished totally. The death of the 
author means, on one level, the negation of criticism and the return to the reader, his 
rights and his perspective. It means the transcendence of an intellectualism that 
makes art a business of a select group of artists, whereas commercialization of art 
brings about a kind of democratization of taste. On the other hand, early postmodern 
comments on the death,of art employed similar language, and prophesied the decline 
of modern art, placing at the same time the recovery of the aesthetic value in an 
intellectual construction, a hybrid of art and criticism. It seems that the two concepts 
are not quite consistent, and although Eco's observations on modern art are brilliant, 
he did not foretell the future successfully. It is interesting to notice that contemporary 
art is based on an element that eludes Eco's early analysis completely, and is not 
only consistent with the death of the author, but it could be seen as one of its natural 
consequences: the return of metaphysics in art. 
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Gianni Vattimo, a leading interpreter of Heidegger, connects the notion of the 
death of art to the trajectory of metaphysics in modern culture. "The death of art," he 
writes, "is a phrase that describes or, better still, constitutes the epoch of the end of 
metaphysics as prophesied by Hegel, as lived by Nietzsche and as registered by 
Heidegger. In this epoch thought stands in a position of Verwindung in regard to 
metaphysics. Metaphysics is not abandoned like an old, worn-out garment, for it still 
constitutes our 'humanity' in geschicklich terms; we yield to it, we heal ourselves 
from it, we are resigned to it as something that is destined to us."20 
Vattimo's comments on the withdrawal of thought in favour of metaphysics 
indicate some kind of way out of the modernist dead end, the infertile opposition 
between thought and emotion. Eco was writing about the priming of emotion and the 
criticism that condemned structure, and the poetics of a work in favour of an 
"aesthetic emotion" that reflected the undisciplined, spontaneous, but ultimately 
extremely conservative, ideals of Romanticism. This kind of deconstructive 
postmodern criticism engaged the problem of identification of author and work by 
giving autonomy to the work, focusing on the poetics rather than on the 
"subjectivity" of emotion which was closely connected with the personality of the 
author. In other contemporary texts as well, like in The Structure of Bad Taste,21 Eco 
expressed similar views that point towards the emancipation of the reader from the 
pre-fabricated emotions of the Kitsch, the response he is expected to have, so to 
speak, provided to him with the text. One should not commit, however, the mistake 
of taking this position too far and dismissing the subjectivity of the reader together 
with the subjectivity of the author. We should not forget that the primacy of thought 
in science and the celebration of individuality were some of the reasons that assisted 
the emergence of Romanticism. Vattimo, on the other hand, writes about a more 
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advanced stage of the same phenomenon, where not only emotion, but also thought, 
or the primacy of rationality, withdraws in favour of metaphysics. 
Vattimo's comments strike one as quite consistent with and descriptive of the 
"New Age" condition. The return of metaphysics is a phenomenon that can be 
approached, predicted and described in philosophical terms, but it is also registered 
by pop culture on a large scale. It is interesting to observe that the death of art affects 
high and popular culture in a remarkably similar way. Perhaps we should discuss this 
point before we proceed with the return of metaphysics in art. 
Eco's previous comments on the death of art belong to what is often 
described as the "deconstructive" phase of postmodernism, which consists of 
critiques of the absolute ideological systems of the past, what Jean Francois Lyotard 
called "the big narratives", but postmodernism also had a second phase, a 
"reconstructive" one, with writings and works of art that sought a kind of inspiration 
from the era before the Enlightenment, tracing the steps of culture and picking the 
thread before the much-criticized emergence of modernism. The withdrawal of the 
author and the withdrawal of art in general can be seen as a protest to the central 
position they claimed since at least romanticism, which is not something that can be 
explained in philosophical or sociological terms only, but also comparing the 
"perceptual fields" of modernity and postmodernity. Let us try to review a more 
technical, or rather perceptual, account of how this happened. 
Christos Hatzis has developed, in a series of unpublished papers22 on 
contemporary art, a theory of "invasionist" versus "non-invasionist" sound. His 
writings describe an analogy between the Zeitgeist and the qualities of sound, since 
the Renaissance. Eighteenth and nineteenth century music, both composition and 
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performance in his analysis, is said to have been constructed on the principle of goal 
orientation. This meant that, from the relatively static early music to baroque and 
romantic music, there was a gradual increase of dynamic tension in music: 
At the height of the Romantic era dramatic tempo and dynamic 
(amplitude) transformations and gestures of every kind became the 
lingua franca of musical communication. The orchestra increased in 
size and volume, to celebrate the ideals of the industrial revolution. 
New, louder instruments were invented and older ones were outfitted 
with new appendages to cater to ears which were becoming used to the 
powerful intensity of industrial machinery. 
Further on, Hatzis contrasts the dynamism of the industrial era to the 
contemporary information age. Our age is characterized by a continuous competition 
of information providers for our attention: advertisements, elevator music, a super-
multiplicity of television and radio channels, etc., create an information overload 
"similar to the environmental contamination caused by the industrial revolution."2 4 
To defend ourselves, therefore, from this information blitz, we have developed a 
complex set of filters in order to (attempt to) block unwanted information. One could 
also say that we are so saturated with information, that our attention is not attracted 
easily anymore. Hatzis' observations are quite consistent, at this point, with the 
thought of another Canadian, Marshall McLuhan, who argued that the more 
information a medium provides (a "hot" medium), the less participation from the 
audience it elicits. It is to be expected then, that in the age of "perfect" digital 
reproduction of sound, music withdraws to the background of attention. 
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Contemporary music and some principles that underlay it are examined in 
another chapter of this study (The Religious Artist). A great part of its success 
however, can be explained in terms of the non-invasionist quality of its sound. We 
can make some observations about the way sound and information pollution favours 
certain kinds of art over others, comparing the recent popularity of Mozart over 
composers like Beethoven. Hatzis argues that this is so because Mozart '"pushes' 
information less relentlessly",25 his music being enjoyable as a sonic experience, as 
opposed to Beethoven, whose music is the "rigorous sonic implementation of 
structure",26 a view reminiscent of McLuhan's famous maxim: "the medium is the 
message". Music, in Hatzis' analysis, is absorbed by the listener at the level of sound 
rather than at the level of structure. This is reflected on the way radio, as the medium 
most appropriate for classical music, tends to avoid linear, "conceptual" programs, 
single-composer or single-work presentations, in favour of the variety show, which 
reflects a non-linear approach, based on the difference of the successive items, where 
the connection can be found only i f the music is seen only as sonic experience and 
pleasure, instead of a conceptual structure with linear development. The same 
observation may be made for contemporary music, although this kind of approach 
was first adopted by the early twentieth century French music school. Ravel and 
Debussy focused on the quality of the sound more than their contemporaries, and 
Igor Stravinsky later developed the music of arrangement and sonority to its limits, 
although their approach was not without precedents. Musical impressionism 
however, was limited to the concert hall, and was destined at the time to be excluded 
from the Hegelian convergence between art and life. Contemporary music, on the 
other hand, is primarily the music of recording and broadcasting, probably because 
the recording industry has developed to such a degree that digital reproductions of 
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studio recordings provide a much better sound than the unregulated sound of the 
concert hall, even i f we do not count factors such as price, multiple auditions, 
mediocre performances, audience noise, dubbing and studio effects difficult or 
impossible to reproduce at a live setting, etc. 
Evaluation of music on the "pure" level of sound favours the convergence of 
the classical and the popular. At this point I will have to disagree with Hatzis' view 
that music is being narrowed to two distinct choices, "the first leading up a narrow 
path to spirituality, whereas the other choice is increasingly M T V , " 2 7 or rather I will 
have to disagree that these paths actually constitute different choices. Semiotically 
speaking, MTV music and post-minimalist classical music share many 
characteristics. Both use minimalist language without being minimalist. Both place 
the utmost importance to the quality of the sound rather than to the melodic and 
harmonic lines as such. Finally, both allude to a conceptual center located outside 
music itself, beyond art; dance and socialization in the former case, spirituality in the 
latter. Furthermore, I think that the concepts of "non-invasiveness" and 
"environmentalism" apply to classical and popular culture in a way that ultimately 
forces them to converge conceptually, with their only defining differentiation being 
the kind of event or state they are part of. Vivaldi and hip hop music do not 
necessarily represent different ideologies incompatible with each other, but may 
reflect a moment of relaxation and a moment of social interaction in the life of the 
same person. The fact that certain people may prefer consistently the one over the 
other may not reflect so much a difference of views on appreciation of art, but a 
difference of lifestyle. 
It has to be noted, however, that the split between spiritual art and MTV 
culture Hatzis warns against, can be seen through a different prism, further analyzed 
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in another chapter of this study (The Religious Artist), corresponding to the centuries-
old opposition of art according to the Greek and the Jewish model, art that attempts 
to make a connection with or to ignore metaphysical reality. Still, although I can 
sympathize with such an interpretation, which could trace the present cultural split to 
an opposition whose roots can be found in the founding forces of our civilization, I 
would have to reluctantly dismiss it as too extreme, at least as far as contemporary 
art is concerned. The reason is that I can see a quite rigorous return of metaphysics, 
more inclusive or total than any other time since the Middle Ages, while at the same 
time M T V culture does not seem to be threatened at all. Pop culture can be extremely 
flexible, and it may cultivate surprising links to spirituality. The new-found interest 
of Madonna (Ciccone) in Cabala and mysticism may or may not be interpreted as an 
isolated example of a pop idol that after years of casual use or commercial 
exploitation of religious motifs and symbols (who can forget the young girl named 
simply "Madonna" who used to make stage appearances wearing big crosses, singing 
"Like a Virgin"?), discovered that those things carry a much deeper meaning, but 
structurally speaking, pop culture, the best example being hippie music, can easily 
include an element of ritual and communion. But, to be fair, art and spirituality at 
young ages is usually not so much an affair of metaphysical nature, as of a certain 
psychology of growing and maturing. Although academic, scientific thought cannot 
say that religious practices are not given to humanity by God, it can certainly detect 
certain elements that reflect collective memories of growing and maturing that apply 
not only to the individual, but to the entire culture. Freud's Taboo and Totem is a 
significant study that, in spite of its materialist assumptions, examines such a cultural 
psychological trajectory, connecting spirituality with the rule of the father, his 
replacement by brother hordes who, after they kill him and consume his body, fight 
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for years before they re-establish the memory of the father as a religious taboo, a 
social convention that will help them maintain civilization. As much as ontology of 
the individual reflects the ontology of civilization and vice versa, the psychological 
stages the human being has to go through in order to achieve an integrated self and 
then pursue higher interests, belong to a religious Becoming, from a psychological 
point of view. Rebellion against authority and a strong connection to one's peers 
(perhaps a memory of the brother hordes) would be necessary stages, at least 
according to a model much indebted to Freud's ideas, towards the acquisition of 
religiosity, as these would be necessary steps one would have to take in order to 
attain a kind of psychological "distance" from the taboo, and rediscover its meaning 
on another level. Having this in mind, we may easily concede that so-called spiritual 
art represents the avant-garde of contemporary art, and MTV art its rear-guard, but I 
will insist that they express the same tendency, they both move towards the same 
goal. Seen from another perspective, it is very likely that the same people who tune 
in to John Tavener in the nineties are the same ones who, as youngsters, followed the 
Beatles in their religious explorations. 
At any rate, as far as the death of art is concerned, both spiritual and popular 
art express it in different ways. This should not be surprising; Vattimo describes the 
withdrawal of art in three different ways: as Utopia, as Kitsch, and as silence.28 
i . Death of art as Utopia, is connected, in Vattimo's account, to the avant-
garde movements in the beginning of the twentieth century, which, aiming towards a 
Hegelian integration of art and existence, and having acquired the technological 
means, attempted to transcend through their art the traditional institutionalized limits 
that had kept art segregated: 
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This explosion becomes, for instance, a negation of the places which 
had traditionally been assigned to aesthetic experience, such as the 
concert hall, the theatre, the gallery, the museum, and the book. A 
series of developments occur - earth-works, body art, street theatre, and 
so on - which appear somewhat more limited in regard to the 
revolutionary metaphysical ambitions of the earlier avant-garde 
movements, but also more concretely within reach for contemporary 
artistic experience.29 
We may observe here that this kind of "death" does not mean a reduction of 
artistic experience as such. People like the Dadaists and certain surrealists, realized 
that the distinction between high and popular culture was a bourgeois invention, and 
changed the way they were doing art. A "downward" move can be seen even earlier, 
in the paintings of Toulouse-Lautrec, for instance. At any rate, this trend is identified 
by Vattimo as a kind of death of art, because a certain kind of art was indeed put 
aside by such practices. Overall however, the opening of the artistic event beyond its 
traditional confines, although it was a first step towards the withdrawal of art into the 
background of the information age, resulted in an (at least short-term) regeneration 
rather than a decline of art. 
2. The much-discussed Kitsch is often seen as a degeneration of art, a 
"manipulative mass culture."30 According to several critical analyses (such as 
Greenberg's famous aphorism: "Avant-garde imitates the processes of art, whereas 
Kitsch imitates its effects"31), one of the major defining characteristics of the Kitsch 
is the katachresis of overexposed symbols, the use of images heavily charged with 
cultural and artistic memories, which can thus be exploited in a more marketable 
form. 
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The Kitsch is also, in Vattimo's perspective, a realization of the aesthetization 
of existence, albeit at a low and weak level, but I often feel I have to defend it 
somehow, or rather to distinguish between bad taste as such, and the cultural 
conditions that allow its expression. It is rather naive to argue that a work of art is 
"manipulative" just because it is bad, or because it acknowledges the emotional 
response of the audience. The art market, the commercial system of artistic use-
values, is completely amoral, and there is no reason whatsoever for bad art to be 
promoted over good art, since good art can be equally accessible and cheap. I would 
tend to see views as condescending as Vattimo's, as the result of a surprise brought 
about by the democratization of taste, and the legalization of (= tolerance to) bad 
taste. It may be bad, but even (or especially) the question of good and bad taste as an 
objective value has to be put on the table. The aesthetic aspect of a work of art can be 
secondary or irrelevant, i f art is to be seen as a functional process. Such was the case 
of medieval sacred art: it was not important whether an icon was aesthetically 
pleasing. 
An icon, even an ugly icon, could still perform its function as a sacred image. 
Taste is not such a significant issue for sacred art, because an icon, for instance, is 
not a work of art that intends to please the spectators; it is a sign of a divine presence, 
as we have seen in A Religious View of the History of the Arts and Anti-Leonardo. 
Sacred art does not express anyone's personal view. The Kitsch is similar to sacred 
art in that they both ignore the question of taste, albeit for entirely different reasons. 
They both fulf i l l a need that has little to do with art and the appreciation of the work 
of art, but is more of emotional and psychological nature, rather than of aesthetic and 
cultural. 
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3. Silence, the most visible kind of death of art, can be observed from two 
different aspects. Vattimo takes it as a reaction of authentic art against Kitsch and 
culture manipulation. In that sense, art has often "taken refuge in programmatically 
aporetic positions which deny any possibility of immediate enjoyment of the work 
(its 'gastronomic' aspect, as it were), refuse to communicate anything at all, and opt 
for silence instead."32 
I find this rationale highly problematic, and I am not sure that it can account 
for all or most of the ways art is "decaying" into silence. Fellini's 8V2, for example, 
ends with the theme of the silence of the artist, this in fact can be seen as one of the 
central issues of the film, but silence here is not at all presented as a protest to the 
devaluation of art, but rather as a result of the realization of the artist that the work of 
art cannot fulf i l l its promise and express the personal vision of the artist. The 
filmmaker within the film, and in the last scene also the critic who advises him, agree 
that the film cannot be completed, because there is nothing it can say, it has no 
substantial raison d' etre. Fellini, however, did complete his own film, but the 
difference is that his film was opened up in a self-reflexive manner, bringing the 
viewer behind the scenes, and showing him that the story line of a narrative film can 
be, at best, a canvas for an unaccountable number of influences that shape the final 
product. In the end, art cannot measure up to life, but 8V2 was not such a narrative 
film, but a commentary on filmmaking, authorship and the withdrawal of the work of 
art. Fellini is doing this in a quite "non-intellectualist" way, showing very often that 
it is exactly the "gastronomical" qualities of reality, to use Vattimo's expression, that 
cannot be translated into artistic material. In that sense, I would not directly disagree 
with Vattimo's observation, but I would definitely disagree with his "denial" of 
gastronomical enjoyment. 
The Death of Art 196 
Interestingly enough, Bergman's Persona picks up the thread exactly where 
8V2 left it: The central character is an artist who refuses to speak, and is put under the 
care of a nurse who does the talking for both of them. The personalities and, finally, 
the identities of the two women clash, and instead of communication (an impossible 
task, something that corresponds directly to the inability of the artist to communicate 
with the audience), the film ends with the question of subjectivity. Silence here 
means the abdication of the author in favour of the reader, an interpretation opposed 
to Vattimo's reading of Adorno. Silence, as in Cage's 4 '33", indicates a shift of 
focus as it is described above, but the death of art altogether, whether we take it as 
Utopia, Kitsch or silence, seems to be happening in many places at the same time. 
This is hard to dismiss as coincidence, and looking for an explanation on the level of 
the symptom seems futile. Maybe we should go deeper into the philosophical 
dimension of art for an explanation. 
Vattimo argues that the information age in a way corresponds to the triumph 
of the absolute spirit in the Hegelian sense, and there are indeed many similarities 
between the two conditions: The triumph of technology and the possibilities it has 
opened up, can be seen .as the fulfillment of the metaphysics that led us to this point, 
the metaphysical assumptions, or axioms, of the late Middle Ages and the 
Renaissance. These axioms became the basis for the consequently mathematically 
predictable evolution of art and society. The paradigm shift discussed briefly in Anti-
Leonardo, visualized the information age. I tend to see the fulfillment of materialist 
metaphysics as a neurosis that has finally completed its course and is being cured. 
The course of this cultural neurosis seems to be similar to fetishism: The fetish is 
more attractive than what it conceals, because it signifies the pleasure or passion of 
absence, drawing its power from what is not, whereas presence (of fulfillment) tends 
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to bring about a dispassionate, balanced state. We should remember at this stage, that 
the icon signified exactly the presence of the divine among humans, and its 
importance was based on this very presence. Nevertheless, when every piece of 
clothing is finally removed, the fetishistic magic disappears. Similarly, having 
eventually reached the end of materialist metaphysics we discover it is not quite what 
we expected. What is the position of the work of art in all this? 
Vattimo claims that what we experience at the deathbed of art is describable 
in the terms of Heidegger's notion of the work of art as an "exhibition" (Aufstellung) 
of the world and a "production" (Herstellung) of the earth.33 As "exhibition" it is 
defined by the historical and social conventions that distinguish "art" from "non-art", 
in the same manner a painting is exhibited in a museum or a gallery. It also refers to 
the idea that the truth of a historical epoch is reflected in the work of art more than in 
any other product of culture, something Vattimo traces to the philosophy of 
Dilthey. 3 4 This idea is particularly important, not so much for the celebration of the 
work of art, but for the "truth" it brings forth, which is also described as the 
"constitution of the fundamental outlines of a given historical existence, that is, what 
is called (in depreciatory terms) the aesthetic function as an organization of 
35 
consensus." In other words, the work of art expresses the social consciousness of a 
people, not in a legal sense, not even in the way of the social or religious conventions 
as repeatedly described by Freudian psychoanalysis, but in a sense of participation, 
or an identification of the self with the community. The work of art in its capacity as 
"exhibition" of the world proposes, criticizes or develops a certain social or 
philosophical framework in which it finds meaning. This framework reflects directly 
the truth at a particular point in the history of a culture. Moreover, the "setting-into-
work of truth" does not belong only to the individual work of art as an "exhibition," 
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but to the entire function of art, even (or especially) art in the commercial era, 
although in a quite different way. The work of art as "setting-into-work of truth" 
marks the participation of the individual in the group, but even when it collapses into 
its use-value and withdraws into the background, the function of art as the locus of 
the meeting of the individual and the social remain, and is further intensified. How is 
this compromised with the theory of the death of art? We have accepted that "death" 
may actually mean a radical transformation, and what the withdrawal of the work of 
art amounts to, is the end of the work of art as something to be exhibited. 
This has been manifested in two different ways. First, on the level of 
"environmental," non-invasionist art and the transformation of the work of art into 
something that attempts not to attract attention directly, dispensing with the barrier 
between art and non-art, and withdrawing into the art of the super market and the 
advertisement. There is certainly something less of an exhibition of art here. 
Second, intellectual art has repeatedly and consciously attempted to transcend 
this barrier, from at least the time of Bertold Brecht. The theoretical counterpart of 
such a tendency is better expressed by Andrew Louth and his description of the 
separation of art and life in the nineteenth century: 
Beauty, instead of being something we might find in life, and 
something that has to do with life, is relegated to the fringes of life: and 
consequently is only of concern to those who have the leisure to spend 
much time at the fringes. (The very self-consciousness of the efforts of 
Rushkin and others to prevent this, only bears out the truth of such an 
analysis.) We find art for art's sake: art as the potentiality for pure 
aesthetic experiences, and the cultivation of an aesthetic consciousness 
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by those who have the time and the inclination to indulge. Such a 
marginalization of the aesthetic is simply an attempt to live with this 
dissociation of sensibility, an attempt to regard it as normal.36 
There has been talk of meta-art, meta-literature, meta-theatre and meta-
painting, and so on. 3 7 1 understand the importance of all this as an attempt to lead the 
reader or viewer to unlearn that he has to be shown a spectacle to which he has no 
input. The reader should learn to transcend the "exhibition" and re-compose the 
work, or participate in (the responsibility of) its composition. This attitude can be 
found as early as Brecht's theory of the epic theatre of alienation, where "the viewer 
must not abandon himself passively and emotionally to the illusion of the stage, but 
must be urged to think and to participate."38 
It is even more interesting, however, to consider the other aspect of the work 
of art according to Heidegger, as "production" or "setting forth" of the earth. The 
word Herstellung, although usually translated as "production", literally means 
"setting forth". Heidegger's translators often use both translations. What is 
associated with the idea of the work art as a setting forth of the earth is its 
"thingness", its materiality (not to be understood physically), and the fact that this 
materiality suggests a continuous return of the work to itself, reflected on the 
writings of Eco discussed above, where he pointed the usefulness of the work of art 
as something poetics always returns to, in order to develop further and explain 
something more. The "thingness" of the work of art consists of what is addressed to a 
pre-logical, sensate understanding. This is what Heidegger means when he says that 
"the setting forth of the earth happens in such a way that the work sets itself back 
* 39 
into it." The earth includes all that, which civilization or the intellect, the "world", 
cannot describe and explain: 
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Colour shines and wants only to shine. When we analyze it in rational 
terms by measuring its wavelengths, it is gone. It shows itself only 
when it remains undisclosed and unexplained. Earth thus shatters every 
• 40 
attempt to penetrate it. 
Nevertheless, the earth, the unexplainable, provides not only the raw material 
for art, but also the basis of what seems to be a psychological rather than intellectual 
or cultural connection with it. The work of art as setting forth of the earth seems to 
correspond to raw experience, a certain feeling one may have in front of a work of art 
when one realizes how deeply this work can penetrate into regions of the mind 
deeper than language and cultural understanding. Raw experience, on the other hand, 
would be useless without the structure, the rational choices and the decision of what 
to exhibit or "set up" {Auf-stellen), and how to do it. The unity of Herstellung and 
Aufstellung is essential, because the raw, unexplainable experience will have no 
effect i f it is not somehow linked to cultural understanding and the conscious mind, 
maintaining its secretive or elusive qualities at the same time. 
Heidegger describes an opposition between the world and the earth, with art 
standing between theml The work of art is the gift of the earth to the world, so to 
speak, and codifies the elusive essence of truth. Truth as aXrjGeia - Heidegger reads 
this as "unconcealment" - is manifested in the rift between the world and the earth, 
the place the work of art exists by virtue of its language, its materials, which are - as 
referrals - connected to the earth and "unconcealed" by the world, which advances 
into what it is being given by the earth. The relationship between the earth and the 
world is a dynamic one, however. The work of art functions as such in a time-
specific capacity. The work of art is not eternal as an expression of aXf|0eia, because 
according to Heidegger's model, the rift between the earth and the world changes 
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(the world advances into the earth), and the "setting-into-work of truth" moves and is 
constantly redefined, so that what "setting-into-work of truth" means in an epoch 
may become a mere cultural memory for another. Vattimo, in fact, finds here the 
explanation for the decline and death of art. He thinks of the work of art in this 
context as the "one kind of artifact which registers aging as a positive event that 
actively contributes to determine new possibilities of meaning."41 Still, Vattimo's 
approach leaves some questions unanswered, because although his connection of 
Heidegger's writings on art to the withdrawal of the work of art, in the sense pointed 
out by Benjamin, is interesting, he does not explain as effectively how the entire 
practice of art withdraws, and how this is different from the withdrawal of the work 
of art. Vattimo's interpretation of the death of art as a consequence of the end of 
(post-Renaissance) metaphysics and the identification of this end as the final victory 
of the world over the earth, with the advent of the information age, should result to a 
complete halt of artistic activity. The transformation of the art as a separate practice 
into the art of the background shows that this is far from the truth, although a certain 
kind of art, in fact art as we have known since after the Middle Ages is dying indeed. 
On the other hand, we witness an emergence of a completely different artistic 
phenomenon, brought forth by the audience rather than the artists or critics (the 
music of Gorecki for instance, eluded the first critics who approached it, until there 
was a better understanding of the art of new simplicity). Vattimo's view cannot 
account for this, and the reason is that his observations are limited by the 
Heideggerian model. 
Heidegger observed that the Greek word rsxvn, which can be translated as art 
or craft, denotes a mode of knowing, something with a unified sense of art and craft. 
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In fact, the concepts of art and craft are derived from xeyyr\, sharing two parts of the 
whole: 
What looks like craft in the creation of a work... is determined and 
pervaded by the essence of creation, and indeed remains contained 
within that creating. What then, i f not craft, is to guide our thinking 
about the essence of creation? What else than a view of what is to be 
created - the work? Although it becomes actual only as the creative act 
is performed, and thus depends for its actuality upon this act, the 
essence of creation is determined by the essence of the work... The 
work's becoming a work is a way in which truth becomes and happens. 
It all rests in the essence of truth. 4 2 
I think this differentiation between art and craft can be further discussed, 
since the unity between the two is dynamic. We have repeatedly seen an opposition 
between two directions in art (Greek and Jewish, inward and representational, etc.), 
and it is possible to argue that neither direction exists entirely void of its opposite; for 
all we know this may be the same opposition marking its presence on different 
levels. Here we have the chance to observe such a dynamic opposition on the level of 
the artwork itself. Is a painting art or is it craft? Is it primarily a gift of the earth, or 
an unconcealment of the world? 
The artistic creation faces problems, challenges and pleasures on two 
different levels, or rather fields of freedom, that occupy almost the same space. Their 
difference is defined by the broadness of the art that is created within the degrees of 
freedom of each field, its intent, its level of reference (personal, social, 
metaphysical), and its target audience. I cannot say that the two fields are mutually 
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exclusive, or that we can always tell them apart. However, they indicate different sets 
o f reasons and motives that drive the artist to create; moreover, the difference 
between the two fields, in my analysis, is mainly a difference o f vision. In the case o f 
craft, the vision extends to the cultural and social traditions that describe and explain 
art and life, whereas in the case o f art proper, the vision extends to the deepest parts 
o f the psyche o f the artist: craft includes all the technical, material, social and other 
details that make the work o f art interesting primarily to the other artists as well as 
the connoisseurs, the people who can evaluate and respect the artistic language o f the 
creator, the innovations and changes the particular work presents, in general its 
contribution to the history o f the artistic tradition and media that brought it about. 
Usually the social value, or even the social role, o f the work o f art is known or 
suspected; sometimes the work o f art exists by virtue o f the social or philosophical 
ideals it expresses. Such would be the art o f the Soviet socialist realism, that reflect a 
conscious focus on social and political issues, as well as a revolutionary technique. 
Some other times, the ideals that permeate the work o f art have to do with the history 
o f art itself, and the work o f art exists in order to articulate a turn o f style or thematic 
content. Such would be the work o f the first surrealist poets. 
•) 
The other field is more diff icul t to define and describe. Art proper is not 
concerned wi th the creation o f a work that w i l l be received and appreciated by artists 
or critics, or at least it is not concerned with them more than with anyone else. The 
most apparent need that underlies and sustains it is the need o f communication 
(which is conscious, direct and personal), as well as the need to offer. I t is not 
important whether the work o f art is known, recognized or appreciated by the 
community o f the experts, nor is this, on the other hand, a fate it tries to avoid. 
Success and recognition are just irrelevant to art proper. For all this description 
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implies, a work o f art could be a game, a personal letter, even a plate o f food. 
However, I would separate this concept from the concept o f craft, which could be 
seen as more technical and perhaps more intellectual or informed, even more 
conscious than art proper, because the latter is the driving force and the paradox, and 
carries the artistic properties that ignore social and cultural recognition. This is the 
kind o f art the artist creates for the sake o f his own soul, so to speak. I have already 
extended this examination into the realm o f the deeply and uniquely personal, which 
is also the domain o f the metaphysical. The artist, whether a nobleman or a rogue, a 
saint or a murderer, opens up and offers his deepest self, his whole self i f possible, to 
his art, because his reference level and his criterion speaks to him only f rom within. 
The term craft can be used to describe art f rom a left-brain perspective, and 
includes everything we can ever know about art, in terms o f verbal information. I f we 
were ever to re-create the practice o f art using the information we have recorded, 
excluding however, any experiential testimonies and the works o f art themselves, we 
would end up wi th craft. Art proper includes, except for everything we can 
externally see about the process, a direct and unique, for each artist, connection to the 
personal and the collective unconscious. The artist struggles wi th the unspoken; in 
that sense the artistic experience is a mystical experience, a channel, rather than an 
opposition, between nature and culture. 
The artist cannot l imit himself to the extents o f his craft. His art, as opposed 
to his craft, including the deliberations, quests, questions and dilemmas associated 
with it, must take place on a deeper-than-practice level within him. His artistic 
identity is problematic, and it has been problematic since the Renaissance, f rom the 
moment Velazquez added his face as a distant reflection on the mirror o f Las 
Meninas43 Still, Velazquez was articulating, perhaps not consciously, a new vision 
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and a new visual field for the artist and the layman alike. The question is not the 
same for the contemporary artist who finds himself in the midst o f a socially and 
politically charged selection o f schools o f thought and artistic traditions. Velazquez 
acknowledged his physical presence on the canvas, but the problem we face now is 
the ego o f the artist; the contemporary challenge is to make the ego invisible and to 
see past it . 
The artist cannot be an art critic or a social analyst at the same time as he is 
an artist, because he has accepted the rational world, the domain o f the critic and the 
academic, is inadequate for his needs. In some ways, art is the denial o f rational 
culture; it punctures its cohesion and it challenges its validity as a closed system, 
because the very existence o f art proves the inadequacy (or lack o f cold rationalism) 
of the system. Criticism as a form o f rational evaluation and approval cannot be 
justified within the artistic process, and the artwork cannot be judged by any 
scientific criteria o f art, as far as they arise out o f a system o f comparison and 
classification o f artistic forms o f the past (that, as such, can be seen as the "shells" -
empty or not - o f artistic communication) and not the inner need they express(ed). 
Criticism and intellectual games in the area o f the arts can be, for the artist, a pretext 
for further research and creation; his function is beyond the critical process, because 
its end is not known and cannot be assumed to be known. In that sense, the artistic 
process is a mystery that connects this world and the other one. 
The work o f art is autonomous, something we have known since Benjamin 
and the Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, and does not necessarily 
reflect the conscious intent o f its creator. In fact, the very word "creator" may be 
inappropriate after the emergence o f the work as a distinct object, since its effect 
depends largely on the receptor (viewer, listener, etc.) as well. Artistic 
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communication occurs in two vital instances o f the artistic process, and in both of 
them the work o f art functions as the displacement of, or, at best, as the conduit o f 
the real communication: the author is the first to communicate with an imaginary 
artistic interlocutor, using the work o f art to mold a message, then the receptor 
communicates wi th an imaginary aesthetic interlocutor, attempting to decipher the 
message. In both cases, the author, as much as the receptor, incorporate their 
personal choices to the content o f the message. Having this in mind, it would be 
inaccurate to state that the author communicates wi th the audience only through the 
work o f art. The work o f art has an identity o f its own and the laws that define i t are, 
very often, beyond the intentions and the expectations o f the author. We can examine 
the artistic process as a structure the ontological center o f which exists outside art 
itself. I n fact, the entire process and phenomenon o f art denotes a presence and a 
structure that extends well beyond the immediate reach and domain o f the artist. 
Classical music, for instance, extends from the concert halls to the entertainment 
parlors, the coffee shops and the commercial advertisements. 
I believe that Heidegger's comments on the opposition between the world and 
the earth deserve a closer examination. From a psychological point o f view, those 
concepts seem to correspond to oppositions like conscious/unconscious, ego/shadow, 
or even left/right brain. Heidegger's essay could easily be read in those terms, but 
there is still more to it. The world and the earth have a metaphysical dimension 
which was not pursued further here. It is interesting to note, however, that die Erde, 
the earth as a concept, appears for the first time in Heidegger's The Origin of the 
Work of Art (1936). I t is found later as one o f the "four" o f the "four fo ld" - earth 
and sky, mortals and divinities - in his essays on the Geviert. 
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Moreover, death o f art in Heidegger's terms would imply a closing o f the r i f t 
between world and earth, an intrusion o f the "other" into "this". What is the "other"? 
I t may have a psychological dimension, as we have seen elsewhere (the Lacanian 
Other), but the "exhibition" aspect o f the work o f art denotes a strong collective 
social character, a social "truth" more extensive than its psychological counterparts. I 
think i t is more f ru i t fu l here to connect the Heideggerian opposition to Mircea 
Eliade's opposition between the sacred and the profane. 
There are certainly many differences between the two sets. The sacred and 
the profane in Eliade's writings appear as almost binary opposites, whereas the Welt 
and the Erde in Heidegger's thought are part o f a more complicated cosmology. Still, 
it is fair to disregard this difference for the moment, because both oppositions 
delineate the ontological relationship o f art and the cosmos in similar ways, wi th art 
being born in the r i f t between the opposites. Furthermore, the sacred and the profane 
are not immediately linked to concepts o f space, like the earth and the world, but are 
initially seen as two distinct modes o f being, in general. Their first application, 
however, is an identification o f space. In the first chapter o f The Sacred and the 
Profane, Eliade speaks o f sacred and profane space, but this differs from Heidegger's 
notions o f the earth and the world in that sacred space is described as non-
homogeneous, constructed around a hierophany or theophany, an expression of 
absolute reality, opposed to the non-reality o f the vast surrounding expanse: "The 
manifestation o f the sacred ontologically founds the world. In the homogeneous and 
infinite expanse, in which no point o f reference is possible and hence no orientation 
can be established, the hierophany reveals an absolute fixed point, a center." 4 4 The 
profane experience, on the other hand, "maintains the homogeneity and hence the 
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relativity o f space. No true orientation is now possible, for the fixed point no longer 
enjoys a unique ontological status."45 
In Heidegger's description o f the Greek temple, the earth corresponds to the 
cpwiq that surrounds i t . 4 6 Earth here is "that whence the arising brings back and 
shelters everything that arises as such." 4 7 So far, there is no difference between 
Heidegger's earth and Eliade's profane space. Both are homogeneous, 
undifferentiated, and provide the material on which the world, or the sacred, 
organized space exists. Yet, Eliade accepts in several writings that modern man has 
made it possible to exist in a predominantly profane space. As mentioned above, the 
sacred and the profane are primarily modes o f being rather than spatial concepts, and 
it is thus possible for both o f them to exist in the Heideggerian world. This analogy 
between the two pairs o f concepts so far can be said to be valid for the religious 
person, who cannot exist outside sacred space. Moreover, one could argue that i f the 
sacred denotes what is consistent with the metaphysics o f an epoch, the modern 
world is not at all profane, but rather organized according to the sacred of materialist, 
post-Renaissance metaphysics. There seems to be a problem, therefore, 
superimposing the sacred/profane on the world/earth in a spatial way. How should 
the two sets be connected then? 
Eliade's concept o f the sacred is based on the presence o f hierophany or 
theophany, a manifestation o f the divine, something wi th no counterpart in 
Heidegger's model. Hierophany marks the connection o f the world to another yet 
space, the numinous, which exists outside man's grasp. Nevertheless, it provides the 
sign, the center o f orientation for the sacred space. The construction o f the sacred 
space is achieved through the efforts o f man, but only inasmuch "he reproduces the 
work o f the gods." 4 8 The meaning o f the entire sacred space is derived f rom the 
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central axis provided by the gods, and in that sense aA,f|0eia is identified wi th it, or i f 
we accept a model more consistent with Platonic tradition, the image o f ctA,f|9sia 
exists there, true aA,r|9eux being confined in the divine realm. For Heidegger 
however, the unconcealment o f the truth takes place in. the bringing forth of the 
(concealing) earth and the clearing o f the world. That suggests that the truth as a 
materiality, as a thing, is essentially part o f the earth, but can only be experienced 
and witnessed at the clearing o f the world. This unconcealment can be found only at 
the center o f Eliade's sacred space. From this, it seems that as far as the essence of 
the truth is concerned, the divine, as it is meant here, is included in the Heideggerian 
concept o f the earth. 
I t has to be admitted, however, that Heidegger's writ ing is not very concerned 
with theistic metaphysics, something that can lead to a certain amount o f confusion. 
Heidegger's description o f the Greek temple illustrates the position o f "God", at least 
in the particular text we have been examining: 
The building encloses the figure o f the god and in this concealment lets 
it stand out into the holy precinct through the open portico. By means 
o f the temple, the god is present in the temple. This presence o f the god 
is in itself the extension and delimitation o f the precinct as a holy 
49 
precinct. 
I t is obvious that Heidegger speaks o f the statue o f god, and his references to 
"the god" are therefore limited to the cultural rather than to the metaphysical aspect 
o f religion. The presence of the statue o f the god in the temple is what designates the 
temple as a sacred space, but this has little to do with the real presence of God as a 
metaphysical entity. As we saw above, the metaphysical content o f religion, although 
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not culturally "sacred", seems to exist in the earth surrounding the temple, rather than 
inside the building. With this in mind, we would have to revise our earlier 
observation, and conclude that, although from a cultural point o f view, Heidegger's 
concept o f the earth corresponds to Eliade's concept o f the profane, from a 
metaphysical point o f view it corresponds to, or rather it includes, the numinous, that 
which for Eliade is even beyond the sacred, which is the space o f man. 
This seems a quite functional comparison, despite the difficulties o f 
superimposing the one opposition on the other, as discussed above. The main 
difference in the two approaches is a question o f direction; does the truth come from 
above or from below? 
Why is the comparison between Heidegger's and Eliade's models useful in 
the examination o f the death o f art? First, we have to see where art fits in the scheme 
of oppositions. We saw above that art in the Heideggerian model is to be found or 
discovered in the r i f t between the earth and the world, whereas in Eliade's model it 
must be located between the numinous and the sacred, but man's actions are 
restricted within sacred space. This, wi th some Platonic overtones, is superbly 
expressed by Fr Pavel Florensky: 
I n creating a work o f art, the psyche or soul o f the artist ascends from 
the earthly realm into the heavenly; there, free o f all images, the soul is 
fed in contemplation by the essences o f the highest realm, knowing the 
permanent noumena o f things; then, satiated with this knowing, it 
descends again to the earthly realm. And precisely at the boundary 
between the two worlds, the soul's spiritual knowledge assumes the 
shapes o f symbolic imagery: and it is these images that make 
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permanent the work o f art. Art is thus materialized dream, separated 
from the ordinary consciousness o f waking l i f e . 5 0 
Human art mirrors, or rather repeats, the truth given by the gods, 
transforming profane into sacred space. Here, art as aXfjGeia does not assume the 
function o f unconcealment, but the function o f revelation. I t is by virtue o f the truth 
o f the noumena that art sets the truth forth. 
We can accept a certain correspondence, however, between Eliade's and 
Heidegger's rifts, in that both writers seem to treat art as a "setting-into-work of 
truth" due to its capacity to stand between two realms, and express a kind of 
knowledge that is acquired by existing in both o f them simultaneously. Art , for 
Eliade (or Florensky) and Heidegger alike, is a coincidentia oppositorum. 
Such an observation would suggest that the death o f art is a process that tends 
to (in a mathematical sense) the eventual coincidence o f the opposed realms we have 
noted (this and the other). I f this convergence cannot be ascertained at present, after 
the death o f the author and the triumph o f the information age (therefore the 
"victory" o f the world over the earth), this probably suggests that there is more to the 
existing metaphysics than the post-Renaissance materialist metaphysics Vattimo 
continuously refers to. 
O f course, to treat Heidegger wi th justice, we have to accept that the victory 
o f the world over the earth and the triumph of the spirit o f the information age have 
to be taken wi th a grain o f salt. The earth (in both the philosophical and the 
geological meaning) could at any moment reverse the situation and produce 
conditions that can end civilization as we know it within a few years. But, at least we 
can agree that the "possibility" or at least the "illusion" o f such a victory is an 
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accomplished fact. In this view, however, Heidegger's earth can assume unexpected, 
infinite powers, which accounts for the identification o f the earth wi th Eliade's 
concept o f the sacred. 
Vattimo discusses the signs that point to the decline and death o f art, such as 
distracted perception and mass culture, through his position that modern metaphysics 
are coming to an end or a fulf i l lment in a (perverted) sense, where thought has 
reached a position that demands a Verwindung o f metaphysics. That would suggest 
that a. the concealing earth is unconcealed and withdraws giving way to the world, 
and b. the work o f art has no further function to perform, and art becomes obsolete 
without the opposition between the earth and the world. From another point o f view, 
Eliade echoes Vattimo's concerns when he writes that modern man has achieved an 
almost total desacralization o f the world, and has moved his social organization well 
into profane space. This also eliminates the opposition between the profane and the 
sacred; numinous truth becomes obsolete, and its reflection on the action o f man, art, 
becomes also obsolete. Yet, Eliade notes that "the completely profane world, the 
wholly desacralized cosmos, is a recent discovery in the history o f the human 
spirit ." 5 1 We cannot, therefore, draw conclusions about it that would completely 
null i fy the sacred, because in effect we cannot suppose that such a world exists in 
reality. Moreover, Eliade does not see the present profane condition as a final one, 
but foresees the return o f spirituality, albeit in a different way, perhaps similar to 
pagan pantheism. 5 2 
Eliade's writings on art confirm, as it were, the extrapolation I attempted by 
superimposing his notion o f the sacred and the profane on the Heideggerian concepts 
of the earth and the world: "Even in archaic and ' f o l k ' cultures, lacking any 
philosophical system and vocabulary, the function o f sacred art was the same: it 
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translated religious experience and a metaphysical conception o f the world and o f 
human existence into a concrete, representational f o r m . " 5 3 
Sacred art is, according to such statements, what makes religious experience 
comprehensible. In some ways, as we have seen in several cases during the 
examination o f the icon in the chapter on the Religious View of the History of the 
Arts, its validity as a religious statement equaled the validity o f intellectual tradition. 
Art, furthermore, has coupled the meaning o f "setting-into-work o f truth" wi th a 
"pleasurable integration o f the senses with the intellect." 5 4 
As mentioned above, Eliade accepted the desacralization o f modern society, 
something that can be reflected on its art: "For more than a century the West has not 
been creating a 'religious art' in the traditional sense o f the term, that is to say, an art 
reflecting 'classic' religious conceptions."5 5 
Yet, in the same way Eliade insists that a society cannot become completely 
profane, art cannot lose its sacred quality completely. The sacred is disguised in a 
"non conventional and mysterious manner."5 6 Eliade's text reads further below: 
This is not to say that the 'sacred' has completely disappeared in 
modern art. But it has become unrecognizable; it is camouflaged in 
forms, purposes and meanings which are apparently 'profane.' The 
sacred is no longer obvious, as it was for example in the art o f the 
Middle Ages. One does not recognize it immediately and easily, 
57 
because it is no longer expressed in a conventional religious language. 
Observing one o f the transformations o f the sacred in art, it is interesting to 
note in this context, that the art o f modern society has transcended the representation 
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of the surface, a product o f the Renaissance and the celebration o f (Christ's) 
materiality, and attempts to represent the formless: "The two specific characteristics 
of modern art, namely the destruction o f traditional forms and the fascination for the 
formless, for the elementary modes o f matter, are susceptible to religious 
interpretation." 5 8 Resonating wi th the thoughts o f the religious scholar, the views o f 
Rene Magritte on painting, remind us very strongly o f the epoch o f the icon and its 
theory: "Things do not have resemblances, they do or do not have similitudes. Only 
thought resembles. I t resembles by being what it sees, hears or knows; it becomes 
what the world offers i t . . . I t is evident that a painted image - intangible by its very 
nature - hides nothing, while the tangibly visible object hides another visible thing -
i f we trust our experience." 5 9 This is consistent with the decline o f art described by 
Vattimo, based on the thingness o f the work o f art in Heidegger's writings. The 
thingness declines as the opposition o f the earth and the world is being overcome, 
and this certainly means the death o f a certain kind o f art. Nevertheless, it also means 
a new direction and a new role for the work o f art, since its hitherto philosophical 
and metaphysical basis is challenged. 
The death o f art is a complex phenomenon. We have briefly examined some 
views on the death o f the author. Contemporary art and criticism have abandoned (at 
least to a great degree) their fascination with the creator, and have focused on the 
reader instead. This automatically makes art a process that receives its input vis-a-vis 
its evolution, not so much f rom the people whose profession is connected with the 
production or evaluation o f the work o f art, but from the people who use it. The use-
value o f art is expressed by a gradual infusion o f art into the other activities o f 
existence, and the con-textualization o f an environment, or operational background, 
where the work o f art as a distinct and unique entity continuously withdraws. 
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This can be juxtaposed to the understanding o f the work as an unconcealment 
o f truth: i f the end o f the opposition between the earth and the world is to be taken as 
the end o f post-Renaissance materialist metaphysics, the work o f art that expressed it 
becomes obsolete. On the other hand, the very change of the language o f art, and the 
loss o f its separate realm can be seen as a Hegelian convergence. Wi th the work o f 
art in its deathbed, art in general can assume its non-material function and transform 
into a practice that attempts not to represent but to connect with, or lead to the 
intangible. As such, art after the first (deconstructive) waves o f postmodernism 
shares many characteristics with art before Renaissance. Its goal is functional rather 
than representational, participatory rather than exemplary. I f we extend a conceptual 
line that connects the art o f the modern age and the art o f the future, it would not be 
far-fetched to say that its evolution shows that art dies as such, giving its place to a 
practice similar to spiritual pursuit. Wi th the end o f the "big narratives" and the death 
of the author, we can accept the end o f the history o f art. 
This cannot signify the death o f art per se, because, as argued above, having 
located the basis o f the existence o f art in the r i f t between "this" and the "other", we 
have to accept that art o f some sort w i l l always exist, as long an opposition between 
"this" and the "other" still exists. Does that mean that the death o f art is a process 
with no (visible) end? Having followed Vattimo in his account for the death o f (a 
certain kind of ) art, we saw that the same model can be applied to metaphysical 
concepts wider than the Heideggerian world and earth. The presence and 
regeneration o f contemporary art, whether we speak o f pop art or post-minimalist 
classic art, shows that the triumph of the information age has far f rom eliminated art, 
but it has certainly affected its orientation. 
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We should not forget that medieval metaphysics were put aside (or under), 
never completely conquered by rationality, and the end o f materialist metaphysics 
should not be taken as the end o f metaphysics altogether. Art, accordingly, redefines 
its values and its goals, adjusting itself to the (new) r i f t between the visible and the 
invisible. Beyond the history o f the work o f art there is yet more art to be made, but 
maybe it w i l l look similar to what it looked like "before the era o f art." 6 0 Is it 
replaced by a spiritual revival? 
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The Religious Artist 
The historical relationship between art and religion in the past has been 
approached elsewhere (A Religious View of the History of the Arts). In order to 
examine the relationship between art and religion at the present however, we would 
have to extend our observations to the particular problems o f contemporary art, 
focusing closely on the actions and choices o f the artists o f the sacred, the people 
whose work expresses this relationship overtly. As we saw earlier {The Death of Art), 
there is a split between consciously spiritual art and popular art. The development of 
the latter may be consistent with the general ontological observations on the religious 
turn in the development o f the arts, but f rom a scientific, academic perspective, this 
happens only passively, whereas the former kind o f art follows a spiritual path, 
explicitly and systematically or, rather, works towards the re-sacralization o f the 
profane. This chapter presents the views o f some artists that can definitely be thought 
o f as artists o f the sacred. For reasons explained in the introduction, the examination 
o f contemporary art here w i l l be limited to music. 
Let us attempt to define what the position o f the contemporary religious artist 
can be. A few centuries ago things were quite simple, at least on the surface, because 
art was a lot more religious than secular, at least thematically speaking. The Church 
was the major art patron and supporter, and the content o f art was therefore largely 
religious, yet the gradual secularization o f the world between the Middle Ages and 
the Enlightenment can be reflected even in this kind of, at least ostensibly, religious 
art. Art became more stylized, more elaborate, and surrendered itself to a process o f 
rationalization, corresponding with the social transformations o f the times. Social 
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changes, which signaled an increasingly objective scientific way of thinking, had 
their counterpart in the domain of art. 
One has to pause here and wonder whether we can actually criticize this turn 
from a religious point of view. I have done something like that in many places in the 
present study. It has to be admitted, however, that we now have the luxury of 
knowing the results of the humanistic turn of Renaissance, and we can therefore 
interpret and criticize it through contemporary experience and it is maybe too harsh 
to criticize the choices that were made a few centuries ago, by people who might 
have never suspected the development of art and society. On the other hand, we have 
to recognize that religious art did not stop at the Middle Ages, even i f its style and its 
understanding of the sacred underwent dramatic changes in the centuries that 
followed. Are we ready to dismiss, as unreasonably secularized and profaned, 
everything that followed medieval Church-centrism, or, to paraphrase Simone de 
Beauvoir, "should we burn Bach?" 
A historical criticism and analysis of the trajectory of art within the Christian 
era can be found elsewhere (A Religious View of the History of the Arts, Anti-
Leonardo). This chapter, however, focuses on the attitude of the religious artist from 
the Renaissance and late Middle Ages to date. The question is how it was possible to 
connect art and religion: what I would like to examine here is how the tradition of 
religion "and spirituality affected the creative process in art. 
In a sense, all the phases of art after the Renaissance were expressing the 
same inner condition and axiom, the emancipation of art from religion, and its 
adherence to rules that were dictated from within art, and not by religion. The 
concept of art as something that lies beyond and above morality and any other 
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responsibility and answerability has survived to date. This does not mean that there is 
no religious art after the Middle Ages. Art was still being put into the service of the 
Church, and many artists were profoundly religious. At the same time however, we 
observe that the development and the evaluation of art cannot depend (only) on 
religious or even moral measures, as was the case with the medieval icon, which 
could perform its religious function and thus successfully fu l f i l its role as an icon, 
regardless of its artistic merit, as it was discussed in Anti-Leonardo. The work of art 
gained an additional dimension, so to speak, and the Renaissance religious artist 
served initially two different purposes, one that corresponds to the purpose of art to 
instruct, to stir the religious emotions of the people, and to inspire feelings of 
devotion, and another one that was oriented towards a more abstract, "pure" 
aestheticism, that was oblivious to the spiritual content of the work of art. It has to be 
said, however, that these two directions were not necessarily mutually exclusive. It is 
much later, in Romanticism for instance, that we encounter the claim for the total 
independence of the work of art! Still, the paradigm change has to be located in the 
late Middle Ages/early Renaissance, and it has been dominant until fairly recently. 
We may observe many of the complexities of the paradigm that has dominated art 
since the Middle Ages in the music of Johann Sebastian Bach. 
A great part of the music of Bach was written in order to be used by the 
Church. His music is still heard in Protestant and Catholic services throughout the 
world, yet it can be appreciated by the religious and the non-religious in more or less 
the same way, as opposed to medieval iconography, for the appreciation of which a 
certain understanding of religiosity, i f not religious belief itself, is required. Bach's 
musical genius is, by the standards of any age, unique, perhaps unsurpassable. Yet, 
his music epitomizes an artistic paradigm that approaches its end in our days. The 
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appeal of Bach's music is not to be found in his melodies, his arrangements or 
theoretical innovations (his "technical" poetics, so to speak); his musical language 
was rather revisionist, technically speaking. Other artists of lesser value, like Bellini 
and Verdi, have written melodic arias that can be recalled immediately, whereas it is 
difficult for most people to recall more than a short theme from any of Bach's 
oratorios - not that Bach has not written memorable melodies as well. His use of 
harmony, although exquisite, does not demonstrate any theoretical breakthroughs 
that were not present in the music of, say, Buxtehude. Bach's distinct character can 
be perhaps described by the mathematically ingenious way he erects structures, 
which he immediately destroys, only to build new ones with their materials. Many 
such examples may be found in his work, from the ever-rising canon and the 
permutations of the Royal Theme in the Musical Offering, to the alteration of bold 
and subtle modulations in the gigue of the French Suite No. 5. An analysis of Bach's 
music by David and Mendel in The Bach Reader expresses this abstract quality 
superbly: 
His form in general was based on relations between separate sections. 
These relations .ranged from complete identity of passages on the one 
hand to the return of a single principle of elaboration or a mere 
thematic allusion on the other. The resulting patterns were often 
symmetrical, but by no means necessarily so. Sometimes the relations 
between the various sections make up a maze of interwoven threads 
that only detailed analysis can unravel. Usually, however, a few 
dominant features afford proper orientation at first sight or hearing, and 
while in the course of study one may discover unending subtleties, one 
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is never at a loss to grasp the unity that holds together every single 
creation by Bach.1 
Still, analyses like this express an attempt to capture something of the 
inexplicable. A semiotic analysis, on an initial level, cannot easily distinguish 
between a masterpiece and the work of an untalented yet industrious composer with 
some original ideas who writes what most musicians would dismiss as "paper 
music", music that may be technically impeccable, but otherwise not interesting. 
Polyphony and counterpoint, an important element of Western music since 
the Renaissance, found their best expression in the music of Bach, reflecting the 
passage from a theocentric to an anthropocentric universe as discussed in Anti-
Leonardo. The advent of polyphony signaled musically the end of the single voice, 
through which everyone was expressed. Originally the independence of the voices 
was rather aimless, as in the organa or Perotin. It was refined during early 
Renaissance and reached its highest point with Bach. In the baroque era, this 
independence of contrapuntal voices was pitted against a harmonic goal orientation. 
The voices had to make sense vertically (harmonically), thus confirming the common 
musical goal of all the participating voices, but had at the same time to maintain 
enough horizontal (contrapuntal) independence, so that their individualism was not 
sacrificed to the common goal. This is where Bach excelled, having found the 
balance between individualism and unity. 
What, on a second level, makes Bach exceptionally interesting, is the way the 
act of creation itself is constantly manifested in his music. Bach's opus can be seen 
as a study in poetics, an exploration and exposition of art as a creative process. It 
would be difficult to say i f any other artist has ever done anything like that with such 
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intensity. It would be fair to say that, as far as the artistic paradigm since the Middle 
Ages is concerned, everything can be expressed through Bach's poetics. An example 
of this debt can be demonstrated by the comments of Anton Webern on The Art of 
the Fugue . 
All these fugues are created from a single theme, which is constantly 
transformed... What does this all mean? An effort towards an all-
embracing unity... So we see that this - our - kind of thought has been 
the ideal for composers of all periods... To develop everything from a 
single principal idea!2 
With Bach the work of art assumes such a complexity of virtually infinite 
variations, yet with a tight unity, that it becomes a separate world, a little universe 
that can be admired in amazement. Although it may still ostensibly have a religious 
function, serving something outside art, the work of art also attracts attention to 
itself, something that can be observed as early as Josquin Des Pres. Quite a lot has 
been already written on the trajectory of the work of art from the Middle Ages to 
date in the present study, which does not have to be repeated here. We have to add 
though, that the religious artist since the late Middle Ages did not have to face any 
issues - as he does in our days - that could question his sense of artistic direction 
radically. The role of the work of art was quite straightforward. The work of art 
evolved into a separate kind of entity, which would reflect the artist's understanding 
of the world on its constituent materials, consciously and intentionally. Augustine's 
City of God, for instance, can be read as an impressive piece of religious fiction, but 
its difference from post-medieval art is that its words, its expressions and its structure 
are only secondary to its theological content, and this is how it was read. When such 
a work has to be translated into another language, it is clear to the translator that the 
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measure of success is the theological thought it contains, and to that end it is 
acceptable, although certainly not desirable, to sacrifice secondary elements of the 
text, such as its literary style or the strength of its metaphors, which would be of 
primary importance in a work of literature. It is theologically sound to publish such 
works with a long body of interpretative comments and even to edit critically the 
original, which is something one would not dare do in a work of literature which is 
supposed to be self-evident and normally with no need for interpretive comments. It 
is much later, for example in Dante's Divine Comedy, that what was once considered 
to be allegorical theological thought words merely tried to do justice to, was 
transformed into a structure of meaning which was derived from and was reflected 
on the words and the poetics, and would have no substance without them. 
We have discussed the parallel evolution of art and society in several parts of 
this study. It would be redundant to repeat here an analysis of the development of 
(artistic) perception since the Middle Ages. This issue has been examined in some 
depth in Anti-Leonardo. The present chapter is interested in the conditions of art seen 
from the level of the artist, and its historical gap between the Renaissance and the 
present has to be forgiven. It would be enough to say here that in the centuries that 
followed Bach and his art the world became more secular, and in many ways art took 
the place of religion. We can trace the celebration of this phenomenon at least as far 
back as Friedrich Nietzsche: 
Art and nothing but art! It is the great means of making life possible, 
the great seduction to life, the great stimulant of life. Art as the only 
superior counterforce to all will to denial of life, as that which is anti-
Christian, anti-Buddhist, antinihilist par excellence.3 
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With the death of God the system of values that were recognized in his name 
came into doubt. Divine commands became nothing more than social and moral 
conventions, something created by the human beings themselves. Art, according to 
Nietzsche's writings, offers the only possible redemption to the man of knowledge, 
the man of action and the sufferer, "as the way to states in which suffering is willed, 
transfigured, deified, where suffering is a form of great delight."4 Nietzsche's view is 
very similar, not surprisingly, to Freud's comments on art in his "atheist manifesto", 
The Future of an Illusion: 
As we discovered long since, art offers substitutive satisfactions for the 
oldest and still more deeply felt cultural renunciations, and for that 
reason it serves as nothing else does to reconcile a man to the sacrifices 
he has made on behalf of civilization.5 
The work of art is replacing the work of religion, providing meaning, 
purpose, and values people can live by. In Nietzsche's work we see that the aesthetic 
assumes a central position, comparable to the position held by religion in the Middle 
Ages. In a section of his final, unfinished theoretical work, which was titled The Will 
to Power as Art (it was published in fragmentary form as Der Wille zur Machi) 
Nietzsche discussed the function of the anticipation of the aesthetic in relation to the 
development of civilization.6 Nietzsche claimed that since one cannot believe in a 
linear development towards an ultimate point, the world can be seen as a work of art 
that makes itself (ein sich selbst gebarendes Kunstwerk). The will to power makes 
itself known through the artist, and ultimately reveals itself as the very essence of the 
world, something that coincides with the death of God as a historical event. Art is, as 
we saw in Nietzsche's excerpt, that which anticipates and shapes the future: the will 
of God has been replaced by the will to power. The centrality of aesthetics is 
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expressed in the art of modernism; one has to remember at this point that the modern 
episteme or condition is defined by Michel Foucault, among other things, by the 
identification of truth with the laws of history,7 a par excellence anthropocentric 
concept, which can be understood through Nietzsche's self-making world after the 
death of God. Despite Rothko's great spiritual dimension and his special position 
within religious art, his work also demonstrates the modernist culmination of art as 
religion, as put by a contemporary theologian, Don Cupitt: 
I have chosen to emphasize especially the case of religious art because 
nobody can deny, first that works of art are just human constructions, 
secondly that great religious art, such as the late paintings of Mark 
Rothko, can still be produced, and thirdly, that such works as Rothko's 
can be quite new and independent of existing religious groups, their 
teachings and their iconographies. I want to say that Rothko (for 
example: he is by no means the only one) just invented works of art 
that are great religion. Indeed, I maintain that the major artists of 
Modernism and after - roughly, since the mid-1860s - can be viewed 
as the prophets of a new religious order. From their dedication to their 
task, their creativity and their works many people now get the sort of 
charge that earlier generations once got from icons and the cult of 
saints.8 
Mircea Eliade, as well, sees a religious quality in all art, which, I think, is not 
unrelated to his general view of art's striving for the pure experience of "the first 
time":9 This reflects the inward direction of contemporary art and its psychological 
character, its problematics on subjectivity and the self, anything that could lead to the 
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possibility of a transformed consciousness and a questioned sense of self, a first step 
towards the search for the sacred: 
The great majority of artists do not seem to have 'faith' in the 
traditional sense of the word. They are not consciously 'religious'. 
Nonetheless we maintain that the sacred, although unrecognizable, is 
present in their works. 1 0 
Eliade, interestingly enough, recognized that modern art has become the main 
manifestation of the coincidentia oppositorum, the bridge between the conscious and 
the unconscious part of the self. Without this bridge the modern areligious man may 
not be able to experience the sacred: 
After the 'second fall ' (which corresponds to the death of God as 
proclaimed by Nietzsche) modern man has lost the possibility of 
experiencing the sacred at the conscious level, but he continues to be 
nourished by his unconscious.11 
Nevertheless, although it can be reasonably argued that the contemporary 
religious artistic movement is largely indebted to the spiritual trajectory of 
modernism, with Rothko perhaps as one of the finest examples, the metaphysical 
basis of art is quite different in postmodernity. The return of the sacred traditions 
posed a very serious question for the artist: could art be non-denominational, 
"independent of existing religious groups, their teachings and their iconographies",12 
or does it have to align itself with one of these traditions? It seems that many 
contemporary artists do the second, or more accurately, that contemporary religious 
art is made by people who have chosen to express their religiosity and their art very 
much based on "existing religious groups, their teachings and their iconographies". 
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This has not been an easy choice for everyone. John Tavener was gradually 
drawn to the Eastern Orthodox Church to the degree that he has stated that i f the 
circumstances in his life were different and he had not married his present wife, he 
would probably be an Orthodox monk.1 3 Perhaps the most decisive shift in his art 
and life occurred after a stroke in 1980. The stroke damaged a small part of his 
temporal lobe, and it is common for people who have had such a stroke to experience 
"temporal lobe attacks", continuing disturbances of the affected area. Tavener's 
physician, Dr David Thomas, commented on temporal lobe attacks: 
In neurological circles it has been put forward that St Paul had some 
sort of a temporal lobe event on the road to Damascus, when he had 
that amazing visionary experience. And that some of his behaviour 
subsequently was attributable to this event. A number of features are 
common to temporal lobe attacks. They can produce hyper-religiosity, 
and people often write a lot. They write letters and diaries... to the 
Corinthians and all the rest of it. A schizophrenic wil l get auditory 
hallucinations: voices telling him what to do. Whereas in a temporal 
lobe attack, the hallucination wil l be more commonly of a visual nature. 
And it can be musical, of course: music is thought to be from the right 
temporal lobe, and that's where we think John had this problem... [no 
amount of temporal attacks, however, could produce a composer] 
without a pre-existent matrix of compositional creativity.1 4 
In spite of the medical description of what happened to John Tavener, or what 
may have happened to St Paul, we must not forget that events like that may be said to 
express the wil l and the action of God, instead of being random accidents that 
produce random hallucinations. They are the exception to the rule however, and even 
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i f the account of the temporal lobe attacks helps us understand Tavener's personality 
and creativity, it says little about the people who embraced his music, most of which 
did not have similar physical or metaphysical experiences. Yet, this incident provides 
an insight to Tavener's psyche, and creativity. His turn to a traditional Church could 
be related to his medical condition, but it is of interest to us only insofar as it 
describes his dedication and the experiential nature of his faith. It is more interesting, 
from another perspective, to observe that the sacred found its expression, for many 
common people, in the art of an artist graced with temporal lobe attacks. 
Closer to the common perspective is the experience of Christos Hatzis, whose 
religious background was questioned by an increasing personal, experiential view. At 
some point in his career he felt a dichotomy between what he described as the 
"inherited" concept of the Divine and one that manifested through personal 
experience of religious and artistic nature.15 Hatzis' recent music is informed by an 
approach that trusts the creative force within the individual, beyond the intellect: 
My growing sense of the divine as a creative force from within an 
individual, was pointing to a direction whereby as a composer I could 
only become an 'open door', a channel for the expression of the 
creative force within, instead of 'playing God' with music. Most of the 
music I wrote from 1994 on, is very much informed by this approach. It 
is at times a frustrating approach because, in contrast to one's 
intellectual development or education which is an additive process and 
in a sense under one's control, this latter approach leaves you at ground 
zero each and every time the creative process is called upon.1 6 
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It so happens that Hatzis' work, which used to reflect non-denominational 
views and art forms, shifted in his current creative period towards more traditional 
sources of inspiration. Heirmos (1994) and Kyrie (1997) are overtly religious works 
whose structure and inspiration are very much informed by the Eastern Orthodox 
tradition. Although, in hindsight, this dramatic change of style between his earlier 
works {Nadir [1988], Byzantium [1991], The Gouldberg Variations [1992], and other 
works are examples of maximalist writing, dense scores and long, fast phrases with 
no pauses), and his recent ones (Heirmos and Kyrie are diametrically different, 
formally speaking, consisting of sparse arrangements and long-held notes) was 
welcomed warmly by audiences and critics alike, it was something of a leap of faith 
for Hatzis, who was concerned at the time that the academic music establishment 
would not understand his "simpler" music, which amounted to a small sacrificium 
intellectus. 
The work and ideas of some other contemporary artists will be examined 
further on, so that we can attempt to illuminate the transition from modernist 
religious art to a special category of postmodern art that attempts to reconnect itself 
with the ancient religious and artistic traditions. For the moment, however, let us 
follow the evolution of modern and postmodern art in more general terms. 
Postmodern art followed the de-constructive and re-constructive mode of 
postmodern philosophy in its attempt to break our concept of art and the world as we 
know it, and then create it anew, re-evaluating our cultural biases. Eliade sees 
something of a ritual dimension in this: 
Al l the modern artistic movements seek, consciously or unconsciously, 
the destruction of the traditional aesthetic universes, the reduction of 
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'forms' to elementary, germinal, larval states in the hope of re-creating 
'fresh worlds'; in other words, these movements seek to abolish the 
history of art and to reintegrate the auroral moment when man saw the 
17 
world 'for the first time'. 
What contemporary art often provides, as discussed in The Death of Art, is a 
sanctuary for the senses. Yet, although a great part of art is dissipating into the 
background, there also exists another artistic trend, which stresses the involved role 
of the reader/viewer and his sometimes tortuous, active discovery of meaning. 
Unfortunately, this has often been the recipe for highbrow intellectualist art, but the 
premise is that the artist produces not a set of meanings, but a field of possible 
interpretations that rely on the reader's input and degree of participation. The input 
of the author is limited to the questions rather than the answers he provides. Works 
like that may be likened to a spiritual quest: 
Such works represent closed worlds, hermetic universes that cannot be 
entered except by overcoming immense difficulties, like the initiatory 
ordeals of the archaic and traditional societies. On the one hand, one 
has the experience of an 'initiation', an experience that has almost 
vanished from the modern World; on the other hand, one proclaims to 
the 'others' (i.e., the 'mass') that one belongs to a select minority... to 
a gnosis that has the advantage of being at once spiritual and secular in 
18 
that it opposes both official values and the traditional churches. 
In that sense, contemporary art has assumed a role traditionally held by 
religion and the church, containing whatever was left of the sacred in a secular 
world, and not only as a result of the inherent search for a moral basis of life, as the 
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Nietzschean writing we saw earlier implies. As Diane Apostolos-Cappadona writes, 
art "has become the religious initiatory ritual of modern culture."19 The films of 
Andrei Tarkovsky may be seen as another example of an artistic initiatory difficulty 
whose task is to communicate the unspeakable or even (in films such as The 
Sacrifice) the super-rational. Tarkovsky's films are sometimes difficult to follow on 
a narrative level, and they certainly seem to ignore, or even consciously oppose the 
conventions of commercial cinema. This means that the viewer has to look actively 
for a meaning, make connections and interpretation as the film plays; it is not 
possible to just sit back and take the story in, as it is with mainstream cinema, 
because the conventions that adulterate the immediacy of the archetypal experience 
expressed in the films, have been removed. Furthermore, Tarkovsky often seems to 
try to elicit a personal participation from the viewer, using several techniques to that 
end (sudden gaze of the characters into the camera, a "personal" address as it were, 
images of the earth and old, abandoned houses that can stir, or rather resonate with, 
personal memories of the "old" and "familiar" for many viewers, a dream-like 
quality where the viewer is urged to see with dream-like perception, i.e. "from the 
inside", etc.), and his ultimate message cannot be measured by the words that one 
could use to describe what his films "are really about" (love, self-sacrifice, the 
feeling of being connected to the earth), but by the depth he gives to those words. It 
is noteworthy that one of the films Tarkovsky started his career with, approaches the 
mystery of the sacred in art, focusing on the most famous Russian religious artist 
(Andrei Rublov, 1966). 
Eliade saw the work of the Romanian sculptor Constantin Brancusi as a case 
where the aesthetic experience can lead to the religious experience. Eliade identified 
a connection between the present and a primordial, archaic, "sacred" past in 
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Brancusi's work, and he was fascinated by his ability to capture a sacred 
understanding of the stone he used for his sculpting, even though his work was, 
formally speaking, following the abstractionism of the twentieth century. 
The return of the artist to his materials has been interpreted as a regeneration 
of the religious feeling after the "death of God", albeit in a different way. The gnosis 
that "opposes both official values and the traditional churches"20 became the research 
framework for modern art, seeking to experience what was lost as religious thought 
was withdrawn from theology to philosophy. Not unlike ancient pagans, Eliade 
claims, contemporary artists discovered the soul of things, "cosmic hierophanies: 
substance as such incarnates and manifests the sacred."21 
This view is supported by the New Age fascination with crystals, stones, and 
pre-Christian mythologies. Art, especially sculpture, has a special place in the (I 
believe) temporary return of paganism, because it was drawn to it by the need to re-
discover the sacred in the very materials that give it substance. Insofar as art is based 
on the direct experience of the reader/viewer, its experiential quests for the sacred 
could not be identified with the official values and the traditional churches, at least 
within the context of post-Nietzschean modern society. On the other hand, our 
religious mythology cannot be disposed of so easily. It is not inaccurate to observe 
that a great part of Christianity has lost much of its ritual character, especially in 
Protestant America, which is why art had to recover these values as the major 
practice with access to the unconscious. In the cases, however, where Christianity 
maintained its mystical character, we see a regeneration of sacred art from within 
religion. The religious art of John Tavener and Arvo Part, for instance, contradicts 
Eliade's generalization about the return of paganism in postmodern society. 
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Eliade, however, developed his views having realized the importance of the 
immediacy of the experience of the sacred. I f the religious cannot accommodate this 
immediacy, the aesthetic wil l certainly try to do so. Eliade's observation would be 
indisputable i f the development of religious consciousness depended on the history 
of humanity alone, i f it were placed solely in human hands. One may argue, on the 
other hand, that religious events and religious consciousness are also affected by the 
Holy Spirit, the ever-present hypostasis of God among humans, regardless of 
whether one actually believes in God and the Holy Spirit as entities independent of 
man, or whether one wants to identify them as the archetypal religious part of the 
subconscious psyche. In both cases we are talking about powers beyond man's 
conscious will and control. Regeneration of the religious feeling and the rediscovery 
of the experience of the sacred can only be fulfilled according to the 
psychological/religious matrix of our own past, as Carl G. Jung repeats in several of 
his works. Even i f the Church is stagnant or corrupt, the religious consciousness it 
corresponds to must forge its expression based on its own images and tradition. 
A new generation of artists, mostly musicians, have done exactly that, having 
combined contemporary art and traditional religion. The present study has alluded to 
this generation in many places, and i f so much importance has been given to the 
artistic trend this generation expresses, it is not so much because the artists have 
presented something unprecedently brilliant, or because they forged a revolutionary 
artistic paradigm, but mainly because of the unexpected response their work 
received, as we shall see. The phenomenon of the success of religious post-
minimalism transcends art criticism and has to be seen as a social, as well as artistic, 
event. The thought and the poetics of some of these artists will be presented here in 
some detail. 
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One of the most well known pieces written by a post-minimalist composer is 
Symphony No 3, opus 36 (1976) by Henryk Gorecki. The 1992 recording of 
Symphony No 3 (Nonesuch records, with Dawn Upshaw singing, and David Zinman 
conducting the London Sinfonietta), stayed for eight months at the top of Billboard 
magazine's classical sales chart, and remained in the top ten for two years. 
Furthermore, it held a spot in Britain's pop top ten chart. It is estimated that at least 
750,000 records of this particular recording have been sold to date.22 Still, Symphony 
No 3 is a strange musical piece that does not yield easily the secrets of its success. 
Formally speaking, there is not much innovative thought in the piece, 
especially in relation to the experiments of the sixties and seventies, when a 
generation of composers, following the groundbreaking example of John Cage, 
expanded the limits of music as much as possible. What is really different however, 
with a piece like Gorecki's Symphony No 3, cannot be found in the music sheets 
alone, but in the kind of rapport the work builds with its audience. Music, like all 
arts, can be seen as a language that communicates ideas, feelings, or even things that 
cannot be described in words, but like any language, it can be broken down to reveal 
its grammar and syntax,. Going beyond conventional semiotic analysis however, we 
have to include all stages of communication in this examination, instead of trying to 
decipher a message with a specific content that is not affected by the conditions and 
circumstances of its delivery. 
The death of the author had, in a way, become standard part of musical 
language after John Cage. Cage's music expresses a reaction to the centuries-old rift 
between the professional artist and the music connoisseur. The grammar and syntax 
of music was becoming increasingly more complex after the Middle Ages, and the 
study of music eventually became an intellectual affair, whereas most great 
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composers of the past had no formal guidelines to adhere to or rebel against (music 
theory in its present form is a much later concept), and their taste, rather than their 
education, was primarily shaping their work and their poetics. Cage can be seen as 
the last "intellectual" composer, as his work put into practice the idea of the death of 
the work of art. The Serialists, composers that represent the intellectual extent of 
modernism, had developed music into a structure whose "inner life" (a term used by 
Josiah Fisk, which will prove to be quite helpful in this analysis) was out of reach for 
most audiences. It is difficult even for musicians to follow the structure of Serialist 
works, and Cage put forth works with similar texture, but with no structure 
whatsoever, based on randomness instead of calculation, proving that "structure was 
always unheardable. And i f it was unheardable, then it was unnecessary."23 The work 
of art, like an ovpoftopoq, completed a full circle and began consuming itself. The 
artist, at the same time, attempted to distance himself from the work of art as much 
as possibly: 
Those involved with the composition of experimental music find ways 
and means to remove themselves from the activities of the sounds they 
make. Some employ chance operations derived from sources as ancient 
as the Chinese Book of Changes or as modern as tables of random 
numbers used also by physicists in research. Or, analogous to the 
Rorschach tests of psychology, the interpretation of imperfections in 
the paper upon which one is writing may provide a music free from 
one's memory and imagination.24 
Cage and his age were quite important, because they taught audiences to treat 
music as a texture without a specific message that had to be extracted. This is where 
we first encounter art with intentionally "no inner life". In his critical, deconstructive 
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crusade however, he could go no further and discover a new role for music, a new, 
different beginning after the death of the work of art. The next step, i f there would 
ever be one, had to build on the premise that music has nothing to say - at least 
nothing that could correspond to a verbal message or even a conscious thought - and 
that the structure of music would be the last thing the audience would be interested 
in. 
This is exactly what happened with the group of composers Fisk identifies as 
the representatives of the "New Simplicity" movement (Gorecki, Part, Tavener). The 
mystifying Symphony No 3 has no structure to talk about. This does not just mean 
that its structure is very simple, but that there is a deliberate attempt to keep the 
structure to such a simple level that it becomes virtually inaudible. The beat and the 
key are always clear; there are no spectacular chord changes, no surprising 
orchestrational effects. 
Fisk mentions two anecdotes that demonstrate the deliberately simple 
character of Gorecki's music.25 Gorecki could not make up his mind about a passage 
in his String Quartet No 1. He thought that the original passage was "too easy" and 
he replaced it with a new passage in which there was some thematic development 
instead of "mere repetition". Yet, after the Kronos Quartet had learned the new 
version, Gorecki decided that he preferred the original "repetition". This was seen by 
some critics as "a masterly change of mind", an intentional self-containment for the 
sake of formal simplicity. Fisk mentioned one more anecdote: 
Asked at a public forum about the form of one of his pieces, Gorecki 
turned cosmic. Saying 'What is form?' he went to the piano and played 
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a soft chord, let it die away, and delivered his Yoda-like clincher: 'That 
is a form' . 2 6 
Symphony No 3 starts with a simple pattern, played by the double basses, 
which is then repeated by other string instruments as a simple canon, at a higher 
pitch, for about 12 minutes. There is no development of the pattern however, no 
interaction among the instruments. Fisk, in his analysis of the symphony, 
distinguishes between the expectations of the "naive ear", the rhythmic and harmonic 
conventions, and the expectations of the "experienced ear", a series of breaks from 
the simple pattern that gives the piece its meaning.27 The expectations of the "naive 
ear" in a piece like Beethoven's Symphony No 5 are fulfilled by the continuity of the 
rhythmic pattern and the tonal harmony, whereas the "experienced ear" will 
recognize that the initial melody is somehow transformed. The development of a 
theme is, in traditional musical terms, a dialogue between the expectations of the 
audience and the answers provided by the piece. Little by little, the supporting 
("naive") structure changes so that the audience cannot tell how or when this change 
took place, and is thus engaged in an aural game, but the meaning of the piece is 
clearly stated. 
Let us pause for a moment and review the significance of "meaning" in 
something as abstract as music. One way to approach the ideas, feelings and symbols 
that a musical piece tries to convey, is to treat everything as information. From what 
we have discussed above, we may follow Leonard Meyer in his definition of 
meaning: 
Musical meaning arises when an antecedent situation, requiring an 
estimate of the probable modes of pattern continuation, produces 
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uncertainty about the temporal-tonal nature pattern of the expected 
28 
consequent. 
This can be compared to a scientific definition of information: 
Information is... a measure of one's freedom of choice in selecting a 
message. The greater this freedom of choice, and hence the greater the 
information, the greater is the uncertainty that the message actually is 
some particular one. Thus greater freedom of choice, greater 
uncertainty, greater information go hand in hand.29 
From this juxtaposition we see that both musical meaning and information 
use a field of uncertainty in order to be communicated. Serialism and atonality, 
similarly, developed as fields of great uncertainty, but the process of multiple 
probabilities can be traced at least as far back as the development of harmony and 
counterpoint in the late Middle Ages. Conversely, the spiritual "New Simplicity" 
proposes a sonic fundamentalism, a reduction of uncertainty to the necessary, and the 
only uncertainty we are left, with is the uncertainty one feels facing the sacred. No 
significant information is not to come from within the piece. Music is there only in 
order to bring one to a halt, or to use the expression of the Mexican medicine man in 
Carlos Castaneda's books, to "stop the internal dialogue" before an inward spiritual 
path. Even closer to the cultural roots of Tavener and Part is something written by an 
Orthodox Finn, that connects the religious music of the New Simplicity and 
traditional Christian prayer: "When you pray, you yourself must be silent... You 
yourself must be silent; let the prayer speak."30 
New Simplicity music seems to ignore the rules of the aural game of 
information, and to show little or no interest in the development of a theme. There is 
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very little information to be passed along, and even the information that is allowed is 
just enough so that the powerful note of silence is avoided, so that there can be 
language with no communication. The basic rules that constitute a musical form are 
followed, but the intent is not the same. Gorecki is not interested in sophisticated 
structures, and the only thing that changes as the symphony is played, is the texture 
of the sound, as more and different instruments enter what seems to be a sonic 
monologue. In this sense the New Simplicity owes a lot to Cage and his experiments. 
Both kinds of music refuse to communicate a message, but there is a conspicuous 
difference between them: there is virtually no dedicated audience that listens to 
Cage's intellectual experimentations for other than educational purposes, whereas 
Gorecki, Tavener, and Part have enjoyed an unexpected commercial success. 
Audiences were impressed by what they described as the "emotional content" of 
Symphony No 3, yet the emotion or any other feeling for that matter, is not to be 
found in the symphony itself Once more, we are reminded of Cage's 4 '33", four 
minutes and thirty-three seconds of silence, where the audience supposedly becomes 
aware of its own presence in the concert hall. The concept is similar, although Cage's 
intellectualism did not recognize that silence is a very powerful note, and his piece 
was, ultimately, not without a message. Gorecki, on the other hand, provides a basic 
structure and no development, so that the audience is not aware of the silence that it 
is really subjected to, and is, without realizing it, left to interact with the sole 
presence: the sonic experience. 
Similar formal analyses can be made for pieces like Part's Passio Domini 
Nostri Jesu Christi Secundum Joannem and Tavener's The Protecting Veil. Both 
those pieces, like Gorecki's Symphony No 3, have had immense commercial success, 
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yet as Fisk put it "what comes out of your CD player on 'Scan' is not much different 
from what comes out on 'Play'." 3 1 
What I attempted in the few previous pages is a brief description of the 
phenomenon of "New Simplicity" music. A formal analysis still cannot explain the 
response to this music. In order to penetrate the mystery further, we would need to 
extend our exploration of the phenomenon beyond the analysis of the form. 
Fisk points out that "it's hard to get very far into the New Simplicity without 
encountering religious aspects."32 Indeed, all three composers mentioned above share 
a strong religious character, although each of them maintains his individual approach 
to religion. Gorecki is also motivated by a feeling of (Polish) nationalism, but this is 
not identifiable in his music, which seems to adopt a universal character instead. As 
for Tavener and Part, their music seems to be written solely for religious purposes. 
Tavener, especially, has placed himself at the service of the Orthodox Christian 
Church as a composer. 
There is yet one more detail concerning the music of New Simplicity: In spite 
of innumerable references to "medieval monks, or Greek soldiers surrounded by 
Saracens"33 and the analyses the composers themselves sometimes offer (cf. 
Tavener's stress on the importance of Byzantine modes and its drones34) the 
character of the music seems to be, in many ways, much closer to New Age rather to 
veritable pre-Renaissance music. This may not be as evident in a textual analysis of 
the music itself, which could be formally similar in many ways to both medieval and 
New Age music, but in the part of music both the New and the New Simplicity value 
and depend on: the texture and quality of the sound. Of course, one could argue that 
the quality of sound was important for medieval music as well, but in spite of several 
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medieval sources that comment on the sound of the voices of the singers for instance, 
we cannot have a clear idea about what was the sound perception of the time, or what 
was the importance of the sound texture. Very often we can observe huge differences 
in matters of sound quality and interpretation within only one generation, something 
we can realize only now, with the help of mechanical reproduction. The music is the 
same, the directions to the musicians or the actors may be similar, yet no 
contemporary singer wants to sound like Maria Callas, and no contemporary actor 
wants to play like Sarah Bernard. How can we comment on the sound quality of 
medieval hymns? It is much safer to say that there could be a similarity between the 
medieval and the contemporary perception of sound quality, but that would be rather 
coincidental, whereas there is more reasonable evidence to identify the similarities 
between the New Simplicity and the New Age. Furthermore, we do not have any 
evidence that the texture and the quality of the sound in medieval music was as great 
an issue as it is for the New Simplicity; today there is something to differentiate the 
desired quality of sound form, popular music or traditional classical, and the New 
Simplicity, as well as the New Age, has made it a point to compare itself with the 
i: 
other kinds of music on the level of the sound, and produce a sound which will stand 
out in comparison to the norm. Part's Passio and the thick sound produced by voices 
that move together in the same rhythm, ignoring contrapuntal development 
altogether, and the ambient music of Brian Eno, for instance, sacrifice their "inner 
life", the outdated message of the artist-creator, in favour of a particular sonic 
environment, to recall McLuhan's famous observation, "the medium is the message". 
Arvo Part has coined an interesting term to describe the clarity and simplicity of his 
style after the mid-seventies: "tintinnabuli", from the Latin for bells, and 
"tintinnabulation": 
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Tintinnabulation is an area I sometimes wander into when I am 
searching for answers - in my life, in my music, in my work... the 
complex and many-faceted only confuses me and I must search for 
unity... everything that is unimportant falls away. Tintinnabulation is 
like this. Here I am alone with silence. I have discovered that it is 
enough when a single note is beautifully played. This note, or a silent 
beat, or a moment of silence comfort me. 
An additional reason to claim that the New Simplicity is closer to the New 
Age than to veritable medieval culture, is that certain cultural and spiritual choices of 
the representatives of the new classical trend, a certain cultural flexibility, would not 
be as possible in the Middle Ages. What we see with people as John Tavener or Ivan 
Moody, is that they chose the culture and the tradition they want to be aligned with, 
which would not be so easy in the past. Although one can argue that Tavener's 
Congregational background shares a common theo-mythological heritage with 
Eastern Orthodoxy, and i f a Protestant were to reject the development of his spiritual 
tradition in the last milleriium or so, he would find himself in great spiritual 
proximity with Orthodpxy, it is more reasonable to see such a choice within the 
framework of a spiritual mobility, a result of the relatively recent quest of the 
spiritual within Western culture, that was evident at least since the sixties. It would 
be unthinkable for a medieval monk to "choose" his spiritual tradition, but the New 
Age, on the other hand, has provided a spiritual pastiche consisting of things as 
diverse as holistic environmentalism, a revival of Gnostic and Mystical beliefs, wide 
acceptance of the law of karma and reincarnation, as well as a revival of traditional 
religions, a general syncretism of Western, native American, Eastern and Oriental 
ideas, all of which can be accepted pantheistically, separately, or in various 
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combinations. Within this framework a conversion such as Tavener's would be 
among the least shocking ones. That should not be taken as a criticism to what can be 
a genuine conversion, a discovery of spiritual meaning in one's life, regardless of 
whether one chooses to leave one's given religion, but certainly this possibility, one 
of the most interesting ways the West can discover the East, was provided to a great 
degree by the New Age. 
Still, there is a great difference between the "pop" and the "classical" 
versions of New Simplicity (the mainstream New Age and the New Classical), but 
this difference has little to do with form and traditional semiotics. The only account 
we may have for the success of such "boring" pieces of music as the classical New 
Simplicity pieces (genuine New Age is also repetitive, but intentionally relaxing and 
pleasing to the ear) is their religious orientation and atmosphere. The "New Pop", i f 
we are allowed the expression, is based on pleasure, whereas the "New Classical" is 
based on the return of the sacred, generally speaking, of course. 
As far as the artists themselves are concerned, this entire quest as to why 
certain kinds of art are successful and what is the relationship of the New Pop with 
the New Classical is, to say the least, irrelevant. John Tavener writes about the artist 
who decides to work within a sacred tradition: 
For an artist to work in a sacred tradition he must first believe in the 
divine realities which inform that particular tradition. This is a sine qua 
non: not, of course, a guarantee for great art, but a sine qua non. 
Secondly, he must know the traditions of the art he works in. He must 
know the tools, so that he can work with material that is primordial, and 
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therefore not his; not his expression, but the tradition working through 
him. 3 6 
Against all the observations discussed above on the nature of the music of 
New Simplicity and the formal kinship to the New Age, Tavener claims that sacred 
music of any age should not sound very differently. 3 7 In a sense he is right, the form 
and the instruments may change, the tacit conventions may change, but what 
ultimately differentiates the sacred from the profane is always the same. 
Nevertheless, Tavener is in a loss for words when it comes to describing this 
difference in mundane terms: "What makes a great icon? I believe that it is the Holy 
Spirit working through the painter. I can say no more. It is a mystery."38 
This deserves a pause in our examination. To deny the effect of the Holy 
Spirit in sacred art is to deny the sacred character of this art. The sacred is not a 
question of style, or a recipe for commercial success. I f we proceed further in the 
examination of the thought of the religious artist, we have to keep in mind that "our" 
reality, judged by the cold, scientific gaze of the academic who cannot accept a 
conjecture without sufficient evidence and proof, may not be the only possible one, it 
may even not be the "higher" or "real" one. Placing a modicum of faith in scientific 
research however, we have to accept that the exploration of the numinous and those 
who serve it may offer an understanding or a relative insight to the ways the Holy 
Spirit works among humans, an understanding of the way mundane reality is 
transformed into sacred. 
To return to Tavener's comment, regardless of whether we take the effect of 
the Holy Spirit into account or not, we see that the artist himself puts it beyond him 
to understand intellectually what motivates him as an artist, and what, ultimately, 
The Religious Artist 246 
makes his art great. This is a break from the modernist past, and a good example for 
what was discussed in The Death of Art concerning the transformation (or 
absorption) of the opposition between the world and the earth into the opposition 
between the sacred and the profane. Post-medieval art, which was largely based on 
rational concepts as to what art is, completed its trajectory by nullifying reason and 
calculation (as a principle) within art. This means that the artist cannot use his art in 
order to illuminate the enigmatic earth, because the basis of that which used to 
unconceal the truth brought forth by the earth is no longer of any use to art. The artist 
of the sacred, on the other hand, leaves his technical preparation, his education, ideas 
and formal frameworks, outside the creative process, and abandons himself to the 
hands of God. 
Of course, with reason out of the way things do not get easier, rather the 
opposite. The artist has to employ a different guide in his exploration, and, like the 
iconographers who fasted and prayed before and during their work, he has to connect 
the materials of his art to the religious archetypes that exist in the unconscious. 
It is unfortunate, from one point of view, but certainly understandable, that 
the artists themselves cannot always interpret their work satisfactorily, in a way that 
would explain its success or its groundbreaking innovations. Very often one could 
suspect that the innovations identified by the artists, which are usually supposed to 
be imperceptible to the audience, are not perceived by the artists either. When 
Tavener considered the application of iconography to contemporary music, he was 
speaking of the sacred "tones" or modes of the Orthodox Church and the power of 
the ison (drone, "eternity note"), but we can be sure that most of Tavener's audience, 
including many musicians, cannot recognize the Byzantine modes at all. Moreover, 
Tavener has often used techniques reminiscent of Cage's random structure, which 
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can certainly not be recognized by any audience. In works as To a Child Dancing in 
the Wind, Icon of Light, Orthodox Vigil Service, he employs a technique colloquially 
known as the "magic square" or (as Tavener, rather mistakenly, calls it) a "Byzantine 
palindrome". Based on an ancient Latin palindrome (SATOR AREPO TENET 
OPERA ROTAS), one can start with five notes (arbitrarily corresponding to the 
letters S, A, T, O, R) and develop a twenty-five note musical palindrome.39 It has to 
be admitted that a twenty-five note palindrome is inaudible as such; the use of such 
an ancient tool may have its effect on the artist, who is trying to distance himself 
from the composition of the music, not for the same reasons as the modernists and 
the Cage school did, but in order for the ego of the artist to withdraw, and let the self 
be blessed by the creative force of the Holy Spirit. It should be noted here that the 
palindrome as a technique is reminiscent of the serialists (Boulez, Babit) and the 
twelve-tone composers (Schonberg, Berg, Webern) rather than of the Cage school, 
but it is hard now to separate such techniques from the pursuit of randomness and the 
critique of intellectualist structure the Cage school attached to them. 
The music of New Simplicity composers uses next to rudimentary musical 
theory, and even the use of the Byzantine modes is rather liberal, and does not 
demonstrate great formal discipline. As we have seen already, the quality of the 
sound is far more important than the notes themselves. Ivan Moody, a Byzantine 
scholar as well as composer in the style of New Simplicity, has drawn an analogy 
between medieval icons and contemporary sacred music. In his article The Mind and 
the Heart: Mysticism and Music in the Experience of Contemporary Eastern 
Orthodox Composers*0 he treats both of them as mystical expressions. Rather 
boldly, but perhaps illuminating the kinship of medieval and contemporary art more 
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satisfactorily than other composers talking about their work, he identifies some 
techniques or devices common to contemporary music and to iconography: 
Part's treatment of the text [of Passio] is deliberately 'cold', that is to 
say, his word setting is like that of the most syllabic kind of Gregorian 
chant, and therefore on the surface 'inexpressive'. Such austerity leads 
to a different form of listening and, as one must suppose was the 
composer's intention, to the contemplation of higher things. In this one 
may find a parallel with the deliberately flat, geometrical style of icon 
painting... Time is suspended, and that is another important element of 
mysticism. In an icon there is no perspective, that is to say, it is not 
situated in reality. Similarly mystical music must suspend real time in 
order to create its own 'two-dimensional' level into whose 
metaphysical simplification the initiate may enter in order to 
understand the multi-dimensional mystery thus presented.41 
Furthermore, Moody differentiates strongly between minimalism and the 
repetition as used by his contemporary composers of the sacred. Minimalism, Moody 
argues, does not share the mystical aspirations of the New Simplicity. Indeed, 
minimalism has an intellectual, rather than spiritual, aura about it, with its repetitions 
being the statements of "minimal change", and was, ultimately, very much interested 
in form and structure. Moody, on the other hand, is interested in the ways music can 
be a vehicle for mysticism, in a way similar to iconography. As such, music is not 
directed towards the mind or the heart alone, but towards their unity, "the mind going 
into the heart, so that you pray no longer with the mind - Orthodox monks incline 
their heads towards their hearts when they pray. That interests me."4 2 
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Interestingly, the unity and opposition of the mind and the heart that interests 
contemporary composers so much, seems to correspond to many other oppositions 
that explain the existence of art. This is yet another conception of art as coincidentia 
oppositorum. The religious connotations however, are particularly remarkable, for 
two reasons: first, because they corroborate the earlier observations (The Death of 
Art) about the transformation of the "worldly" opposition (the world and the earth) 
into a "sacred" one (the sacred and the profane). What is more interesting however, 
is that the work of art has been finally seen as secondary to what it is inspired by. 
Tavener meditates on the icon, which is "beyond art, because it plunges us straight 
into liturgical time and sacred history,"43 and Moody goes even further when he 
writes that "we must be 'used' by theology, 'used' by tradition... The mission of the 
sacred artist in the contemporary world is the effecting of a re-entrance into sacred 
tradition. Such an artist is concerned with the sacramental as opposed to the 
aesthetic, even when it is the case that he has to work 'in the world', outside the 
framework of the Church; when his art has to become 'paraliturgical'."44 
Something more about this function of religious art is expressed by Tavener's 
comments on the concept of the temenos. Tavener sees the role of art as something 
that can connect us to our primordial origins - not unlike religion. The "primordial 
consciousness that lies dormant in all of us"4 5 can be addressed by sacred art, 
although its return is, essentially, a religious event. Both Tavener and Moody see a 
connection between this return and the concept of gnosis, the mystical knowledge of 
the paradise lost. A serious problem with contemporary society, which has been 
discussed in many places in this study, is the disassociation of the inner self and 
social reality, although, as Tavener argues repeatedly, true gnosis has been 
maintained in the tradition of the Church. The primordial sacred gnosis as far as the 
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whole of society is concerned however, has been replaced by "an insane, 
technological, psychological, intellectual culture."46 
A sign of the secularization of what used to be a world organized according 
to sacred principles, which is immediately relevant to this discussion, is the elevation 
of art to the status of religion in contemporary society. A major gallery or museum 
has all the signs of a great shrine: we lower our voices when we enter, we 
contemplate the exhibits in admiration and silence, and we generally employ a 
different kind of attention when faced with the exhibits, even i f they do not differ 
significantly from the reproductions we have at home (besides, it is not unusual for 
museums to exhibit reproductions of unique or fragile artifacts). The space of art is 
sacred, and appropriate rules of conduct that, presumably, surpass the rules of civic 
politeness, can be found in the art gallery and the museum, the opera house and the 
concert hall, the ballet, and the theatre. This is perhaps best expressed in a passage 
from Andre Malraux's The Voices of Silence: 
The gestures we make when holding pictures we admire (not only 
masterpieces) are those befitting precious objects; but also, let us not 
forget, objects claiming veneration. Once a mere collection, the art 
museum is by way of becoming a sort of shrine, the only one of the 
modern age; the man who looks at an Annunciation in the National 
Gallery of Washington is moved by it no less profoundly than the man 
who sees it in an Italian church. True, a Braque still-life is not a sacred 
object; nevertheless, though not a Byzantine miniature, it, too, belongs 
to another world and is hallowed by its association with a vague deity 
known as Art, as the miniature was hallowed by its association with 
Christ Pantocrator. 
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In this context the religious vocabulary may jar on us; but unhappily we 
have no other. Though this art is not a god but an absolute, it has, like a 
god, its fanatics and its martyrs and is far f r o m being an abstraction. 4 7 
The "ray o f hope" for Tavener against this secularization o f the world and the 
replacement o f religion by art, is that eternal truth has been forgotten but not lost; the 
connection to our primordial origins can still be repaired. The sacred space, the 
temenos o f the present, has been taken over by secular art, but sacred art can reclaim 
its temenos. Tavener thinks that it serves the spiritual work o f the Church when the 
temenos is moved back to the cathedrals and the churches. This does not mean "to 
popularize, but to allow sacred art to breathe gently on the ancient stones... Let the 
great medieval cathedrals o f England be used to breathe back the medieval thought 
or gnosis that formed them." 4 8 
A l l this is especially important from the point o f view o f the death o f art. The 
need for a transcendence o f the work o f art was recognized and realized by 
contemporary artists who, ultimately, see the structural center o f their art to be 
beyond art, even beyond mundane reality. I n that sense we are reminded o f the 
coincidence o f the birth o f art during the fall o f the angels, according to the book of 
Enoch, and the end o f art in the Apocalypse, just before the marriage o f the Lamb 
and the Woman. Both ends o f this trajectory are outside the history o f the conscious, 
but the aim o f religion is to take us f rom the one end to the other, from the Fall to 
Redemption, and it is in this capacity that art, which once was a symbol o f the human 
ego (and, for that reason, a symbol o f man's self-consciousness and self-exploration, 
as well), becomes a spiritual tool. As John Tavener put it: 
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I am neither philosopher nor theologian, but my work - my work o f 
repentance that may or may not lead me towards a sacred act - can only 
be judged on how near the music that I write comes to its primordial 
origins. This, I have come to see and believe, is my task. This is my 
work within the area from which I must continue to dig and labour, to 
try and f ind again something o f the immeasurable magnificence, 
simplicity, and magisterial beauty and power that emanates f rom God, 
Who is the Source o f Everything. 4 9 
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Conclusion 
This study attempted to bring together a number o f ideas and problems from 
various parts o f the academic spectrum. The first chapter (A Religious View of the 
History of the Arts) examined two different kinds o f relationship between art and 
religion, and the way they developed f rom Jewish art and Greek tragedy to the 
Byzantine icon and the medieval Cathedral. An effort was made to connect the 
development o f art to a number o f theological ideas that could interpret it from a 
theological and psychological point o f view. 
The second chapter {Anti-Leonardo) focused more closely on some basic 
religious and social issues that are indicative o f the advancement o f the Renaissance 
paradigm, and showed how much art accompanied or preceded them. In that, we saw 
how much art since the Renaissance is interwoven with the social and religious 
framework o f the post-medieval West. 
I n The Death of Art we discussed some o f the ideas that describe the 
withdrawal o f the Renaissance paradigm, and its extension to modernism. Again 
here, we saw how much the practice o f art is inseparable from the profound issues 
that define our culture, spiritually, philosophically and sociologically. Furthermore, 
the emergence o f a paradigm where religion has a more central role, with similarities 
with, but also differences from the medieval world, was briefly discussed. 
Finally, in The Religious Artist we examined contemporary religious art, 
some o f its problems and some o f the views o f its representatives. As it has been 
mentioned in several places, what elevates this kind of art into a far-reaching 
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sociological phenomenon is not only its penetrative scope and the review o f artistic 
problems that have been with us since the Middle Ages, but also its great commercial 
impact, including a wide popular acceptance, something quite unusual for classical 
art. 
What are we left wi th at the end o f this study? We began with a general 
question and a hypothesis: -What lies at the end o f formal art history, which we are 
experiencing at the age o f postmodernity? -The death o f art as we know it, and its 
reincarnation as a spiritual practice. 
We have to admit that this question and the proposed hypothesis can be 
pursued f r o m many more different angles, in the fields o f art criticism, philosophy, 
sociology and theology. I t is not possible to exhaust this issue in a single study, on 
the contrary, it could become a source for a lifetime o f research. Nevertheless, there 
should be enough in the present study to substantiate the death o f art and the spiritual 
revival connected with it as a valid hypothesis, especially f rom the perspective o f 
theology and psychology. Following the example o f Carl Gustav Jung, who 
maintained that the object o f psychology is not essentially different f rom the object 
o f religion, I have allowed for theological thought to be heavily informed by 
psychological observation/This is especially evident in the first chapter (A Religious 
View of the History of the Arts), where the metaphor o f the mirror, as it appears in the 
writings o f Lacan, became a key concept for the theological interpretation o f 
Christian art and, ultimately, the yardstick for a comparison between Eastern and 
Western art. 
The metaphor I think illustrates an even stronger connection among theology, 
psychology and art criticism however, is expressed in the observation o f the birth and 
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the death o f the arts in the first and the last book o f the Christian Bible, the book o f 
Genesis and the book o f the Apocalypse, discussed in the beginning o f A Religious 
View of the History of the Arts. It is this metaphor I think, that more than any other 
shows the extent o f the identification o f art with civilization, and at the same time 
views the withdrawal o f art as a step forward in our spiritual evolution. 
This should not be taken as a fundamentalist view that would attempt to 
discredit art and diminish its importance. Quite the contrary, according to this 
biblical connection o f the fate o f humanity and the arts, i t seems that art is essential 
for our life outside Paradise, in the same way religion is. Religion, as well, has no 
reason o f existence at the beginning or at the end; it is obsolete when man has a 
direct relationship wi th God. 
Still, the present hypothesis o f the death o f art cannot be taken as an 
imminent prediction o f the end o f civilization or the end o f religion. Obviously there 
are many levels o f death, or withdrawal o f art. Besides, according to the views that 
have been put forth in this study, the condition we are about to witness, when the 
death o f the author and the death o f the work o f art become complete, would be a 
reprise o f only the medieval art paradigm, an "undoing" o f Renaissance so to speak. 
I t has to be noted, however, that this "undoing" cannot deny the value o f the last five 
centuries, and in that sense it is not possible to return to the medieval world. The end 
is not the same as the beginning. The kind of criticism, however, that plays a role in 
what we observe as the death o f art, has been directed almost exclusively at the 
Renaissance paradigm. Yet, according to the view that holds the phenomenon of art, 
as well as religion, to be consequences o f the Fall, and obsolete in the pleroma o f 
time, it is possible to experience many other levels o f death o f art in the future, until 
we render symbolic thought and language obsolete, and until we see God "face to 
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face", and not "enigmatically through a mirror", something that would coincide with 
a complete annihilation o f art. 
I t is important to note however, that at least we can register this mechanism 
now, and we can visualize its end. In a sense this is not an entirely new concept in 
the history o f philosophy. As we saw in The Death of Art, perhaps the earliest 
references to the idea o f the death o f art in the way it was examined here within 
Western philosophy, can be found in the philosophy o f Hegel, but it is possible to 
locate such ideas in even older philosophical traditions. The concepts o f "death of 
art" or "death o f wri t ing" or "death o f thought", accompanied by the respective 
spiritual rebirth signified by each "death", with an ultimate point perhaps being the 
"death o f existence", meaning from a theistic point o f view the end o f separate 
existence o f man away from God, and his return to Paradise, sound very similar to 
the ideas o f the Neoplatonists. The emarpocpri o f Plotinus is such a concept shared, 
albeit wi th differences, by pagan and Christian philosophers such as Origen, Proclus 
and pseudo-Dionysios the Areopagite. 
The concept o f S7iiorpo(pf| was preserved within Christian tradition, and this 
is probably one reason why the phenomenon o f "death" could f i t so easily within the 
framework o f religious tradition. For people like John Tavener, for instance, there are 
no negative connotations in what we described as "death o f art", as we saw. What 
was important for Tavener was the return o f the temenos and the re-sacralization o f 
art. The shift between the r i f t o f the world and the earth as it appears in the 
philosophy o f Heidegger, and the r i f t between the sacred and the profane as they 
appear in the writings o f Eliade, was o f no concern to traditional religious art, which 
had never accepted the metaphysics o f modernity. A kind o f coincidence between the 
way art was developing and traditional spirituality (although, as we saw in The 
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Religious Artist, contemporary spirituality in art owes a lot to the New Age as well), 
allowed people like Tavener, Moody and Part to express both worlds at the same 
time, or, in other words, to witness the emcrrpocpfi o f art to its medieval spiritual level 
- keeping in mind that in Christian thought as it is found in Fathers o f the Church 
such as Maximus the Confessor, the end o f such a trajectory cannot be exactly the 
same as its beginning. 
From everything we have seen in this analysis, it seems that a study o f the 
development o f art is a study on the development o f consciousness, i f this concept 
could include the conscious as well as the unconscious part o f the self. Art is always 
defined by a paradoxical dichotomy, the world and the earth, the sacred and the 
profane, the I and the Other. The evolution o f art marks the evolution o f the 
coincidentiae oppositorum as it is understood and experienced personally and 
collectively. Ar t draws from the known and the unknown (or the suspected) at the 
same time, and it translates the ineffable mystery into direct experience, the same 
kind o f inexplicable experience one has in front o f a great work o f art. I t is precisely 
this capacity o f art, which in Nietzschean terms anticipates the next step, as we saw 
in The Religious Artist, ,or accommodates the presence o f the divine, as we saw in A 
Religious View of the History of the Arts, that makes it an exceptional vehicle for the 
dichotomies o f the human fate, regardless o f whether they are measured in terms o f 
social or spiritual progress. I t remains to be seen how the evolution o f consciousness 
described by the event we registered as "the death o f art" w i l l be manifested in the 
years to come. 
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